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“It’s not the sort of job that you do in halves.  You have got to live for it, 
love it. No one does it just for the money. It’s not like working in an office 
and really hating it ‘cause you have to stick at it. You have got to be in to it 
‘cause it’s not your average job. Part of it is seeing the fish, big hauls of 
fish…. but the fun of the job is the unknown.  
They call us the last of the hunters,  
we go out here and we can’t see our prey,  
we are hunting it down.” 
(Cornish skipper, May 2008) 
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Abstract 
The links between the behaviour of fishers, the marine environment and fisheries 
management institutions are poorly understood.  There is a widespread lack of compliance 
with fisheries management, and fisheries policy has failed to develop the ability to understand 
and anticipate fisher behaviour in advance of regulations, or learn how to shape individual 
behaviour in ways that promote societal management goals.   An in-depth understanding of 
fisher decision-making is required to design appropriate incentives to improve the ecosystem 
functioning, the efficiency and profitability of fishing enterprises, and improve the well being 
of fishing communities.   
 
This thesis attempts to help redress the imbalance between understanding the resource itself 
and the resource users.  It adds to our understanding of the complexity of individual fisher and 
fishing fleet behaviour by challenging the standard models used to understand behaviour.  It 
examines the behavioural economics of fishers as well as the psychological, cultural and social 
determinants of individual behaviour.  An interdisciplinary methodology was used to unveil the 
heterogeneity of fisher behaviour as well as the patterns of fisher decision making.   
 
Specifically, this thesis presents a comprehensive review of the literature, synthesising and 
summarising the approaches used to understand fisher decision making, with particular 
reference to location choice behaviour.  It goes beyond a review of existing approaches by 
drawing on theory from disciplines outside fisheries research and formed the foundations of 
the methodology used for understanding fisher decision making in the southwest of England.  
In examination of individual behaviour, four typologies of fishers’ strategic behaviour are 
identified using a framework drawn from the strategic management literature.  A random 
utility model of location choice behaviour is presented and shows that southwest beam 
trawlers trade-off economic returns with knowledge transfer within the fleet and risk-aversion 
tactics.  The acute fuel-price shock in 2008 provided the opportunity to examine the ability of, 
and barriers to, fishing enterprises and fishing communities adapting under changing and 
uncertain conditions.  Increasing costs combined with strong market constraints on ex-vessel 
fish prices has resulted in lowered profitability for fishers which may have negative 
consequences for the sustainability and resilience of southwest English fishing fleets and 
fishing communities.    
 
This thesis shows that understanding aggregate fisher incentives can be achieved using an 
interdisciplinary approach and could enrich the design of fisheries governance systems for 
social-ecological sustainability and promotion of healthy fishing communities. 
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Introduction 
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1. The fisheries management dilemma 
Marine fish stocks are in decline on a global scale (Pauly et al., 2002, Pauly et al., 2005, FAO, 
2008), the biomass of higher trophic-level species (i.e. the fish humans prefer to eat) in the sea 
is diminishing (Christensen et al., 2003), and several fish populations may be threatened with 
ecological or commercial collapse, and local, regional or global extinction (Cook et al., 1997, 
Dulvy et al., 2003, Dulvy et al., 2006).  The Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations reports that globally, 28% of stocks are considered to be overexploited (19%), 
depleted or recovering from depletion (9%), 52% are fully exploited, and 20% moderately or 
underexploited (FAO, 2008).  An ecological study of ocean ecosystem services published in 
Science predicted the collapse of all the world’s wild stocks by 2048, and received great 
publicity (Worm et al., 2006). While this prediction and other papers that document global 
fishery declines have widely been considered to be alarmist, (Walters, 2003, Hampton et al., 
2005, Essington et al., 2006, Polacheck, 2006, Hilborn, 2007b), there is scientific consensus 
that many of the world’s fisheries are overexploited and over fishing is a serious problem 
(Worm et al., 2009).  The degree of overfishing varies widely between and within geographic 
areas, but where it exists ecological resilience is compromised (Botsford et al., 1997).  This 
translates directly into economic losses. 
 
Fisheries management systems need to be addressed.  It is generally recognised that the 
future of sustainable fisheries requires less fishing effort and larger fish stocks, a reduction in 
by-catch (unintentionally caught species) and removal of damaging fishing practices, and a 
strengthening of governance systems.  It is suggested within the fisheries science community 
that there is a need to move away from legislation designed to extract the maximum 
sustainable yield (MSY) from fisheries (where fishing capacity is matched to the productive 
capacity of the resource), or hold back fish stocks from tipping over Blim (the biomass limit 
reference point beyond which stocks are likely to suffer a reduction in reproductive capacity).  
Instead, appropriate incentives to reduce fishing pressure and increase stocks, improve 
stability and profitability for fishers and improve governance should be implemented (Hilborn 
et al., 2003, Hilborn et al., 2005, Hilborn, 2007b).   
 
We have a good understanding of why fisheries have declined.  It is primarily due to fisheries 
management failing to set appropriate goals and achieve them, or lack of regulation (Peterman 
and M'Gonigle, 1992, Peterman, 2004).  For example, European fisheries are governed by the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which was originally designed in 1983 to promote growth, 
increase income and stability for fishers, while minimising conflict.  The CFP did not aim to 
reflect the complexity of the ecosystem and its services required to promote sustainability, 
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instead fisheries policies were designed to subsidise the fishing industry (Symes, 1997, Jensen, 
1999, Hanna, 2001). Similar to other fisheries around the world, lack of appropriate 
management goals in the past and lack of regulation lead to overcapacity within fleets and 
overexploitation of marine resources (Holden, 1994, Daw and Gray, 2005).  Overcapacity has 
been attributed to the ‘race for fish’ which can develop in open access or shared resource 
fisheries, where users have no rights over the resource and thus incentives are created which 
emphasise short term gains and few incentives for long term stewardship (Gordon, 1954).  
Over the years technological creep and subsidised costs have also allowed vessels to 
successfully exploit new fishing grounds further from shore and in deeper waters and have 
expanded seafood markets (Morato et al., 2006, World Bank and Food and Agricultural 
Organisation, 2008).  Habitats have been destroyed as a result of damaging fishing practices 
(Jennings et al., 2001, Hiddink et al., 2006, Kaiser et al., 2006); and there is evidence of a 
negative disruption to the balance of the ecosystem through exploitation, by-catch and 
discards (unwanted catch thrown away) (Goni, 1998) which further contribute to fishery 
declines.   
 
In industrialised countries, fisheries policies have tended to use top-down management 
approaches to achieve MSY or Blim. Input controls restrict access to marine resources through 
vessel licenses, restrictions on vessel capacity, or seasons and areas closed to fishing. Technical 
measures such as fishing gear restrictions and prohibition limit the efficiency or selectivity of 
fishing gears. Output controls regulate catch directly through devices such as total allowable 
catches (TACs) and limits on by-catch proportions.  However, imposed input, technical and 
output control measures have a high failure rate for a number of reasons.  Firstly, these 
measures on their own are not able to readily adapt to the short-term and unpredictable 
variability in the trends of fish stocks (Wilson et al., 1994).  The complex behaviour of fish 
stocks and ecosystem interactions has led to insufficiencies of ecological information on which 
management is based.  Also, the management institution often lacks adaptability and 
resilience to change under uncertainty (Berkes and Folke, 1998). Complicated regulations and 
the information requirements contribute to lack of legitimacy of fisheries policy among fishers 
which causes problems of compliance and result in high management costs (Raakjaer Neilsen, 
2003). 
 
The failure of traditional management measures has led many to propose an ecosystem based 
approach to fisheries (EAF) which gives weight to integrated management and emphasises the 
importance of maintaining whole ecosystem health through addressing fishery-ecosystem 
interactions  (FAO, 2003, Garcia and Cochrane, 2005).  A key component of the EAF is to 
19 
 
protect key habitats that are critical for ecosystem processes through marine reserves and no-
fishing areas (FAO, 2003, Pikitch et al., 2004).  The EAF is a step in the right direction, shifting 
away from target species fisheries management to ecosystem management.  Although 
theoretically it incorporates the human dimension, in practice it tends to overlook the 
importance of fisher behaviour and creating the right incentives for fishers to achieve 
ecological and environmental sustainability recommended by a growing number of fisheries 
economists and social scientists contributing to the fisheries management debate (Grafton et 
al., 2006).  Hilborn (2007b) examined the successful fisheries from which management lessons 
can be learned and applied, and found that when there was good governance and appropriate 
incentives for fishing fleets, management was more likely to succeed.    
 
Rights based measures - giving fishers long term secure harvesting or territorial rights that are 
legally enforceable - are considered key by advocates of incentive based approaches 
(Hannesson, 2004, Grafton et al., 2006). Allowing fishers to exclude others from fishing 
provides fishers with two incentives, they protect the value of their assets and encourage the 
greatest possible sustainable flow from fishing because they suffer by overexploiting and gain 
through conserving. The types of rights based measures that are being used in fisheries 
management are individual harvesting rights such as individual transferable quotas (ITQs).  
Rather than setting industry wide quotas, fishers are allocated individual and trade-able fishing 
rights, conferring stewardship incentives, and have been shown to improve the economic 
performance of the fishery (although the ecological links are more tenuous) (Squires et al., 
1995, Costello et al., 2008).  Group rights, encourages collective action through community-
based co-management of their own fisheries. That is, fishers have a significant decision-making 
role and help in the design of regulations that are more flexible, adaptable, and appropriate to 
their specific situations compared to generic regulations determined by centralised agencies 
(Pinkerton, 1989, Jentoft et al., 1998). Territorial user rights (TURFs) are areas of exclusive 
access to fishing allocated to a group of resource users which they then manage between 
them.  Given their defensive nature, fishing capacity is limited, and newcomers are 
discouraged.  ‘Sole ownership’ improves efficiency, prevents damaging practice and has also 
been shown to improve wellbeing of fishing communities (Christy, 1992).   
 
Thus, fisheries science and management appears to have a sound knowledge of what is wrong 
with fisheries and understand the limitations of different management actions.  It also has a 
set of remedies that have been shown to work if adapted in the appropriate way.  There is 
increasing fisher participation in management, and greater efforts to incorporate their views 
and incentives in the setting of regulations.  Yet fisheries management still often fails.   
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There is still widespread lack of compliance and fisheries management has failed to develop 
the ability to understand and anticipate fisher behaviour in advance of regulations, or learn 
how to shape behaviour in ways that promote management goals.  The links between the 
behaviour of the resource users, the marine environment and institutions created by fisheries 
management are poorly understood (Hanna, 2001).  Regulations continue to be developed 
without taking account of the human systems through which they are implemented.  As a 
result of poor understanding of human motivation, response and adaptation, there is still a 
large element of surprise in marine ecosystem management (Hilborn and Walters, 1992, 
Hanna, 2001, Wilen et al., 2002, Hilborn, 2007a).  Almost ten years ago Hanna (2001) identified 
five high priority research questions that are critical to the management of the human-
ecological interface in marine fisheries, requiring consideration of both ecological and human 
dynamics. Hanna (2001) suggested that an interdisciplinary approach encompassing the 
spectrum of behavioural sciences (anthropology, economics, geography, political science, 
psychology and sociology) is required to address these questions: 
 
1. What systems of incentives will work best to promote human behaviour consonant with 
the multiple objectives for sustainable ecosystems? What options do markets offer that 
can help management to meet its goals? How has history influenced the current choice of 
incentives? 
2. How can feedback among resource managers, user groups, public owners, and ecological 
systems be strengthened? How can improvements in scientific literacy contribute to this 
integration of information? 
3. How can management and ecological scales be reconciled? What are the strengths and 
weaknesses of alternate management approaches? 
4.  Which performance indicators can be used to adequately represent the socioeconomic 
and biophysical components of natural resource systems? How can management resilience 
be measured and monitored? 
5. How can the design of management be improved to promote effective ecological, 
economic, and social function in the face of discontinuous change? How do management 
structures and processes affect the cost and effectiveness of programs and policies? 
  
Fundamental for answering these pertinent questions is an in-depth understanding of fisher 
behaviour so that managers can design appropriate incentives to improve the ecosystem 
functioning, the efficiency and profitability of fishing enterprises, and improve the well being 
of fishing communities.  Understanding fisher behaviour and fishing strategies will improve 
predictions of how fishers respond to management action and how fishers will respond under 
uncertain and changing conditions such as climate change and market shifts.  Inclusion of the 
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dynamics of the resource users and their fishing communities in the policy design process will 
also have positive implications for compliance with regulation because of improved legitimacy 
among fishing groups. 
 
This thesis attempts to help readdress the imbalance between understanding the resource 
itself and the resource users.  It adds to our understanding of the complexity of individual 
fisher and fishing fleet behaviour, by challenging the standard models used to understand 
behaviour, examining the behavioural economics of fishers as well as the psychological 
(personality), cultural and social determinants of individual behaviour.  I have used an 
interdisciplinary methodology and theory from a range of disciplines outside fisheries science 
to uncover the heterogeneity as well as the patterns of fisher decision making.  This thesis 
shows that understanding aggregate fisher incentives has the potential to enrich the design of 
fisheries governance systems for social-ecological sustainability and for fishing community 
resilience. 
 
2. Thesis outline  
The five principal chapters of the thesis (Chapters 2 to 6) are written in the form of peer-
reviewed papers. One paper was published at the time of submission (Chapter 5).  Chapter 2 
presents a comprehensive review of the literature, synthesising and summarising the 
approaches used to understand fisher decision making, with particular reference to location 
choice behaviour.  Models of location choice behaviour dominate the literature and 
interdisciplinary methods are argued to improve economic modelling approaches.  Sets of 
knowledge and theory drawn from disciplines outside fisheries are introduced and are linked 
with examples from the fisheries literature to challenge the assumptions of models - that 
fishers operate as perfectly rational beings and they are homogeneous in the way they make 
their decisions.   Chapter 2 was crucial for forming the foundations for the methodology I used 
for the remainder of the thesis, Chapters 3 to 6. These data chapters focus on fisheries of 
southwest England.  Chapter 3 aimed to gain insights into the strategic behaviour of fishers in 
the southwest of England.  This chapter used a case study approach and a qualitative 
methodology using content analysis of in-depth interviews, to develop a new framework for 
analysis and categorisation of strategic types, drawing typologies used in the strategic 
management literature.   Chapter 4 returns to a key element of fisher decision making – where 
to fish. Informed by data collected through interviews, this study uses a random utility model 
(RUM) of fisher location choice to understand and predict where fisher’s choose to fish.  
Chapters 5 and 6 then depart slightly from understanding individual fishers’ strategies and 
tactics, to examining the problems facing fishing communities’ ability to adapt under changing 
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and uncertain circumstances.  In Chapter 5 I document the impact of the acute fuel-price shock 
in 2008 on the structure, behaviour, and relative vulnerability of different sectors of the UK’s 
southwest fishing fleet to identify who might be the winners and the losers in the face of 
uncertainty.  This chapter revealed that in fact the key barrier to fishers in the face of unstable 
and rising fuel prices was that they were unable to offset increased costs because ex-vessel 
market fish prices have remained stagnant for at least a decade. The divergence of trends for 
fuel and fish prices, and the evident inability of fishers to pass cost up through the value chain 
to buyers, retailers and consumers prompted Chapter 6 which conducts a further empirical 
econometric and interview-based investigation on the market structures and processes that 
constrain fishers’ ability to set prices to offset their rising costs.  I conclude with an overview in 
Chapter 7, drawing conclusions from my findings and highlighting key priorities for future 
research. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1. Interdisciplinary approach and mixed methods 
This thesis uses an interdisciplinary approach for understanding fisher behaviour.  Social 
approaches (sociology, psychology, social anthropology, political science, geography) have not 
been embedded into the fisheries management systems despite their ability to understand 
fishers, fishing, the political processes, institutions and incentives (Jentoft, 1998, Hart, 2003).  
There is increasing interest and many calls within the fisheries science and management 
community to incorporate interdisciplinary approaches but it has been difficult to 
institutionalise so far (Charles, 1995, Jentoft, 2006).  Integration of social sciences into fisheries 
science requires overcoming disciplinary boundaries by merging the different research cultures 
and epistemological approaches (Degnbol et al., 2006).  Interdisciplinary scientists are required 
who can promote disciplinary cooperation and communication.  
 
For this thesis, I have used a mix of methods to gather and analyse data in order to understand 
the complexity of fisher behaviour while also attempting to provide generalisable results 
required for practical policy measures.  I spent a total of six months in the southwest of 
England, gathering data through in-depth semi-structured interviews with skippers and key 
informants, participant observation (going on fishing trips to sea), quay-side and market 
observations, questionnaires, document review as well collecting data on fish and fuel prices.  
These data were used in all Chapters 3-6.  In addition, I extracted data from databases stored 
at the Centre for Fisheries and Aquaculture Science (Cefas) to create a large database of fishing 
locations and related catch (using vessel monitoring system satellite data and the fishing 
activity catch data).  As a result, the methods I have used in data analysis are diverse.  I have 
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combined qualitative and quantitative content analysis of interview transcripts, with 
econometric modelling and time series analysis. 
 
3.2. The case study approach  
The fisheries of southwest England were selected as the case study for this thesis (Figure 1). 
This region is of importance to English fisheries because with the decline of North Sea stocks, 
the fishery in the southwest of England now harbours most of the remaining English fleet.  
Fishing communities in the southwest are representative of many fishing dependent 
communities across the UK, located in remote areas with few alternatives to fishing for 
employment.  Yet there is little research apart from ecological research undertaken in 
southwest England.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of the UK, including the major southwest ports (Newlyn, Brixham and Plymouth) 
and number of scientifically assessed stocks inside and outside safe biological limits in ICES 
regions exploited by southwest fishers. Data source: (ICES, 2008).  
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Researching the fisheries of southwest England also provides an opportunity to explore issues 
faced by fisheries in general in the European Union.  Since 1983, European fisheries have been 
managed through the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).  It manages all the member states’ 
(including the UK) marine exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and is now effectively one 25 
million km2 EEZ, the largest single management regime in the North Atlantic.  In 2009, the 
European Commission for Fisheries identified that the current methods underpinning fisheries 
governance required transformation, and is now looking to reform the CFP and the way EU 
fisheries are managed (European Commission, 2009) with a goal to achieve:  
 
“…exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides sustainable economic, 
environmental and social conditions…” 
 
However, given the density of fishing, EU fisheries are heavily overexploited.  Over the past 50 
years fishing effort has significantly increased and there is evidence that many fish populations 
are declining (Jennings et al., 1999a, Jennings et al., 1999b).  The International Council of the 
Sea (ICES) which provides summary of the status of the stocks managed by the EU, show that 
20% of all marine stocks, including approximately half of demersal stocks (roundfish such as 
cod, haddock, whiting, hake, etc.), are outside safe biological limits (ICES, 2008).  There is 
considerable variation by marine region and species.  Nonetheless, EU fisheries have been 
identified as having inadequate management regimes which has resulted in European fisheries 
eroding their own ecological and economic basis (European Commission, 2009).  The findings 
of this research in southwest England, may be generalisable to other European fisheries. 
 
3.3. Ethical Considerations 
As laid out by the School of International Development ethical guidelines, ‘research which 
involves primary data collection or the use of secondary data that contain personal or 
confidential/restricted information requires ethical clearance’.  This research was given ethical 
clearance by the University of East Anglia’s Research Ethics Committee.  The principles of 
ethical clearance to which this research has adhered is as follows: 
 
1. Research should be designed, reviewed and undertaken in a way that ensures its integrity 
and quality. 
2. Research staff and subjects must be informed fully about the purpose, methods and 
intended possible uses of the research, what their participation in the research entails and 
what risks, if any, are involved.  
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3. The confidentiality of information supplied by research subjects and the anonymity of 
respondents must be respected.  
4. Research participants must participate in a voluntary way, free from any coercion 
5. Harm to research participants must be avoided 
6. The independence and impartiality of researchers must be clear, and any conflicts of 
interest or partiality must be explicit. 
 
The research presented in this thesis was designed, reviewed and approved before it was 
undertaken through the upgrade procedure.  In the School of International Development, this 
process requires a substantial piece of work, the procedural paper, which is reviewed by the 
upgrade committee, and presented to faculty and research students in the School. 
 
For interviews, I obtained written consent from all participants, after explaining my research, 
the purpose, and proposed dissemination of findings, both verbally and in writing.  I explained 
to all participants that individual data was confidential and anonymity would be preserved.  I 
explained that participation was entirely voluntary and that if there was any part of the survey 
participants did not want to answer, this would be respected.  Furthermore, participants were 
told that they had the right to withdraw entirely from the interview at any time. I stored data 
securely, keeping identifying markers of individual’s data separate from the collected data.  My 
computer was password protected.  Interview data were primarily collected in one fishing 
community in the southwest.  Due to the sensitivity of some of the data presented, I was 
advised to protect the respondents by keeping the field site anonymous.  Therefore, 
throughout the thesis my field site is referred to as a ‘SW fishing community’.  In published 
work, I have taken care to prevent the identification of individuals. The issue of rewarding 
informants is a difficult issue.  As skippers were very busy, a token of appreciation was given – 
cake!  To encourage skippers to return questionnaires I gave skippers the opportunity to enter 
a draw to win a hamper.  I gave all respondents my contact details so that they could contact 
me with any questions they might have after the interview had taken place. 
 
EU Vessel monitoring system data and data from the UK logbook fishing activity database used 
in modelling (Chapter 3) were extracted at the Centre for Environment, Fisheries and 
Aquaculture Sciences (Cefas).  Data extracted at Cefas were completely anonymised before 
leaving the Cefas building. 
 
I am confident that the data presented in this thesis was collected, analysed and is presented 
using ethical and rigorous methods. 
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Chapter 2 
Where shall I fish today?  
The trade-offs fishers make between 
profit, risk and knowledge, and the role 
of institutions and incentives  
on fisher decision making 
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1. Abstract 
Fisheries management aims to alter or constrain incentives on where, when and how to fish in 
order to change fisher behaviour in ways that make it more compatible with resource 
conservation, sectoral economic efficiency and/or other management goals. Thus 
understanding the factors shaping fishers incentives and developing the ability to accurately 
predict fisher response to changing incentives can inform and improve the effectiveness of 
resource management.  This review synthesises and summarises the approaches used to 
understand fisher decision making in the European fisheries context.  I review modelling 
approaches to understanding location choice behaviour by fishers - important for management 
because fisheries are increasingly being managed spatially.  I also present an argument for 
using interdisciplinary methods to improve modelling approaches.  I then introduce sets of 
knowledge and theory drawn from disciplines outside fisheries which challenge the key 
assumption of most models - that fishers operate as rational profit maximisers at all times.  
 
Using alternative bodies of theory can add depth for understanding the complexities of fisher 
behaviour and the interactions between individual profit maximisation goals, risk, knowledge 
and the incentives and institutions that shape decisions. Knowledge of the patterns of resource 
use that result from the aggregate of individual decisions can help not only in the design of 
effective management and support accurate predictions of resource users’ responses to 
management, but also help to understand industry-wide responses to challenges, threats and 
opportunities, particularly in the context of an industry where stock decline is leading to a 
shifting regulatory environment.   
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2. Introduction 
Fisheries are comprised of two basic components; the fish and the fishers that harvest them.  
There is a disparity between the amount of information known about these two elements and 
how they are incorporated into fisheries management.  Fisheries research and policy actions 
are dominated by using data on the dynamics of the fish stocks.  Yet almost all management 
action focuses on the fishing fleets that are in pursuit of the fish.  The current fisheries 
management paradigm in Europe assumes that if stock levels are determined, catch and effort 
levels can be set, and as long as these are controlled the fishery will be managed more 
successfully (Punt and Hilborn, 1997, Pauly et al., 2002, Baker and Clapham, 2004).  However 
understanding the fishing fleets and their behaviour is equally important to develop the ability 
to understand and anticipate fisher responses in advance of regulations, and learn how to 
shape behaviour in ways that promote management goals (Wilen 1979, Hilborn 1985, Hilborn 
& Walters 1992). 
 
The problem with the current management paradigm and its assumptions relate directly to a 
lack of understanding of fisher behaviour.  First there is the issue of control.  This management 
regime requires strong control to ensure fishers compliance to regulations, which is 
determined by the economic deterrents of rule breaking (Beddington et al., 2007) but also by 
whether the imposed regulations are perceived by fishers as legitimate (Raakjaer Neilsen, 
2003).  Fishers are often creative in finding ways to bypass regulations (Copes, 1986).  Control 
mechanisms almost always result in a less economically efficient fishery (Branch et al., 2006), 
therefore in response incentives are created for fishers to try to improve their profitability and 
increase their efficiency through unregulated aspects of the fishery, known as ‘effort creep’ 
(i.e., changing the physical inputs of production such as different technologies and the ways 
these inputs are used to harvest target species) (Marchal et al., 2007).   
 
Second is that management concentrates on how to assess the state of stocks and thus control 
fishing effort to be in line with how much fish can be harvested sustainably. Fisheries stock 
assessments used to estimate the status of fish stocks tend to combine readily available data 
obtained by fisheries such as commercial catch per unit of fishing effort (CPUE) indices. In its 
most basic form, CPUE is assumed to be linearly related to fish abundance.  However, fisher 
behaviour can influence the commercial catch data used.  Time series of fish length and age 
data are confounded by fishers altering the gear they use to catch fish, where they go to catch 
fish and species they target.  Branch et al. (2006) give a full review of how fisher behaviour can 
influence the interpretation of CPUE data.  The authors assert that management action often 
targets fishing effort but does not constrain fishing power.  One of many examples given is that 
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information exchange between vessels can allow fishers to reduce the time searching for fish.  
If searching decreases and catches also decline, overall CPUE will not change and the 
assumption of CPUE-fish abundance proportionality is invalid. CPUE is standardised as much as 
possible (accounting for vessel characteristics, fishing season, and grounds) in stock 
assessments, and the scientific and modelling techniques have been advanced considerably in 
their predictive power and ability to deal with uncertainty in complex systems since their 
origins in surplus production theory (Shaefer, 1954) and single species population models 
originally developed by Beverton and Holt (1957) more than 50 years ago.  However, when a 
meta-analysis was undertaken to examine CPUE with independent fish surveys, there was 
evidence of ‘hyperstability’ (CPUE remains high while stocks were declining) in 70% of cases 
(Harley et al., 2001). There is also evidence of CPUE ‘hyperdepletion’ where CPUE declines but 
does not affect the stock abundance (Fonteneau and Richard, 2003).  If this results in further 
restrictions of effort controls, this undermines the science underpinning management and 
gives weight to fishers’ arguments of lack of legitimacy of regulations.   Branch et al. (2006) 
suggest that CPUE data need to account for fisher behavioural changes. 
 
Since the 1950s there has been consistent recognition that successful fisheries management 
relies on a detailed understanding of fisher behaviour (Gordon, 1953, Hilborn and Walters, 
1992, Charles, 1995, Wilen et al., 2002, Hilborn, 2007).  Research on fisher behaviour, mainly 
how and where fishers allocate their fishing effort, has been undertaken by a variety of 
academic disciplines using various methodologies over the past 30 years including: biological 
(Hilborn and Walters, 1992, Gillis et al., 1993), economic (Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983, Hutton 
et al., 2004) and anthropological (Acheson, 1981, McCay, 1981).  However, fisheries managers 
have not had the opportunity to assimilate this information on fishing fleets into policy 
decision making.  Fisheries now has good ecosystem-level integration of economics, ecology 
and political science but the conspicuously missing element is the integration of the human 
element; fisher behaviour and application of more individual based approaches as opposed to 
ecosystem properties and fluxes.  The result is a gap in our understanding of fisher incentives 
in relation to management.    
 
The purpose of this review is to synthesise and summarise research on fisher behaviour.  There 
have been other reviews of fisher behaviour.  Branch et al. (2006) reviewed the fisheries 
dynamics and behaviour literature at the fishing fleet scale of emerging, mature and senescent 
fisheries using a population dynamics approach to review what determines fishing location, 
quantity of fish caught, investment and response to regulation and enforcement in large 
commercial fisheries.  Salas and Gaertner (2004) reviewed the literature on small scale 
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fisheries, identifying individual fishing tactics and strategies based on social, economic and 
behavioural dynamics to help understand the human component of small scale fishery 
systems.  This chapter adds to these reviews by providing a review of approaches used to 
understand fisher behaviour, critiquing the successes and limitations of different approaches, 
and arguing for research that draws on the most relevant and successful concepts, models and 
methods from the full range of social sciences.  It examines the heterogeneity of individual 
fisher behaviour and, with recourse to behavioural economic theory, attempts to explain why 
this occurs.   
 
This review is limited to the approaches used to understand the location choices of fishers for 
three reasons.  The first is that the decision where to fish is central to the success or failure of 
a fishing enterprise.  Second, it is important to understand the spatial behaviour of fishers 
because fisheries are often and increasingly being managed spatially.  Third, an analysis of the 
spatial behaviour of fishers can help to understand the criteria that underpin fisher decision 
making and strategies more generally.  This review focuses on temperate commercial fisheries 
with specific reference to the European fisheries because most of the relevant research has 
been carried out in temperate commercial fisheries and this thesis specifically focuses on a 
European fishery in the United Kingdom.    
 
The review begins by arguing for the need to understand fisher behaviour in the European 
fisheries context.  It then reviews the modelling approaches that have been undertaken to 
understand location choice, and the factors that have be revealed to influence location choice 
behaviour.  I present an argument for using interdisciplinary methods to improve modelling 
approaches.  I then introduce sets of knowledge and theory drawn from disciplines outside 
fisheries which challenge the assumptions of perfect rationality of fishers and homogeneity of 
fisher decision-making made in modelling approaches, and inter-link these with examples from 
the relevant fisheries literature.  Using alternative bodies of theory can add depth to 
understanding the complexities of fisher behaviour and the interactions between individual 
profit maximisation goals, risk, knowledge and the incentives and institutions present.  
 
3. The blind spot in EU fisheries 
Since 1983, European fisheries have been managed through the Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP).  It manages all the member states’ marine exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and is now 
effectively one 25 million km2 EEZ, the largest single management regime in the North Atlantic.  
In 2009, the European Commission for Fisheries identified that the current methods 
underpinning fisheries governance required transformation, and is now looking to reform the 
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CFP and the way EU fisheries are managed (The Green Paper (European Commission, 2009)).   
Its goal is to achieve:  
 
“…exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides sustainable economic, 
environmental and social conditions”… 
 
And states that:  
 
”…Economic and social sustainability require productive fish stocks and healthy 
marine ecosystems. The economic and social viability of fisheries can only result 
from restoring the productivity of fish stocks. Ecological sustainability is therefore 
a basic premise for the economic and social future of European fisheries”… 
 
…”The MSY [maximum sustainable yield] concept was accepted by all Member 
States at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development as an objective to 
achieve by 2015. It was also part of the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement. This 
international commitment should now be enshrined as a principle for stock 
management in the future CFP ” (European Commission, 2009). 
 
This series of quotes taken from the Green Paper reveals that there is definitive progress in 
terms of understanding there is need for reform of EU policy, that EU fisheries need to be 
considered as an issue of sustainable development, and environmental, economic and social 
points of view all require action.  However, they reveal the same ‘blind spot’ that Branch et al. 
(2006) highlighted in North American fisheries policy:  
 
“although objectives are to achieve long term health and viability of fisheries, the 
prescription is to protect marine ecosystems with no words or thoughts of the 
dynamics of fishing fleets including their economics and behaviour” 
 
The EU focus is still to achieve maximum sustainable yield of fisheries, perpetuating the 
accepted wisdom that if you look after the fish, you manage the fishery.  Despite references to 
adopting a more holistic framework for fisheries management using precautionary and 
ecosystem approaches, management goals that attempt to reduce the fleet and rationalise it 
lack understanding of the behaviour of fishers, and policy makers seem unsure of how to 
actually incorporate resource user dynamics:  
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“while direct references are made to adopting a precautionary and an ecosystem 
approach, it is not clear how this relates to economic and social conditions. There 
are no clear indicators and yardsticks that could provide more concrete guidance 
or to help measure policy achievements” (European Commission, 2009). 
 
A fundamental gap in the CFP reform is the incorporation of knowledge of how fishers will 
respond and adapt to management actions.  Yet it is widely acknowledged that lack of this 
knowledge of behaviour can be a primary reason for management failure (Hilborn 1985; Hart 
2003).  Management can alter fisher incentives unpredictably and can result in behaviour that 
is not intended by managers, even producing negative environmental, economic and social 
effects (Hilborn et al., 2004, Pascoe and Mardle, 2005).  A recent European example 
epitomises this type of management oversight.  In 2001, the North Sea beam trawl fleet were 
excluded from the ‘cod box’ (an area of more than 40,000 square miles closed to protect 
spawning aggregations of cod) for 75 days.  Exclusion from their favoured fishing grounds led 
to a redistribution of beam trawl effort to the west of the closed area to a previously un-fished 
area, having a long term negative impact on the sea bed productivity macro fauna (Dinmore et 
al., 2003).  A priori assessment of the effects of the management measure on the marine 
ecosystem was not undertaken and the ecosystem effects were considered to have been 
negative and the closed area unsuccessful.  If the response behaviour of fishers could have 
been predicted through a greater understanding of how vessels select fishing locations, then 
the negative effects could have been weighed up against the potential management benefits 
for the target stock.  With better understanding of both the pattern and scale of resource use, 
in addition to the dynamics and productivity of the resource(s), management might not have 
failed in this instance.  
 
4. What can interdisciplinary research add? 
Social approaches (sociology, psychology, social anthropology, political science, geography) 
have not been embedded into the fisheries management system even though human activities 
are the study subjects of these disciplines.  Non-economist social scientists are conspicuously 
absent from fisheries decision making processes in EU fisheries despite their potential 
contributions to understanding fishers, fishing, and the political processes, institutions and 
incentives that shape the nature of the fishery system (Jentoft, 1998, Hart, 2003).  
Interdisciplinary approaches to fishery management science have been difficult to 
institutionalise (Charles, 1995, Jentoft, 2006).  There is inertia on the part of the scientists and 
the institutions because fisheries research has traditionally been the domain of natural 
scientists (Charles, 1995).  Disciplinary boundaries are highly embedded and integration of 
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social sciences requires the merging of entirely different cultures with conflicting views on how 
the world works (Jentoft, 2006).  There are disciplinary boundaries in terms of what the 
emphasis should be for management solutions, what researchers assume the incentives of 
fishing practices are, and of course, research methodology differences.   
 
Perhaps because of similar epistemological approaches, economists who use quantitative 
methods and modelling have fitted more readily into fisheries scientific institutions and 
collaborations have resulted in the creation and use of quantitative bio-economic models to 
understand the interactions between the ecology and economics of fishing (Hilborn and 
Walters, 1992, Grafton et al., 2006, Cunningham, 2008).  But the large differences in 
methodologies between natural and other branches of the social sciences have meant there is 
reluctance for collaboration.  Social complexities of fishing and fisher behaviour are often 
captured using ethnographic techniques and qualitative data analyses (Firth, 1966, Acheson, 
1981, McCay, 1981, McGoodwin, 1990, Jentoft, 2000).    Depth of knowledge is provided 
through qualitative social science methodologies, such as case-study based research, and it is 
argued that without context-dependant knowledge, one cannot develop an expert 
understanding of humans and their activities (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  Fisheries management is 
essentially a context-specific activity, with regions and communities fishing within specific 
stocks and areas. These characteristics lend themselves to social science research, particularly 
for understanding the dynamics of fisher behaviour.   An interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary 
approach that is achieved by coupling the descriptive and generalisable strength of the natural 
and economic sciences with the analytical depth of social science methodology, could produce 
a more holistic and accurate understanding of resource-use dynamics.   
 
5. Location choice behaviour: What do we know so far? 
One of the key factors policy makers require in order to know if a policy will meet its 
objectives, is to understand how fishermen will respond to management in terms of location 
choice, especially in forecasting where fishing effort will be displaced to in the event of 
management action (Smith, 2000). Research into understanding and predicting where fishers 
go to fish has been dominated by modelling and statistical approaches, generalising human 
behaviour.  Models are a key tool in informing fisheries management and are applied to 
acquire a greater understanding of fishery dynamics over time.  They are used by management 
advisers to evaluate how well the fishery is being managed and how management should be 
structured in order to deal with uncertainty and unpredictable change.   Models are appealing 
because they provide a structured use of available data for comparing choices, but the 
limitation is that they require making trade-offs between accurately capturing all the relevant 
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details while still making the model practical and suit the available data.  Models “are 
mathematical abstractions of non-mathematical processes and there will be uncertainty about 
whether a given model structure is an appropriate representation of a real system” (Hill et al., 
2007).  The individual fisher’s action is observed, but the variables that drive their choices are 
limited and cannot be understood using modelling methods, therefore the modeller has to 
make assumptions about fisher values even though there is no information on what the values 
are and how they are formed (Smith, 2000).   The data used in models may also have reporting 
bias, for example, fishers may misreport the exact location of fishing success or species caught.  
Some researchers have been able to overcome this limitation by using data derived from 
observers at sea (Dorn, 1997, Bertrand et al., 2004, Branch et al., 2005, Murawski et al., 2005).  
As part of this review, I wanted to investigate the types of modelling methods that have been 
used to understand location choice behaviour.  I reviewed 33 papers that used modelling 
approaches and examined the resulting factors that influenced location choice of vessels.  
These are divided into two methodological types.  The first type (23 studies) used data derived 
from fishery databases such as catch and effort data (herein, ‘database studies’) and a 
summary of their variables can be found in Table 1.  The second type (10 studies) used a more 
interdisciplinary approach (herein, ‘interdisciplinary studies’), using insights from interviews 
and questionnaires to better classify the dataset and inform the variables used (Table 2).  
These studies also used the interview and questionnaire data to add qualitative and contextual 
explanations of the variables and behaviour. 
 
The database studies can be grouped into two main types of model (Table 1): The first group 
are models based on the concept of utility, which in economics, is defined as the measure of 
happiness or satisfaction gained from a good, service or activity and rational decision makers 
are assumed to make decisions based on maximising their utility.  The random utility model 
(RUM) is the most commonly used modelling method and a vibrant literature is emerging 
aiming to improve the accuracy of these models.  The second group of models are based on 
ecological foraging theory, mainly the Ideal Free Distribution (IFD) (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970) 
which has commonalities with Gordon’s (1954) seminal paper on fishing fleet behaviour.  
These studies use the null hypothesis that in a fishery, vessels will seek the most profitable 
fishing grounds and fishing effort will eventually distribute so that profit rates are equal among 
grounds.  This hypothesis has been successful in predicting location choice but the case studies 
have been relatively simple, with only one or two species caught in a limited number of areas 
fished by a fairly homogenous fleet of vessels.  The RUM overcomes these limitations and is 
used to characterise more complex multispecies fisheries, such as those in Europe (Hutton et 
al., 2004, Anderson and Christensen, 2006). 
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The interdisciplinary studies have attempted to improve models of behaviour by seizing the 
opportunity of asking fishers what they do and why.  Unlike fish, people can explain their 
behaviour and this information can be used to develop model variables that have the most 
relevance to the fishery being modelled as long as appropriate and rigorous methods are used 
for data collection and analysis.  One clear example of where interdisciplinary methods lead to 
more substantiated work is research on the Danish North Sea demersal fisheries (Anderson 
and Christensen, 2006, Christensen and Raakjaer, 2006).  Qualitative in-depth and semi-
structured interviews were undertaken with 16 fishers to gain a thorough understanding of 
each fisher’s situation and decision-making processes.  Based on this information 
questionnaires were administered to determine the importance of different factors relating to 
location choice decisions.  These factors were then used to inform the variables for a model of 
location choice for Danish gill netters.  The predictive power of the resulting model was very 
high (nested random utility model: R2 = 0.75) and the variables were thoroughly explained and 
contextualised, and conflicting results between the model and interview analyses were 
identified and discussed.  This resulted in a study that was rigorous and contained depth of 
understanding of location choice behaviour.   
 
I now describe and compare the variables used in database studies with interdisciplinary 
studies.  This review has attempted to review all published location choice studies (See Table 1 
and 2 for references).  Less than a third of location choice studies reviewed used 
interdisciplinary methods.   Although each study was undertaken with different objectives and 
may have concentrated on different aspects of behaviour, this review reveals that using an 
interdisciplinary methodology can add value to modelling studies.  Not only do they provide 
validation and explanation of variables but variables related to information exchange between 
vessels are more likely to be revealed (see below).  Studies that use only statistical approaches 
derived from fishery databases uncover a narrower range of variables than interdisciplinary 
studies.  This may be due to the limitations of available data and because of the hypothetico-
deductive approach used by statistical and modelling methods, compared to the inductive 
approach used by interdisciplinary methods and analyses. 
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Table 1. Summary of database modelling studies variables, split by model type: Random utility models (RUM), Ideal Free Distribution models (IFD) and 
studies that used various other modelling techniques including variations of general linear models. 
Variables affecting location choice Number of database studies that found factor significant  (total number of studies: N = 23) 
 
RUM (N = 12) IFD (N = 7) Other statistical methods (N = 4) 
(a) Profitability of location 
   
Previous or expected effort, catch or catch 
revenue at location 
N = 10 
(Dorn, 1997, Campbell and Hand, 1999, Mistiaen 
and Strand, 2000, Smith, 2002, Hutton et al., 2004, 
Pradhan and Leung, 2004, Strand, 2004, Smith, 
2005, Berman, 2007, Valcic, 2009) 
N = 7 
(Hilborn and Ledbetter, 1979, Abrahams and 
Healey, 1990, Gillis et al., 1993, Vignaux, 
1996, Rijnsdorp et al., 2000, Swain and 
Wade, 2003, Powers and Abeare, 2009) 
N = 4 
(Lane, 1989, Béné, 1996, Bertrand et al., 
2004, Murawski et al., 2005) 
(b) Risk-taking behaviour    
Expected variance of revenue at location N = 3 
(Mistiaen and Strand, 2000, Pradhan and Leung, 
2004, Strand, 2004) 
N = 0 N = 1 
(Béné, 1996) 
Distance from port (or fuel cost to location) N = 8 
(Lane, 1989, Campbell and Hand, 1999, Mistiaen 
and Strand, 2000, Smith, 2002, Strand, 2004, 
Smith, 2005, Berman, 2007, Valcic, 2009) 
N = 3 
(Hilborn and Ledbetter, 1979, Swain and 
Wade, 2003, Powers and Abeare, 2009) 
N = 1 
(Murawski et al., 2005) 
Inertia to change  N = 1 
(Pradhan and Leung, 2004) 
N = 0 N = 0 
(c) Knowledge     
Vessel aggregation (presence other vessels 
at/near location & following behaviour 
N = 3 
(Allen and McGlade, 1986, Dorn, 1997, Campbell 
and Hand, 1999)   
N = 1 
(Vignaux, 1996) 
N = 0 
(d) Vessel characteristics     
Vessel age, size, engine power N = 2 
(Mistiaen and Strand, 2000, Pradhan and Leung, 
2004) 
N = 1 
(Rijnsdorp et al., 2000) 
N = 1 
(Murawski et al., 2005) 
(e) Influence of Institutions and incentives    
Remuneration system N = 0 N = 0 N = 1 
(Béné, 1996) 
Price of fish N = 1 
(Lane, 1989) 
N = 0 N = 0 
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Table 2. Summary of modelling studies that used interdisciplinary approaches (using social surveys), and their variables, split by model type: Random 
utility models (RUM) and studies that used various other modelling techniques.  
Factors affecting location choice Number of interdisciplinary studies that found factor significant (total number of studies: N = 10) 
 RUM + social surveys (N = 8) Other statistical methods + social surveys (N = 2) 
(a) Profitability of location 
  
Previous or expected effort, catch or catch 
revenue at location 
N = 7 
(Eales and Wilen, 1986, Robinson and Pascoe, 1997, Holland and 
Sutinen, 1999, Curtis and Hicks, 2000, Curtis and McConnell, 2004, 
Anderson and Christensen, 2006, Smith and Zhang, 2007) 
N = 1 
(Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986) 
(b) Risk-taking behaviour   
Expected variance of revenue at location N = 3 
(Holland and Sutinen, 1999, Curtis and Hicks, 2000, Prellezo et al., 2009) 
N = 0 
Distance from port  
(or fuel cost to location) 
N = 4 
(Eales and Wilen, 1986, Anderson and Christensen, 2006, Smith and 
Zhang, 2007, Prellezo et al., 2009) 
N = 2 
(Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986, van Oostenbrugge et al., 2001) 
Inertia to change  N = 2 
(Curtis and Hicks, 2000, Prellezo et al., 2009) 
N = 1 
(Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986) 
(c) Knowledge   
Vessel aggregation  
(presence other vessels at/near location & 
following behaviour) 
N = 4 
(Holland and Sutinen, 1999, Curtis and Hicks, 2000, Curtis and 
McConnell, 2004, Anderson and Christensen, 2006) 
N = 1 
(Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986) 
Information exchange between 
skippers/vessels 
N = 2 
(Curtis and McConnell, 2004, Anderson and Christensen, 2006) 
N = 2 
(Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986, van Oostenbrugge et al., 2001) 
(d) Vessel characteristics    
Vessel age, size, engine power N = 2 
(Smith and Zhang, 2007, Prellezo et al., 2009) 
N = 2 
(Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986, van Oostenbrugge et al., 2001) 
Skipper age N = 1 
(Smith and Zhang, 2007) 
N = 0 
(e) Influence of Institutions & incentives   
Management constraints N = 2 
(Smith and Zhang, 2007, Prellezo et al., 2009) 
N = 0 
Price of fish N = 1 
(Smith and Zhang, 2007) 
N = 0 
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5.1. Profit 
Studies that used analyses of large databases as their methodology primarily found that the 
profitability of the location was the most important reason for location choice by fishers - the 
higher the expected catch, or value of catch, the more likely a location will be selected.  There 
is nothing surprising about this result, given that fishing is an economic activity.  Studies that 
used mixed or interdisciplinary approaches also found profitability to be the most significant 
decision factor.  For simplicity sake I have termed this a ‘profitability’ variable, but it is 
measured in almost as many ways as there are studies, and was defined at either the 
individual vessel level or a fleet-wide level.  In general the profitability of a location was 
measured as the previous catch or catch per unit effort (CPUE); the previous value of catch, 
value per unit effort (VPUE) or revenue obtained at the location or the relative catch per unit 
effort to other locations.   
 
5.2. Risk 
Variables related to risk-taking behaviour were also commonly found to be significant in 
influencing location choice in both the database and interdisciplinary studies.  There were two 
commonly-used measures of risk taking behaviour in both methodologies.  Variability in 
returns at a location is used as a measure of risk.  In most cases fishermen display risk aversion 
by deciding to choose sites with less variation in returns.  Other fishermen do not avoid areas 
with high variability, but use other methods to mitigate against risk, such as using knowledge 
about successful fishing trips rather than average revenue rates or reducing price risk instead 
by targeting a wide range of species (e.g. Holland and Sutinen, 1999).  Distance from port is 
also used as a measure of risk taking, with fishermen tending to be risk averse and choosing 
sites closer to port rather than further away.  It is not possible to distinguish whether distance 
from port is a risk variable related to physical danger of being further away from port, or a 
financial risk variable related to costs of fishing further away in the database studies, whereas 
studies using interdisciplinary methodology provided this distinction in the discussion of the 
models.  
 
5.3. Knowledge 
The difference between the interdisciplinary and database only methodologies was most 
apparent when I examined variables related to knowledge.  The role of knowledge, and access 
to knowledge in making decisions about where to fish is more likely to be modelled or 
analysed using an interdisciplinary approach.  Six of the ten interdisciplinary studies considered 
knowledge as a factor, compared to four out of 23 studies using databases alone.  The 
knowledge variable used in database studies was related to vessel aggregation - vessels fishing 
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close to other vessels could indicate that some vessels follow others movements, and vessels 
are using where others are fishing as a source of knowledge of good fishing grounds.  It could 
also be considered to be a risk-averse behaviour with vessels preferring ‘safety in numbers’.  
Presence and number of vessels at a location were also considered by interdisciplinary studies.  
The exchange of information between skippers was only considered by interdisciplinary 
studies.  Interdisciplinary studies were able to identify its importance through interviews and 
then use suitable proxies for information exchange in their models.  Therefore, it appears that 
using social science methods can help to incorporate knowledge in location choice modelling. 
 
5.4. Vessel characteristics 
Vessel characteristics were more likely to be incorporated as variables in interdisciplinary 
studies, with four out of ten studies using characteristics such as vessel age, size and engine 
power, compared to four out of 23 database studies.  One of the interdisciplinary studies also 
used skipper age as a variable to measure individual experience which is data that are only 
likely to be gained through an interview or questionnaire process (Smith and Zhang, 2007). 
 
5.5. Institutions and incentives 
Interestingly, the role of institutions and incentives in decision making were considered by very 
few studies of location choice and the variables vary between studies and across 
methodologies (three interdisciplinary studies and two database studies).  Béné (1996) found 
that the market constraints and remuneration system of the fishery influenced their location 
choice using a database study.  Similarly, Lane (1989) and Smith and Zhang (2007) found the 
price of fish was important in deciding what to target and therefore where to fish.  Regulations 
(effort controls and closed areas) were also found to be a constraining factor in two 
interdisciplinary studies (Smith and Zhang, 2007, Prellezo et al., 2009). 
   
This review of existing literature of location choice behaviour shows that the factors used in 
models and statistical approaches vary considerably.  This is because the variables used are 
specific to what is being modelled and the aspect of behaviour the authors are trying to 
understand.  What is clear is that the correct specification and use of the model depend on a 
clear understanding of the behaviour of the fishery, and this can be done by incorporating a 
social science methodology into research.  Using an interdisciplinary mixed methods approach 
broadens and adds to our understanding of where fishers choose to fish.  Simply stated by 
Durrenberger & Palsson (1986), “numbers are most useful in the context of ethnographic 
description” (p 227).   
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6. Towards richer mechanistic understandings of fisher behaviour 
 
“…people are not simply rational economic beings, nor are they entirely in harmony with 
nature, recognising their dependence on the environment’s productivity over the long-
term.  People are social creatures as well.” (Iudicello et al., 1999, page 54)  
 
Neoclassical economic or ecological theory, expressed in static optimisation models such as 
utility maximisation or the IFD, often fail to predict accurately the spatial distribution of an 
aggregate group (or fleet) of fishers because the model assumptions are restrictive and over-
simplify the decision-making process.   However, this is the nature of models.  All models are 
simplifications of reality, and the only way of making them simple enough to use is to make 
assumptions.  However, assumptions need to be explicitly defined by the analyst and taken 
into consideration when interpreting the results of the model, particularly if they are to be 
used to inform fisheries policy.  The two main assumptions of models of behaviour are that 
fishers operate with perfect information and perfect economic rationality, and they are 
homogeneous in the way they make their decisions.   
 
Perfect rationality means that people behave in a way that maximises their utility, and make 
decisions based on complex deductions in order to achieve their utility – they are capable of 
thinking through all of the possible outcomes and choose the course of action which will result 
in the best possible outcome.  Assumptions of perfect rationality have been tested through 
empirical studies of actual behaviour in a wide range of decision-making situations (not 
restricted to fisheries) and are often contradicted (Dawnay and Shah, 2005, Camerer and Fehr, 
2006).  For example, Camerer et al. (1997) found that New York cab drivers would rather take 
one day at a time than evaluate choices over many years in relation to their lifetime wealth 
opportunities – they do not behave in order to maximising their profit, preferring to work 
shorter hours on busy days and work longer hours on slow days.  For fishers, alternative 
decision theories suggest that decisions may be limited by their risk preferences, the cognitive 
and situational constraints, and by the institutions (comprising formal constraints such as 
rules, laws, constitutions, and informal constraints such as norms of behaviour, conventions, 
self-imposed codes of conduct) and incentive structures they are embedded within.   
 
Models also treat fishers as fixed elements with “no consideration of individual attitudes based 
on their operating scales (geographical, ecological, social and economic) and personal goals” 
(Salas and Gaertner, 2004).  Models assume that fisher goals and knowledge are evenly 
distributed amongst fishers.  They are limited in terms of promoting a deeper understanding of 
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the motives and responses of fishers to the multiple and uncertain changes they face in 
conducting their fishing operations.  The value of applying the IFD theory or economic models 
to fishers is for the examination of past and current effort allocation, with particular attention 
to seeking explanations of significant, systematic deviations from standard theoretical 
expectations. They can be useful starting points for understanding the complex optimisation 
criteria that determines fisher behaviour.   However, deeper understanding of fishers’ 
overarching strategies and the criteria that underpin these is required to predict responses to 
changing conditions such as management actions or wider environmental influences such as 
climate change and changes in species abundance and distribution.  Béné (1996) defined a 
fisher’s strategy to be “the set of decision criteria that link a given fishing behaviour with the 
objective(s) and constraint(s) that have stimulated such behaviour”.  In other words, a long 
term fishing strategy is the internal decision-making process that is defined by his/her long 
term objectives as a fisher and the constraints he/she faces.  Where a fisher chooses to fish is 
one of the observable outcomes of this strategy.  A fisher’s strategy is related to their 
‘objective function’, in other words, what they want to maximise in life.  Empirical evidence 
suggests fishers are heterogeneous in their objective functions.  For example, one fisher’s 
objective function may be to make as much money as possible, while another may be to 
balance time between family and work (Abernethy et al., 2007).  In addition, individuals don’t 
necessarily make choices independently of other decision makers (see below).  A person’s 
objective function and the interactions they have determine the decisions they make.   Thus, 
when we consider the behaviour of a fleet of vessels, it is necessary to consider that fishers 
have heterogeneous objective functions, which can lead to heterogeneous decision processes, 
which can lead to heterogeneous outcomes, such as where to go to fish.   
 
Decision-making that is determined by heterogeneous, complex and shifting optimisation 
criteria, long-term strategic goals and access to information are the three main challenges to 
the standard models of location choice.  In this section I use alternative behavioural theories 
and empirical evidence as well as the research in fisher behaviour to provide a comprehensive 
summary of factors that can influence fisher1 behaviour beyond what is found in statistical 
models of location choice.  For social and interdisciplinary researchers wanting to understand 
fisher behaviour this summary may be useful for designing methods for research.  Fishers 
develop different strategies in response to their particular human, social, cultural and 
economic contexts (Béné, 1996, Allison, 2003).  Therefore it is important to consider the trade-
                                                          
1 When referring to fisher behaviour, I am primarily talking about skipper behaviour (as opposed to 
crew) as they are the primary decision makers. 
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offs against profit-based goals with other objective functions such as well being and 
consumption satisfaction , risk minimisation, and the constraints of knowledge and ability, 
competitive or collaborative interactions between fishers, and the institutional and incentive 
structures present in the fishery.   Drawing upon the existing literature and disciplines outside 
fisheries science may provide a deeper understanding of fishers’ behaviour and how these 
relate to their fishing decisions. 
 
6.1. Profit  
Most formal mathematical models of fisher decision making assume that fishers operate to 
fulfil individual profit maximisation goals (Pascoe and Mardle, 2005).  A direct result of this 
assumption can be seen in the data-rich location choice models described in Table 1.  It is 
often explicitly stated in these papers that profit-based variables have been selected a priori 
(Campbell and Hand, 1999, Hutton et al., 2004).   While profit will certainly motivate where 
skippers’ choose to fish, it may not be their only motive and it may also be constrained.  One 
study has looked at profit maximisation strategies quantitatively.  Christensen & Raakjaer 
(2006) used interviews and questionnaires to identify three broad strategy types in the Danish 
demersal fishery and found that less than ten percent of fishers had a strategy based strongly 
on profit maximisation criteria.  They termed this strategy ‘pushing the edge’, and this smaller 
section of fishers (8.7% of fishers) owned large boats, had high geographical mobility, they 
embraced and invested in new technology, fished 24hrs a day, were highly organised and 
skilful skippers, and were constantly developing new ideas to improve profitability. In 
comparison, the second fishing strategy was to be risk averse – fishers were minimising costs 
(47.6% of fishers).  These fishers had a family history of fishing and did not want to get into 
debt like previous generations.  They avoided financial risk and accepted lower returns by 
fishing close to harbour, and could enter and exit the fishery easily through having alternative 
sources of income.  These fishers also placed a high value on leisure time with their family and 
community.  The third strategy was to specialise in one preferred fishing method (43.7% of 
fishers), despite alternatives to exploit other and potentially more profitable fisheries.  They 
were financially risk averse and careful investors, and depended on a good peer network and a 
high level of information exchange to catch fish.  They tended to either be young fishers who 
spent a lot of time at sea, or older fishers who valued their leisure time.  These other two 
strategies identified profit maximisation motivation but not to the same extent as the group of 
‘pushing the edge’ fishers and they used different mechanisms to be profitable such as 
alternative sources of income or specialisation.  One can see from this analysis that fishing 
strategies are highly diverse and many factors contribute to heterogeneity of profit 
maximisation goals.   
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6.1.1 Social interactions  
The notion that resource users act only to maximise their own self interest is contentious.  
Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons”, emphasises that open access resources are vulnerable to 
overexploitation because resource users have no incentive to conserve for the future (Hardin, 
1968).  This assumption is often a good reflection of open access resources with no societal 
control, however it is important to distinguish between open access (resources that are not 
owned by anyone) and common pool resources (resources ‘owned’ by a group of individuals 
where access and use is controlled).  In a response to Hardin’s paper, ‘The benefits of the 
commons’ by Berkes et al. (1989), the authors argue and provide evidence that Hardin’s model 
is not always upheld for common pool resources.  Individual interest is constrained by 
institutional arrangements and social pressures can modify behaviour.  In other words, 
because people talk to each other and live within communities, decision making to a degree 
can be modified by sanctions imposed by social ties and networks.  The types of access to 
resources varies widely between different countries and different fisheries, yet the assumption 
that resource users are individualistic and rational prevails and underpins fisheries economics.   
 
6.1.2. Satisficing behaviour & wellbeing 
Empirical behavioural economics studies have indicated that objective functions are complex, 
and that pursuit of individual profit maximisation behaviour is traded off with social 
interactions (Camerer et al., 1997, Dawnay and Shah, 2005, Camerer and Fehr, 2006).  
Satisficing behaviour is a decision-making strategy that attempts to meet a level of adequacy 
rather than maximisation.  In other words, once a level of need is satisfied, human behaviour is 
not necessarily motivated by maximising profit alone (Jager et al., 2000, Dawnay and Shah, 
2005).  In the case of fisheries, fishers may appear to be satisfied with recovering their costs or 
keeping catch constant.  For example, fishers in San Felipe in Mexico have to maintain a catch 
of 300 kg a month to retain membership in the fishing cooperative, and some concentrate on 
only meeting this level of catch (Salas 2000 in Salas and Gaertner, 2004).  In the Caribbean on 
the island of Anguilla, a significant proportion of fishers chose to catch lobsters during the day 
and forgo the higher returns of fishing at night, because they valued their evening leisure time 
more (Abernethy et al., 2007).  This type of satisficing behaviour tends to be more common in 
small-scale fisheries where lower capital and daily investment is required (Salas and Gaertner, 
2004) but has also been observed in larger scale operations where fishing harder and making 
more money is traded off with leisure time, particularly in older fishers (Christensen and 
Raakjaer, 2006) (see also Chapter 3).    These findings are not contrary to labour economics 
which include leisure time as a fundamental variable.  However, the value of leisure time is not 
explicitly considered in many fisheries economic models.  Other lifestyle considerations such as 
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independence, tradition and community solidarity were emphasised as the objective functions 
UK inshore fishers sought to maximise, with resulting trade-offs against maximum achievable 
profits (Allison, 2003).   
 
6.1.3. Rules of thumb 
People are often not consistent or coherent in their decision making (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1981).  Responses under uncertain outcomes can lead to decision-making processes that 
appear to bypass cognitive deduction and self-maximisation criteria (Dawnay and Shah, 2005).  
To mitigate lack of knowledge in an uncertain environment, people often use defaults such as 
habits and ‘rules of thumb’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Camerer et al., 1997, Gintis, 2000).  
Fishers may use simple rules of thumb because the costs of solving complicated optimisation 
problems are too high.  In other words, it is not rational for a fisher to spend a lot of time 
directly thinking and researching where to fish given all the other tasks he/she may have to do.  
It may be more ‘optimal’ for that individual to use simple ‘rules of thumb’ in the decision 
making and maximise the time actually fishing.  An example of this is Alaskan skippers’ choices 
of where to fish (Gatewood, 1983).  Gatewood concluded that it was impossible for skippers to 
compute an optimal location decision and that skippers tended to follow ‘hunches’ and then 
rationalise their decision afterwards.  It is also observed that fishers may be habitual, and 
always choose the same location to fish because of inertia to change (Durrenberger and 
Palsson, 1986, Curtis and Hicks, 2000, Prellezo et al., 2009). 
 
6.2. Risk   
Fishers operate under high levels of uncertainty.  For example, there can be uncertainty 
surrounding where the fish are; the catchability of the fish; what the expected environmental 
conditions will be during fishing; the fluctuations of the fish market itself; as well as future 
institutional uncertainties such as changing regulations.  Understanding fisher behaviour under 
uncertainty requires attention to physical risk (to the vessel and crew on board, posed by 
occupational hazards) and financial risk (variability in returns due to variable fish abundance, 
fish prices, and regulation change) and the relationship between them.   The combination of 
potential mortality risk and financial risk  is said to make fishing a unique profession (Smith and 
Wilen, 2005) and has led to an assertion by some researchers that all fishers are inherently 
‘risk-takers’ (McGoodwin, 1990).  This oversimplifies the economic environment a fisher 
operates within and ignores potential heterogeneity within a fleet for coping with uncertainty 
(Smith and Wilen, 2005).  In fact, the large uncertainty of income can mean the opposite - that 
a fisher must have a clear long-term risk strategy for anticipating and coping with risk (Firth, 
1966).  Similarly Graham and Wiener (1995) at the Harvard Centre for Risk analysis examine 
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risk taking by regulators, and stress that in order to avoid opposing risks (such as physical and 
financial risks), decision makers need to consider the full set of risk trade-offs to reduce risks.  
In support of this, in discussions about risks with fishers in southwest England (See Chapter 3), 
skippers found it difficult to define their attitudes towards physical and financial risk 
separately, instead they talked about the types of risk trade-offs they made.  Spurious 
conclusions about risk taking or risk aversion may be made if it is presumed that decision 
makers only consider one form of risk when they are actually managing multiple risks.  For 
example, say fisher behaviour is modelled using a single risk type, there is a possibility that a 
fisher may have the capacity to offset this risk or understate a fisher’s tolerance to risk 
because another risk is of the same nature rather than in opposition.  There are few studies in 
economics that examine the relationship between financial and physical risk. Using an 
experimental economics approach, Barsky et al. (1997) found that there was a positive 
correlation between risk tolerance and undertaking risky behaviours such as smoking and 
investing in stocks, whereas Slovic’s (1972) psychometric research indicated that there was 
independence between risk tolerance and different behavioural responses according to 
different types of risk.  It has also been shown that there are intercultural differences in risk 
perception - people from different countries display different perceptions of risk (Sjoberg et 
al., 2004).  Thus there are substantial intercultural and intra-cultural differences in the way 
people perceive and respond to risks.  In the only study of the relationship between physical 
and financial risks in fisheries, Smith and Wilen (2005) found that there was a correlation 
between financial and physical risk takers, while the research I undertook in the southwest of 
England showed that there is not necessarily a relationship between the two types of risk (see 
Chapter 3).  To understand fisher’s risk taking behaviour it is necessary to understand that an 
individual fisher’s strategy incorporates tactics to alleviate irreducible uncertainty and they will 
also have an overarching attitude toward risk which is determined by a person’s perceptions of 
risk - the subjective judgements that people make about the characteristics and severity of a 
risk.     
 
6.2.1. Risk aversion strategies  
Although there is variation, the literature reveals an overall tendency toward risk averse 
behaviour in commercial fisheries (Eggert and Martinsson, 2004) (see Table 1 and 2).  This is 
consistent with ‘prospect theory’, which was developed as a psychologically realistic 
alternative to expected utility theory.  It shows that people are more inclined to put more 
effort into preventing a loss than winning a gain (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  Profit 
maximisation behaviour in fisheries is often constrained by financial and physical risk aversion.  
For example, studies have observed that a significant portion of a fishing fleet will choose to 
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operate close to harbour despite the potential for greater reward at sites further away.  This 
can be for safety reasons (Béné, 1996, Robinson and Pascoe, 1997, van Oostenbrugge et al., 
2001, Swain and Wade, 2003), because the cost of fishing further away is too high and returns 
are uncertain (Hilborn and Ledbetter, 1979), or because of the travel time to market 
jeopardising the quality of caught fish due to spoiling (van Oostenbrugge et al., 2001).  Fishers 
trade-off the physical risk of fishing against the financial rewards of fishing.  However, the 
trade-offs are heterogeneous within a fleet.  Some fishers may choose to take more physical 
risks because they have a more reliable vessel and experienced crew compared to other 
fishers, some fishers may take more physical risks because they are under high financial 
pressure, or other fishers may simply be more risk taking because of their overarching risk 
preference (Chapter 3)  (Smith, 2002, Smith and Wilen, 2005).     
 
A fisher may also trade-off fishing an area of high catch variability with the potential of a 
windfall, against the financial security of fishing in a known patch with lower catch variability.  
Fishers have shown risk-averse behaviour choosing lower and consistent returns over higher 
but more variable returns (McCay, 1981, Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983, Pradhan and Leung, 
2004, Abernethy et al., 2007).   On the other hand, studies have shown that a portion of fishing 
fleets are not risk averse, and choose to seek higher returns despite their variability (Holland 
and Sutinen, 1999, Mistiaen and Strand, 2000, Branch et al., 2006).  A clear example of this is 
the highly threatened Chinese bahaba (Bahaba taipingensis) fishery which has declined to 1% 
of its 1960 population.  The bahaba’s highly prized and valued swim bladder ($US 20000-64000 
per kg in 2000-01) combined with low cost fishing effort incentivises fishermen to target 
bahaba despite its rarity (Sadovy and Cheung, 2003).   It has been suggested that risk-taking 
behaviour may be related to financial security, with financially secure fishers able to take more 
financial risks because they have reserves to overcome the shortfall if not successful (van 
Oostenbrugge et al., 2001, Eggert and Martinsson, 2004).  Conversely, risk-taking behaviour 
has been associated with minimising the likelihood of financial loss.  For example a study was 
carried out on illegal fishing behaviour in the mackerel-rich Norwegian waters.  EU vessels 
caught illegally fishing in the Norwegian zone are subject to fines ranging from £85,000 to 
£500,000.  Hart (1997) found that if the hold of an EU fishing vessel was less than half full by 
the end of a trip, these fishers were more likely to make up the short fall by risking fishing 
illegally in Norwegian waters. 
 
It is clear from these studies that fishers’ risk preferences and how they make risk trade-offs is 
very heterogeneous among and within fleets, which can result in very different patterns of 
behaviour such as location choice.  The heterogeneity of risk behaviour appears to be the 
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result of interactions between personality characteristics and risk preferences of the individual 
fisher, attitudes to uncertainty, individual wealth, and vessel and crew characteristics. 
 
6.2.2. Influence of other fishers   
Allen & McGlade (1986) identified two different risk strategies adopted by fishers in the 
Scotian shelf groundfish fishery, and called them ‘stochasts’ and ‘cartesians’.  ‘Stochasts’ are 
hunters who explore the unknown in search of good catch.  They are financial and physical 
risk- takers, but the rewards are potentially very high.  Conversely, ‘cartesians’ are followers, 
preferring to not take risks and fish where the returns are known even if they are low, or fish 
where other vessels fish.  Following-behaviour in humans is a common social phenomenon 
that is used to mitigate lack of knowledge.  Humans look to others to see how to behave 
especially if there are ‘experts’ to follow (Cialdini, 1993). A following strategy, where fishers 
choose to go where others are fishing, has also been observed by many fisheries researchers 
(Cove, 1973, Vignaux, 1996, Dorn, 1997, Holland and Sutinen, 2000, Ruttan and Tyedmers, 
2007).   Vignaux (1996) suggests there are three ways that fishers may justify fishing with other 
vessels and accept lower returns than striking out on their own or exploratory fishing may 
provide.  Firstly, a skipper may choose to fish where other vessels are because it is an indicator 
of fish location.  Secondly, fishing with other vessels minimises the risk that catch will be less 
than the rest of the fleet.  Finally, fishing with other vessels provides a rationale for a location 
choice.  If catch is bad, it can be attributed to ‘bad luck’ rather than poor decision making.  
There are two other possible reasons for following where others fish.  Fishing with others may 
reduce physical risk because help is at hand if something goes wrong.  Following also 
minimises the computational costs (factoring in variables such as season, weather, tides, costs 
of distance) of deciding where to go.  
 
Given that there is variation in risk preference, there is also likely to be variation in individual 
catch rates as a result (Branch et al., 2006).  Some skippers repeatedly catch large quantities of 
fish, often termed ‘highliners’, while other skippers consistently catch lower quantities of fish.  
Highliners tend to be stochasts - leaders and the innovators in the fishery, usually the first to 
develop new resources (Allen and McGlade, 1986, Holland and Sutinen, 2000).   They also tend 
to be generalist fishers, with high mobility and flexibility to move between fishery types 
(Christensen and Raakjaer, 2006).  The reason why a skipper chooses one risk strategy over 
another remains uncertain.  It may be simply a factor of a skipper’s personality or financial 
security.  Or, it could be due to the skippers’ ability or knowledge, which can mitigate the risk 
of being a stochast and/or a highliner.   
 
52 
 
6.3. Knowledge  
Even an overriding profit motive does not mean that a fisher will actually obtain high level of 
profits on any given trip.  Foremost, fishers are trying to extract a resource they cannot see.  
Fishers may have a good understanding of local fish dynamics through experience or via 
technology such as fish finders, depth finders and GPS, but they may only have a probabilistic 
knowledge of the value of the resource at each site (Allen and McGlade, 1986, Robinson and 
Pascoe, 1997).  This is particularly true for fisheries that are mixed species or migratory 
species, typical of coastal shelf sea fisheries (Holland and Sutinen, 1999).  If fishers did have 
perfect knowledge and if behaviour was solely determined by profit maximising decisions, 
then (a) fishers would always go to where the fish are, and (b) fishing effort would be expected 
to be distributed so that average profit will equalise among fishing areas of varying fish 
densities and among fishers (if fishing ability is controlled for) (Gordon, 1954, Hilborn, 1985) 
which means they would fit the null hypothesis of the IFD.  In empirical cases deviations from 
the IFD have been due to variation in factors discussed above - attitudes toward personal and 
financial risk, tradition and inertia to change - as well as lack of perfect knowledge of the 
resource (Holland and Sutinen 1999; Rjinsdorp et al. 2000; Swain and Wade 2003).  The role of 
knowledge and types of knowledge are now discussed. 
 
Gordon’s (1954) economic theory of fisheries assumes that fishers are equal in their 
acquisition of perfect information and are aware of opportunities to increase profits by 
changing locations.  The difficulties associated with finding fish is assumed away (Wilson, 
1990).   Profit rates in different areas and the overall economic efficiency of the fishery is 
reduced when the flow of information between fishers is too low (Allen and McGlade, 1986, 
Holland and Sutinen, 2000).  Given that the ocean is large, complex and often undergoes rapid 
changes means that no individual fisher can have perfect knowledge, and there is 
heterogeneity in what different people know. Knowledge such as understanding weather 
systems and the ecology and behaviour of the environment can reduce uncertainty and bring 
higher rewards (Allen and McGlade, 1986, Abernethy et al., 2007) and an intimate 
understanding of market demands and fluctuations can help maximise revenues and reduce 
economic risks.  The role of knowledge of fishers has been researched in terms of the value of 
fishers’ knowledge for understanding ecosystems and fishery dynamics for fisheries 
management (Berkes et al., 2000, Stead et al., 2006):  
 
“When it comes to understanding fish behaviour and the many environmental 
factors that help determine and predict it, marine biologists must often take a 
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back seat. This is hardly surprising. There are hundreds of times as many 
fishermen today than there are marine biologists, and their forebears were plying 
their trade and passing on their accumulated knowledge tens of centuries before 
anyone ever heard of marine biology. What is surprising is how little effort has 
been made by scientists to search out and record this information” (Johannes, 
1978). 
 
Determining the complex role of knowledge, the heterogeneity of individual knowledge and 
the sharing of knowledge for understanding the complexity of fisher behaviour has primarily 
been undertaken by anthropologists (Johannes, 1978, Acheson, 1981).  Knowledge can be 
divided into three types that can influence behaviour – public knowledge, knowledge through 
networks, and individual knowledge. Public knowledge, such as national weather forecasts, or 
new fishing equipment is knowledge potentially equally accessible to all skippers.  Although 
there can be variation in how/if individual skippers access public knowledge, for understanding 
the heterogeneity of fishers knowledge and how this relates to behaviour such as location 
choice, it is more important to consider knowledge through networks and individual 
knowledge, and this is discussed below. 
 
6.3.1. Knowledge through networks 
Knowledge through networks is how fishers gain knowledge through other people.  Access to 
this knowledge may not be available to all and a skipper’s strategy will depend on which 
networks he/she belongs to.  Many different strategies of knowledge transfer have been 
reported both between fisheries and within fisheries (Branch et al., 2006).  In some cases, 
competition precludes information sharing (Cove, 1973, Vignaux, 1996), and can even result in 
deliberate misleading of other skippers (Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986, Palmer, 1990).  
However information can still be subversively gained in a number of ways such as finding out 
what other skippers catch was and where (Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986), or using the 
location of other boats as an indicator of fish location (Cove, 1973, Dorn, 1997, Little et al., 
2004).  Alternatively, information sharing and collusion can be beneficial.  When information is 
shared, it is often associated with networks of fishers using similar fishing methods, close kin 
ties and long-standing relationships, and requires reciprocity (Gatewood, 1984a, Palmer, 1991, 
Crona and Bodin, 2006).  This is in line with psychologists and sociologists who argue that 
individuals are most influenced by others who they have frequent interactions with (Cooley, 
1909, Festinger et al., 1950, Homans, 1950, Kadushin, 1966).  Therefore it should not be 
assumed that knowledge acquisition is uniform among a fishing fleet.  Social network analysis 
54 
 
is a method used to map the patterns of information exchange and has been applied 
empirically to uncover the knowledge interactions between groups of fishers in fishing 
communities (Wasserman and Faust, 1994, Scott, 2000, Crona and Bodin, 2006).   
 
Lake Malawi is a particular case where information sharing makes more sense than 
competition.  Artisanal fishers concentrate their fish landings in one place and make the 
landing location known to others in the fishery.  This means that buyers congregate at one 
landing site and compete for supply, which is good for the prices fishers’ receive for their 
goods.  The alternative of keeping location and landing site a secret is that a fisher may arrive 
at a landing site with a large catch of fish and there are few or even no buyers, and bargaining 
power on price is drastically reduced.  In this fishery there is also a limited range of fishing craft 
which has the effect of concentrating fishing in one place.  Therefore in this case, group 
location choice is driven by shared information on fishing location and market location (Allison 
and Mvula, 2002).  Thus, it is important to understand the types of knowledge and how 
knowledge is shared between different groups because this can have implications for fisher 
location choice and the distribution and concentration of fishing effort. 
 
6.3.2. Individual skipper knowledge and ability 
There has been considerable and lively debate surrounding whether some skippers are more 
skilled at catching fish than others since the 1980s.  Anthropologists, interested in folk models 
and associated ideologies of individuality, embodied knowledge and ‘luck’, conducted most of 
the early research and referred to skipper skill as the ‘skipper effect’.  Now economists and 
fisheries scientists have entered the discussion as there are potential ramifications of 
differential skipper ability for fisheries management strategies such as vessel buy-back 
schemes.  Vessel buy-backs are a common management tool for reducing fishing effort in the 
fishery where the governing body buy out skippers’ vessels, reducing the number of fishing 
boats.   However, vessel buy-backs have been shown to be both expensive and ineffective at 
removing total effort because they remove only the least efficient vessels leading to increased 
competition and effort among the remaining successful vessels who may invest in better 
technology.  Thus, the effort removed often seeps back into the system which can necessitate 
another round of buy-backs (Clark et al., 2005, Hentrich and Salomon, 2006).  At an extreme, 
Hilborn (1985) argues that if the skipper effect exists and the aim is to reduce fishing effort, 
then buybacks should not aim to reduce the number of boats randomly, but remove the most 
successful skippers.  However, if sectoral efficiency and net economic contribution of fisheries 
is the goal of fisheries policy (e.g., wealth-based fishery management, which puts resource 
55 
 
rent at the heart of the management process (Cunningham and Neiland, 2005)), then the most 
successful and efficient vessels should be encouraged. 
 
Attempts to measure the skipper effect has yielded mixed results.  This has been primarily due 
to confusion of the definition of skipper ability as well as the choice of research approach.  
Early papers did not attempt to define skipper ability.  Instead, researchers assumed skipper 
ability to be the portion of unexplained variance in catch that could not be attributed to vessel 
characteristics or effort.  One of the first authors to explore this notion was Acheson (1977 in 
1981) who found that 39% of the variance in the Maine lobster fishery was unexplained by 
physical factors, effort or education.  Technical efficiency2 could explain 35% of catch variance 
in English Channel demersal trawlers, but 65% remained unexplained and was attributed to 
skipper/crew skill and education (Pascoe and Coglan, 2002).  Conversely, Palsson & 
Durrenberger (1982, 1983, 1984) found little evidence of the skipper effect in Icelandic cod 
fishers.  They found that vessel size and number of trips were better predictors of catch.  
However a second study repeating the analyses, and using independently collected data in the 
same region, found unexplained variance for large (63%) and small vessels (25%) (Bjarnason & 
Thorlindsson, 1993).  They also found that a few skippers did consistently well over several 
consecutive years.  In response, Palsson & Durrenberger (1990) accepted that the skipper 
effect may exist, but it is less important than cultural tradition and folk ideologies suggest, and 
that the impact of the skipper effect can depend on the society.  In some societies differences 
in success may be better explained by technical factors.  However, it has also been contended 
that technical advantages such as vessel size could be a proxy for skipper skill, with better 
fishers making more money that can be then invested into larger and better boats (Gatewood, 
1984b).   
 
The debate has turned more recently to trying to determine what the causes for differences in 
catch rates.  Once again, there is no clear answer.  Higher education level has been found to be 
a factor explaining increased technical efficiency in commercial fisheries (Kirkley et al., 1998, 
Almeida et al., 2003, Esmaeili, 2006).  Experience and family history of fishing has also been 
attributed to increased technical efficiency (Pascoe and Coglan, 2002, Esmaeili, 2006).  
Interestingly, Tingley et al. (2005) found that the value of experience and education was 
dependent on the type of gear.  For mobile gear fishers, technical efficiency increased with 
education and family history, and decreased with experience.  For stationary gear, technical 
                                                          
2
 Technical efficiency measures the ability of vessels to maximise output using a given set of inputs.  In 
this case, (Pascoe and Coglan, 2002) incorporated number of crew, ratio of crew to boat size, ratio of 
engine to boat size, boat age, a measure of specialisation, a measure o experience in the fishery, and 
gear type. 
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efficiency increased with experience, but was negatively influenced by age and formal 
education.  In another study, two skippers who had the same type of vessel, same gear and 
targeted the same species, were the same age, with the same experience, education, and 
family history were compared.  One skipper was consistently more successful than the other 
(Kirkley et al., 1998).  Deeper reasons for differences in ability are required to understand the 
‘skipper effect’.  It may be that some skippers are better managers (Kirkley et al., 1998), or 
perhaps some skippers have better access to information about fish stocks (Christensen and 
Raakjaer, 2006).  It could also be a case of success breeding success: if a skipper is successful, 
then this attracts a good crew and with little turnover, thus increasing the chances of success 
(Abernethy et al., 2010). 
 
Understanding the heterogeneity of skippers in terms of their knowledge and skill may mean 
that fishers could be categorised into different groups and their fishing effort and locations 
could be more accurately predicted than if it is assumed that all skippers/vessels are equal in 
their knowledge capacity (see Chapter 3 for empirical study of categorisation based partly on 
knowledge).  
 
 6.4. Institutions and incentives 
6.4.1. Management 
Fisheries management tends to be focussed on the status of the stocks and how to control 
fishing effort and there is a wide variety of systems designed to do this.  Management regimes 
that regulate access to fisheries are increasing in interest and use, such as marine protected 
areas (MPAs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs).  The system of management of a 
fishery can alter efficiency, incentives and therefore constrain and alter fisher behaviour (See 
Branch et al., 2006 for detailed review, Prellezo et al., 2009).  Table 3 provides a summary of 
potential fisher behavioural responses to different management regimes.   
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Table 3. Examples of different fisheries management systems and possible fisher behavioural 
responses observed empirically. 
Management 
system 
Fisher behavioural responses Empirical example 
Marine protected 
areas 
Redistributes fishing effort  (Hiddink et al., 2006) 
Season length 
restrictions 
Switch from being generalist fisher to specialist 
fishers, causing market glut and reducing fish prices. 
Lowered profitability can change fisher behaviour - 
fishers may increase the risks they take, operating in 
bad weather 
(Pautzke and Oliver, 
1997) (Chapter 5) 
Vessel and gear 
restrictions 
Switching gear types because of reduced economic 
efficiency, investing in unregulated inputs. 
(Wilen, 1979, Metzner 
and Ward, 2002) 
Total allowable catch 
and quota 
Strategies may change throughout the year as yearly 
quotas are used up. Fishers may concentrate their 
fishing effort for a particular species at the start of a 
season, or decide to wait and target the species when 
prices are higher. 
Illegal fishing and misreporting 
Increased high grading and discards 
(Copes, 1986, Revill et 
al., 2007) 
Individual transferable 
quotas 
ITQs provide flexibility to the fisher in terms of when 
and where to fish. Instead of capital and resources 
being spent on maximising the volume of catch, 
strategies may shift to improving the quality of fish 
caught and increasing the diversity of fish species 
caught 
(Grafton et al., 2006) 
 
6.4.2. Vessel ownership 
The ownership structure of the boats in a fishery may impact upon individual fisher strategies.  
Skippers may own their own boats or work for a firm and differential risk to investment could 
alter the motivation and incentives for fishing among owner-operators and contract-skippers.  
For example, non-owner skippers do not need to incorporate decisions about whether to 
update equipment into their strategy (Mardle and Hutton, 2005) or devote time to market 
considerations (see Chapter 3).  Unlike economic research in agricultural systems (Acharya and 
Ekelund, 1998), there have been few fisheries studies that have examined the role of 
ownership in influencing strategies and output - and the results of these few studies have been 
highly variable.  There may be no difference in overall catch and effort by owner-skippered and 
non-owner-skippered boats (Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986), skipper owners may be more 
efficient than non-owner skippers (Sharma and Leung, 1999, Esmaeili, 2006, Abernethy et al., 
2010), or non-owner skippers may have higher output than skipper owners (Kirkley et al., 
2003).   
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In political science and economics, the principal-agent model provides insights and explains 
the dynamics underlying the strategies of different types of organisation, or hierarchies which 
could be applied to skippers in a given fishing operation.  The principal-agent setting is the 
relationship between the principal (e.g. owner of the vessel) and the agent (skipper who works 
for the principal).  Various mechanisms and incentives may be used to try to align the interests 
of the agent with those of the principal and thus alter observed behaviour.  A common 
mechanism used in fisheries is profit-sharing, where the skipper and crew are paid a share of 
the revenue of the catch.  Stiglitz (1974) explains sharing outputs as an institution to share 
risks and provide incentives in situations where the monitoring of worker input is costly.  
Profit-sharing is used in both systems of skipper- and company-owned vessels and the specifics 
of the profit-sharing arrangement will influence overall strategies of skippers and effectiveness 
of the crew.  For example, when company-owned vessels have a higher output than skipper-
owned vessels (Kirkley et al., 2003), it may be due to appropriate share incentives for skippers 
and crew, alongside financial security that the skipper-owners do not have.  On the other 
hand, the system provided by company-owned vessels may not induce a skipper strategy of 
highest possible returns.  For example, skippers of the Newfoundland offshore fishery were 
found not to be motivated by gaining the highest catch, but by being the ‘best skipper’, even 
though they are paid on a share system.  ‘I don’t really care how much I catch as long as it is 50 
more than the next guy” (Cove, 1973, p254).  In this case, skipper jobs were competitive and 
scarce and by being the ‘best’ skipper, one gained job security and crew stability (Cove, 1973).  
Thus the ownership structure and sharing system can alter motivations of fishers and can 
influence strategies and behaviour. 
 
6.4.3. Market structure of the fishery 
Fisher behaviour will also be influenced by the market structure of the fishery – how the 
fishery is organised in terms of vessels number and the number of owners.  Economic theory 
suggests that in a perfectly competitive market, there should be many firms, any one of which 
has too small a market share to influence the price of the good.  Markets that are dominated 
by a few firms (oligopoly), two firms (duopoly), or one firm (monopoly) are less competitive (in 
that order).  For example, the system of management can alter the number of participants, 
alter its competitive nature, and therefore alter fishing decision-making strategies.   A 
widespread observation of the individual transferable quota (ITQ) system is that incentives are 
redirected away from secretive and competitive behaviour, and towards cooperation in joint 
ventures (Pearse and Walters, 1992).  This inevitably results in harvesting rights concentrated 
among a few operators, an oligopoly market structure (Grafton, 1996).  This has been 
observed in New Zealand which has a comprehensive ITQ system of fisheries management.  In 
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this case, there has been a reduction in the number of firms, most acute in fisheries that 
originally had a wide range of vessels and gears (Stewart and Callagher, 2003, Newell et al., 
2002).  This has been at the cost of social equity, and an erosion of the family-based units, and 
an increase in ecologically damaging practices such as discarding marketable fish when new 
catches bring individuals of higher value (high-grading) (Symes and Crean, 1995). 
 
6.4.4. Market for fish 
The market for fish and the influence of fish prices and buying companies can determine 
decision making strategies (see Chapters 5 and 6).  The market price of fish can fluctuate, 
which can influence target species choice (Béné, 1996, Holland and Sutinen, 1999), and can 
have knock on effects for location choices at sea (Lane, 1989, Dupont, 1993, Abernethy et al., 
2010).  Market price can also influence the fishing method used which may change patterns of 
effort.  For example, adding value to seafood products through differentiation such as 
premium and eco-friendly products can command higher prices at market (Babcock and 
Weninger, 2004, Revill et al., 2007, Nautilus Consultants Ltd, 2008).  This creates incentives for 
fishers to pursue these opportunities given there are appropriate interventions in the market 
chain creating consumer demand (e.g. via certification schemes). 
     
The institutional set up of the market can also influence fisher behaviour.  Even though all fish 
markets operate slightly differently, they tend to be auction markets in Europe.  The price 
received at market is generally dependant on the amount of fish being sold on a given day.  
When supply is low, or there is high demand, buyers compete harder with each other and 
prices are likely to be higher.  Therefore, the fish buyers have the price-setting power, which in 
turn can impact fishers choice of species to target, choice of location and time to land 
(Abernethy et al., 2010).  The more competition there is between buyers, the better fish prices 
tend to be, and the less power fish buyers have.  The price setting power of buyers can be 
challenged and altered via fishermen’s marketing cooperatives (Kitts and Edwards, 2003).  
 
Altering the structure of supply chains may influence the spatial distribution of fishing.  The 
supply chain and consumer demand determines the relative value of different seafood 
products.  In the UK, different fish markets specialise in different species that are caught in the 
region.  This can result in price differentials between ports for the same species and vessels 
choose to land at ports with higher prices, forcing a concentration of landings at fewer ports 
(see Chapters 3 and 6). If vessels adapt their fishing to target different species and sell at 
different markets in response to market forces, then this changes where they fish and where 
they fish from. Economic geography looks at the organisation of the spatial patterns of 
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production.  In other words, the location choice of firms not just in pure economic terms, but 
through an understanding of economics related to location choice in space (Lloyd and Dicken, 
1977).  They use formal mathematical models of location and are particularly interested in 
clustering of firms, which may be useful for understanding vessel responses to market forces.   
There is more literature that is theoretical than empirical, but empirical research does support 
the theory with industry level agglomeration benefits playing an important role in location 
decisions (Head et al., 1995).  Economic geographers try to link location choices to the 
geography of demand and also of supply. The goal of economic geography is to talk 
simultaneously about the centripedal forces that pull economic activity together and 
centrifugal forces that push it apart (Fujita and Krugman, 2004) and how the geographical 
structure of an economy is shaped by the tension between these forces.  Key to this approach 
is the recognition that the attractiveness of any location for production (for fisheries, the fish 
market) is represented by an index of market potential derived from underlying economics and 
it is the market potential that drives location choice.  This body of theory may be of use for 
predicting where vessels will concentrate to sell their goods and therefore where they will fish.   
  
6.5. Can greater understanding of fisher behaviour be useful for management? 
In the previous sections, the literature on the factors that influence human and fisher 
behaviour has been comprehensively reviewed.  There are an enormous number of factors 
that need to be considered in order to completely understand the heterogeneity and 
complexity of fisher behaviour, and a number of theories from disciplines outside fisheries that 
can contribute and frame our understanding.  The value of this review is primarily for fisheries 
scientists who want to understand fisher strategies and want to know the factors to be aware 
of when designing methods for research.  In this section a framework is presented for how 
understanding fisher strategies and behaviour fit into the wider picture of fisheries 
management.   
 
Based on Raakjaer Neilsen’s (2003) framework for understanding compliance and legitimacy in 
fisheries management, the costs of fisheries management are examined.  They are made up of 
information costs, decision making costs and monitoring, control and enforcement costs3 
(Figure 1.). 
 
 
                                                          
3
 Operational costs - the costs of undertaking fishing activities, the cost effectiveness of the fishing 
operation in relation to CPUE, price optimisation and side effects (such as socio-economic, bycatch, high 
grading, discards etc) of the management system in lace – are not included in this summary. See 
Raakjaer Neilson (2003) for details. 
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Figure 1. The relationship between costs of management and legitimacy of management 
information is critical for fisheries management and is the main determinant of the total costs 
of management.  There is often insufficient information, which increases the uncertainty of the 
decisions made for management action, which reduces the legitimacy of management for 
fishers.  This increases the costs of monitoring, control and enforcement required to prevent 
non compliance by fishers. 
 
 
The cost of fisheries management may be reduced if information on the strategies of fishers is 
incorporated (Figure 2).  In order to understand strategies, the trade-offs between profit, risk 
and knowledge need to determined as well as the constraints placed by the institutions and 
incentives present in the fishery.  Incorporating information on strategies may alleviate fishers’ 
legitimacy concerns and improve compliance because management will be better informed 
about how fishers are likely to respond to management action.  Furthermore, understanding 
fishers’ strategies may help to understand a fishing communities ability to adapt to uncertain 
and changing conditions (Chapter 3). 
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Figure 2. The role of incorporating fisher strategies for compliance and cost of management; 
and adaptation to uncertain and changing conditions.  Understanding fisher strategies include 
knowledge of the tradeoffs between profit, risk, knowledge and the institutions and incentives 
present. 
 
7. Conclusion  
This review has highlighted the consequences of not incorporating fisher behaviour in the 
management of fisheries.  It has also shown there is a wealth of theory from a number of 
disciplines and empirical evidence from which to improve research into fisher behaviour.  In 
order to understand the heterogeneity of fisher behaviour, social approaches are required. 
However, these approaches need to fit and compliment current fisheries research and 
management goals.  Therefore, interdisciplinary research which can use social approaches to 
uncover different fisher strategies and then incorporate these into approaches that are 
practical for fisheries policy makers to use, such as models that predict location choice in 
response to management actions, seems to be the most appropriate methodology. 
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1.  Abstract 
Fisheries managers recognise that there is a fundamental need to understand fisher behaviour 
to design appropriate incentives and disincentives. Policy often does not account for possible 
fisher behaviour in reaction to changes in fishery regulations, and policy frequently treats 
fishers as a homogeneous group without consideration of the heterogeneous strategies that 
underpin fisher decision-making within their particular individual, social, and economic 
contexts.   
 
This study aims to gain insights into the strategic behaviours of fishers.  A case study approach 
is used, and a new framework for analysis is developed, drawing on the strategic management 
literature and specifically the Miles and Snow (1978) typology.  The framework enabled 
integration of both fishers’ strategic choices and their individual characteristics to explain why 
fishermen fish where they do, choices made in how they fish, and what factors explain why 
some fishers continue to exist while others don’t.   Fishers are classified into four strategic 
archetypes – Prospectors, Defenders, Analysers and Reactors – for the fishery in the southwest 
of England based on a qualitative methodology using content analysis of in-depth interview 
transcripts.  The implications of understanding the strategic archetypes of fishers are discussed 
for predicting the efficacy of different management regimes with a focus on policy directed at 
fleet capacity management.   
 
This study is exploratory and results are preliminary but this approach encompasses previous 
and current thinking on fisher strategies and may be useful for overcoming existing disciplinary 
boundaries to enable a wider integration of fisher behaviour with fisheries management. 
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2. Introduction  
Fishers are hunters, searching for prey they cannot see.  Fishing is an economic activity but is 
also a deeply embedded social activity (McCay, 1981, Jentoft, 2000).  To be effective, a fisher 
needs to make decisions based on experience and knowledge of the distribution of resources 
and potential competitors, against a backdrop of opportunities, constraints and hazards that 
shape their choice of where, when and how to fish.  Fisheries management seeks to influence 
opportunities and impose constraints on fishing activity through the use of incentives that aim 
to change fisher behaviour in ways that make it more compatible with resource conservation, 
sectoral economic efficiency and/or other fishery management and biodiversity conservation 
goals. Thus, understanding the factors shaping fishers behaviour and developing the ability to 
accurately predict fisher response to changing incentives can inform and improve the 
effectiveness of resource management.   
 
Although fisheries management advisors recognise that there is a fundamental need to 
understand fisher behaviour to design appropriate incentives (Hilborn, 2007), EU fisheries 
policy, for example, does not account for possible fisher behaviour in reaction to changes in 
legislation, price or stock availability, or fishery regulations – including the widespread 
revisions suggested to EU fisheries policy in 2002.  Policy frequently treats fishers as fixed 
elements with “no consideration of individual attitudes based on their operating scales 
(geographical, ecological, social and economic) and personal goals” (Salas and Gaertner, 
2004).  Studying the strategic behaviour of fishers can help build resilience to and mitigate 
against the failure of fishery management policy by informing policy makers of the 
heterogeneous strategies that underpin fisher decision-making within their particular 
individual, social, and economic contexts.  Although this adds a layer of complexity to 
designing fisheries management policy, without this understanding, fishery management 
initiatives such as closed area, have been shown to fail (Rijnsdorp et al., 2001, Dinmore et 
al., 2003).  Understanding existing institutional frameworks can pay dividend in terms of 
increased compliance and reduced enforcement costs.  The key is to design a means of 
predicting fisher behaviour that will encompass enough of the complexity and 
heterogeneity of their behaviour while also yielding user-friendly outputs to make inclusion 
practical for policy design. 
 
Research has been undertaken to attempt to define the fishing strategies which drive fishing 
tactics such as location choice.  This research was conducted to challenge the relevance of 
assuming that all fishers are homogeneous in their pursuit of optimal efficiency or profit.  Allen 
& McGlade (1986) identified two different strategies adopted by fishers in the Scotian shelf 
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groundfish fishery, and called them ‘stochasts’ and ‘cartesians’.  ‘Stochasts’ are hunters who 
explore the unknown in search of good catch.  There are financial and physical risks but fishers 
take the risk as they believe the rewards are sufficiently high to compensate.  Conversely, 
‘cartesians’ are followers, and are risk averse.  They fish where the returns are known even if 
they are low, and typically follow other fishing vessels.  Following-behaviour in humans is a 
common social phenomenon that is used to mitigate lack of knowledge.  Humans look to 
others to see how to behave especially if there are ‘experts’ to follow (Cialdini, 1993).  This 
behaviour has been observed by many fisheries researchers (Cove, 1973, Vignaux, 1996, Dorn, 
1997, Holland and Sutinen, 2000, Ruttan and Tyedmers, 2007).    
 
Other researchers have classified fishers into conceptually similar categories.  Since the 19th 
century skippers who repeatedly catch large quantities of fish are called ‘highliners’.   
Highliners tend to be leaders and the innovators in the fishery, usually the first to develop new 
resources (Allen and McGlade, 1986, Holland and Sutinen, 2000).  Holland and Sutinen (2000) 
provide evidence that the type of strategy a fisher follows can predict a fisher’s location 
choice.  They use income as a proxy to define highliners.  Those earning in the top 20% of the 
fleet’s income distribution by vessel are classified as highliners.  By including a highliner 
strategy dummy variable in their model they found that highliners were more likely than other 
fishers to try new locations and suggested these individuals may be more informed than other 
fishers.   In contrast, others have observed that some fishers are habitual, and always choose 
the same location to fish because of inertia to change (Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986, Curtis 
and Hicks, 2000, Prellezo et al., 2009). 
 
Since the 1980s, there has been considerable and lively debate surrounding whether some 
skippers can be categorised as being more skilled at catching fish than others.    
Anthropologists, interested in folk models and associated ideologies of individuality (e.g. 
embodied knowledge and ‘luck’) conducted most of the early research and referred to skipper 
skill as the ‘skipper effect’.  One of the first authors to explore this notion was Acheson (1977 
in 1981) who found that 39% of the variance in the Maine lobster fishery catch was 
unexplained by physical factors, effort or education and concluded that there was a ‘skipper 
effect’.  Conversely, Palsson & Durrenberger (1982, 1983, 1984) found little evidence of the 
skipper effect in Icelandic cod fishers and observed that vessel size and number of trips were 
better predictors of catch.  However, it has also been suggested there is a relationship 
between the skipper effect and characteristics of vessels and that the technical advantage 
associated with vessel size could be a proxy for skipper skill; i.e., that better fishers have the 
resources to invest in larger and more technologically advanced boats (Gatewood, 1984).   
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 Christensen & Raakjaer (2006) qualitatively identified three broad strategy-types in the Danish 
demersal fishery using interviews and questionnaires.  The first fishing strategy was risk 
aversion – fishers were minimising costs (47.6% of fishers).  These fishers had a family history 
of fishing and did not want to get into debt like previous generations.  They avoided financial 
risk by fishing close to harbour, were flexible in terms of their target species and gear used, 
and could enter and exit the fishery easily through having alternative sources of income.  
These fishers also placed a high value on leisure time with their family and community.  The 
second strategy was to specialise in one preferred fishing method (43.7% of fishers).  These 
fishers were highly mobile and could easily move to better fishing grounds.  They were 
financially risk averse and careful investors, and depended on a good peer network and a high 
level of information exchange.  They tended to either be young fishers who spent a lot of time 
at sea, or older fishers who valued their leisure time.  The third strategy was called ‘pushing 
the edge’, and this smaller section of fishers was defined as profit-maximisers (8.7% of fishers). 
They owned large boats and had high geographical mobility, they embraced and invested in 
new technology, fished 24 hours a day, were highly organised and skilful skippers, and were 
constantly developing new ideas to improve profitability.   
 
In thinking how to move beyond the phenomenological or idiosyncratic contradictions in 
interpretation of fisher behaviour in the fisheries literature, it is useful to look to disciplines 
outside fisheries research which explain human behaviour and identify strategy types.  In non-
fishery contexts, empirical studies of human behaviour have tended to test assumptions of 
homogeneity of behaviour and perfect rationality (Dawnay and Shah, 2005, Camerer and Fehr, 
2006).  These alternative decision theories suggest that fisher strategies may develop in 
response to their particular human, social, cultural and economic contexts (See Chapter 2 for 
detailed discussion).   This includes: trade-offs against profit-based goals with other objectives 
such as well being, consumption satisfaction  and risk minimisation; the constraints of 
knowledge and ability; competitive or collaborative interactions; and the institutional 
(comprising formal constraints such as rules, laws, constitutions, and informal constraints such 
as norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of conduct) and incentive structures 
regulation imposes (Durrenberger and Palsson, 1986, Béné, 1996, Robinson and Pascoe, 1997, 
van Oostenbrugge et al., 2001, Allison, 2003, Branch et al., 2006). 
 
This study aims to gain insights into the strategic behaviour of fishers.  I use a case study 
approach, and develop a new framework for analysis and identification of the strategic choices 
of fishers and their individual characteristics. It is argued that without context-dependant 
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knowledge, one cannot develop an expert understanding of human behaviour (Flyvbjerg, 
2006). Without this knowledge it is difficult to develop policies aimed at changing that 
behaviour.  Therefore this study may provide some guidance for fisheries management that 
accounts for fishers’ behaviour and specifically the diversity in behaviour and strategies. In 
order to gain understanding of fisher strategies, qualitative data were gathered primarily using 
repeated in-depth interviews with fishers in southwest England.  To define fishers into robust 
easily-communicable strategy types I looked outside fisheries research to a widely-used 
framework developed in the strategic management literature to analyse and interpret our 
data.  This framework has been examining and empirically defining the strategic typologies of 
firms in a number of industries for over 30 years.  Our rationale is that the robustness of this 
approach has been forged through repeated application and refinement to encompass a wide 
array of human endeavours.  Strategic behaviour is defined in this literature as behaviour 
directed towards managing environment risks and matching organisational capabilities with 
the opportunities offered by the environment (Hofer and Schendel, 1978).  The framework 
presented is straightforward and hence easy to communicate, provides quantifiable results, is 
applicable to fishers and can provide insights into the strategic behaviour in different fisheries 
contexts.  While the study is exploratory and results preliminary this approach may develop 
current thinking on fisher strategies and may be useful for overcoming the disciplinary 
boundaries that exist to integrating fisher behaviour with fisheries management (Charles, 
1995, Jentoft, 2006).    
 
2.1. A strategic management perspective to understanding fishers’ strategic choices 
The fisheries literature recognises that fishers adopt different strategies and that these 
strategies are influenced by individual fisher attributes.  However, the existing attempts to 
understand fisher behaviour have used a range of conceptual starting points and provide 
highly context-specific results (see Chapter 2).  In addition, efforts to define broad fishing 
strategies have been limited to a small number of studies and therefore guidance for policy 
makers to effectively integrate fisher behaviour into management design has not been clear.  
In this study a new framework for analysing fishers strategic behaviour that will facilitate 
comparison to the diversity of behaviour employed in other industries and businesses is 
proposed.  The strategic management literature provides such a framework.    Fishers run a 
small business and make a number of strategic choices that influence the viability of their 
business.  The management literature is similarly interested in the strategic choices firms make 
in relation to the product-market domain; technology and scale of operation; structure and 
processes associated with their operations.  The strategic management literature is interesting 
79 
 
in understanding which configuration of choices will achieve optimal outcomes for the firm in 
order to inform practice.  I draw on this literature to develop a framework for understanding 
fishers’ strategic behaviour.    I combine the individual characteristics of fishers, identified in 
the fishers’ behaviour literature and also in the management psychology literature, into this 
framework.   
 
The strategic management literature uses a number of typologies to classify firms’ strategic 
choices (Miles and Snow, 1978, Porter, 1980).  I draw on the Miles and Snow typology to 
examine fishers’ strategic behaviour for several reasons.  First, it continues to be widely used 
to classify large and small firms’ strategic position (Miller and Toulouse, 1986a, Covin and 
Slevin, 1989, Borch et al., 1999, Hambrick, 2003) and subjected to considerable psychometric 
assessment (Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980, Hambrick, 1983, Shortell and Zajac, 1990). Second, it is 
a typology that captures the three broad problems and solutions faced by small and large firms 
in any industry including fishing firms:  (1) the entrepreneurial problem; (2) the engineering 
problem; (3) the administrative problem.  Third, researchers have used both quantitative and 
qualitative methods to operationalise the typology.  I thus use this typology as an integral part 
of the framework for analysing rich qualitative data collected from fishers to provide findings 
that have the potential to inform policy on fishery management.  
 
Miles and Snow (1978) identify three viable strategic archetypes – Prospectors, Defenders and 
Analysers, and one non-viable strategic type - Reactors.  Each type has its own unique strategy 
for relating to its chosen market(s), and each has a particular configuration of technology and 
administrative processes that are consistent with its market strategy.  
• Prospectors are firms which continually search for market opportunities, regularly 
experiment with emerging trends, are the creators of change and are at the forefront 
of new technologies.   
• Defenders seek to create a stable domain, producing a limited set of products and 
organise themselves to be highly expert in their domain and do not search for new 
opportunities.   
• Analysers are a combination of Prospector and Defender, on the one hand have a 
stable strategy and particular products they have expertise in, while also watching 
their competitors including Prospectors, and follow change, after observing the 
success of others  
• A fourth type of organisation is called the Reactor; a form of strategic ‘failure’ in that it 
is unstable, and inconsistencies exist amongst its strategy, technology, structure and 
process (for a full description of strategy types by Miles and Snow, see Appendix 1).   
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These typologies have some similarities with those used in the fishers’ behaviour literature.  
For example, ‘stochasts’, ‘highliners’ and the ‘pushing the edge’ strategy are conceptually 
similar to what Porter (1980) would classify as a ‘differentiation’ strategy; or what Miles and 
Snow (1978) would classify as a ‘Prospector’ strategy.  The ‘cartesians’ are similar to the Miles 
and Snow ‘defender’ strategy.    
 
This study captured data on three strategic qualities of fishers identified in the management 
literature and applied in the fisheries context, namely dynamism, innovation, and adaptability.  
Dynamism relates to a fisher’s short term flexibility, innovation relates to fishers’ long term 
flexibility and adaptability is fisher’s ability to adapt to changing and uncertain conditions.  I 
then use these qualities to identify their strategic approach to fishing (e.g., where to fish; how 
responsive they are to changes in environment) and their approach to solving the ‘engineering 
problem’ (primarily in relation to gear type and technology).  This enabled classification of 
fishers into four strategic archetypes – Prospectors, Defenders, Analysers and Reactors – for 
the fishery in the southwest of England based on a qualitative methodology using content 
analysis of in-depth interview transcripts.  I also examine the administrative processes that 
allow fishers to pursue their strategy (the ‘enablers’) based on Miles and Snow (1978). These 
enablers include the degree of interactions (communication and cooperation with others 
within and outside the southwest fishery), the type and level of planning the individuals 
undertake in the short and long term, the level of financial and physical risk-taking (putting 
themselves and/or vessel in danger), and the stability of their business (such as crew turnover, 
level of maintenance and focus on quality of product).  
 
Following previous research in the fishers’ literature I also explore whether there are individual 
characteristics that influence the strategic position adopted, such as the time horizon, level of 
household dependence on fishing income and their personal fishing ethic.  Personal 
characteristics of individuals have also been used in the management literature to understand 
managerial behaviour (Miller and Dröge, 1986, Miller and Toulouse, 1986a, Miller and 
Toulouse, 1986b).  The framework used to study fishers’ strategic behaviour, adapted from the 
Miles and Snow (1978) typology, is presented in Figure 1.   
 
The purpose in undertaking this study is to draw on management theory to provide a research 
framework which will inform our understanding of the strategic behaviour of fishers.  By 
examining the relationship between strategic position, administrative practices, and individual 
fisher characteristics, this study will improve our understanding of why some fishers are 
successful and some aren’t.  It will provide insights for policy makers when developing fishing 
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regulations that can cater to, and predict responses of different strategic archetypes, and how 
to develop incentives to influence strategies for better fisheries management outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 1. Typology framework for understanding fishing strategies 
 
3. Methods   
3.1. The study location 
The study was undertaken in a fishing community in the Southwest of England.  The field site 
has been anonymised and is referred to throughout the chapter as a ‘SW fishing community’.  
With the decline of North Sea stocks, the fishery in the southwest of England now harbours 
most of the remaining English fleet.  The southwest fishery is termed a ‘mixed fishery’: diverse 
in terms of gear type and species caught.  The five main types of vessels over 10 metres in 
length are beam trawlers and otter trawlers which catch up to twenty different demersal 
species such as monkfish (Lophius piscatorius), megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) and 
Dover sole (Solea solea); fixed netters which also target mixed species such as hake 
(Merluccius merluccius)and pollack (Pollachius pollachius), crab potters which mainly catch 
brown crab (Cancer pagurus) and lobster (Homarus gammarus) and scallop (Pecten maximus) 
dredgers.   
 
The three largest ports and markets in England are Newlyn, Brixham and Plymouth (Barratt 
and Irwin, 2008) (Fig. 2.).  In 2007, 18% of the over ten-metre fleet were registered in the SW 
fishing community, catching 9% of the total reported English landings and representing 12% of 
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the total value of catch landed in England in 2007 (Barratt and Irwin, 2008).   The fishery 
operates primarily in ICES Area VII (Fig 2.).  ICES Area VII contributed 28% of UK registered 
vessel landings (163,300 tonnes), constituting 27% of the value of landings (£169.9 million) by 
UK vessels in 20084.   
 
The SW fishing community in this study is representative of many fishing dependent 
communities across the UK, located in remote areas with few alternatives to fishing for 
employment (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2004).  An estimated 34% of employed people in 
the SW fishing community are fishermen or work within the fishing industry (Nautilus 
Consultants Ltd, 2008).  Fishing communities like this community have been considered 
vulnerable for a number of years as the fishing industry in the UK has contracted.   
 
 
Figure 2. Map of the UK and ICES Area VII. ICES Area VII is further subdivided into Areas VIIa-k.  
Main Southwest ports/markets, Newlyn, Plymouth and Brixham are also identified on the map. 
 
3.2. Background on fisheries management  
In this paper I discuss how fishery management can accommodate different strategy types.  
This section gives a short history and current structure of fisheries management in the EU and 
UK.  I highlight the gaps in fisheries policy that require understanding fisher behaviour and also 
how the overall aim of current fishery management is conducive to using new frameworks and 
                                                          
4
 Landings into the UK and abroad by UK vessels 
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an interdisciplinary approach to integrate social science in fisheries policy.   Since 1983, 
European fisheries have been managed through the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).   Under 
the UN Law of the Sea (1977) all coastal nations were allocated exclusive exploitation rights up 
to 200 nautical miles from their coastlines (known as exclusive economic zones, EEZs).  This 
caused problems for the once open-access unregulated fishing that vessels enjoyed in 
European seas.  The CFP was put into place in 1983.  It manages all the member states’ EEZs 
and is now effectively one 25 million km2 EEZ, the largest single fishery management regime in 
the North Atlantic.  The sustainability problems that are facing the EU today can largely be 
traced to the objectives of fishery management in the past and, more recently, the inertia to 
substantially change the management regime.  European fisheries management and the 1983 
CFP were originally designed to promote growth, increase income and stability for fishers, and 
minimise conflict.  It did not explicitly aim to reflect the complexity of the ecosystem or 
prioritise promoting environmental sustainability of its services (Symes, 1997, Jensen, 1999, 
Hanna, 2001).  As a result the CFP has undergone reforms.  The second reform, in 2002, 
emphasised environmental and economic sustainability.  The 2002 reform identified that Total 
Allowable Catches (TACs) and technical measures (such as mesh sizes) were not sufficient as 
management measures.  The focus for the new reform was to have a longer term, ecosystem 
approach to fisheries (EAF) - an adaptive integrated management system that aims to promote 
both biodiversity conservation and sustainable resource use by managing the ecosystem as a 
whole.  Despite best intentions, it has been very difficult to transform the fisheries 
management system into the more holistic EAF and there have been few practical 
implementations in the EU to date (Caddy and Seijo, 2005, Branch et al., 2006).  The fishery 
management system is widely regarded as failing to conserve fish stocks.  EU fishing capacity is 
estimated to be at least 40% too high (too much fishing by too many vessels), with 50% of the 
entire fleet estimated to be experiencing poor profitability and more than a third actually 
operating at a loss (Hentrich and Salomon, 2006).  Decommissioning or vessel ‘buy-backs’ are a 
common management tool in the EU and UK for reducing fishing effort in the fishery where 
the governing body effectively buys skippers’ vessels, reducing the number of fishing boats 
(fishing capacity).  However, decommissioning has been shown to be both expensive and 
ineffective at removing total effort because they remove only the least efficient vessels and 
the effort removed often seeps back into the system which can necessitate another round of 
decommissioning (Clark et al., 2005, Hentrich and Salomon, 2006).   
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The current foundation for fisheries management in the EU is spatial zoning.  In basic terms, 
EU waters have been carved up into what are known as ICES5 Areas (see Fig. 2).  Based on 
scientific advice, the EU annually allocates a total allowable catch (TAC) for each species to 
each ICES Area.  TACs are allocated to EU member states based on historical fishing rights, and 
scientific advice given by the Advisory Council on Fisheries Management (ACFM) and the 
Assessment Working Groups of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), 
an independent scientific body.  TACs are then allocated by the Council of Ministers in the 
form of individual vessel fixed quota allowances (FQAs) which are based on historical fishing 
effort attached to fishing licences6.   Each country is then responsible for managing their own 
fishing fleets.  English fisheries are administered by DEFRA (Department of Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs) and policed by the MFA (Marine Fisheries Agency).  Structural policies are 
aimed at fishing effort controls7, such as quotas, gear restrictions and reductions in fleet 
capacity; as well as temporal and spatial closures while conservation policies regulate the 
quantity of fish caught through quotas.  To further limit fishing effort, no new licences are 
given.  Instead, licences are bought and sold, and quota is leased and traded between vessels. 
 
3.3. Data and information sources 
Data were collected using interviews with skippers and key informants, participant 
observation, and questionnaires.  These data capture skippers’ strategic behaviour and their 
individual characteristics.   
  
3.3.1. Semi structured interviews 
Interviews were held with 34 skippers from large vessels (i.e., over ten metres in length).  This 
represents 62% of the larger vessels registered in the SW fishing community in 2008. This 
percentage of vessels is approximate because although vessels are registered in the SW fishing 
community, their actual home port may be elsewhere and vice versa. It may also be an 
underestimation because there are several large vessels registered to the port that are not in 
service. Owing to the general difficulty in getting fishers to participate in surveys because of 
factors such as interview fatigue and time constraints, and the lack of a central register of 
                                                          
5
 ICES is the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas - the (non-political) organisation that 
coordinates and promotes marine research in the North Atlantic.  More than 1600 scientists from 20 
member countries make up the intergovernmental panel. 
6
 Although a FQA is attached to a licence, these are paid for separately.  Licence fees are based on the 
size and capacity of the vessel (VCU), while FQA fees are based on the previous fishing effort of the 
licence holder. 
7
 Fishing effort is regulated by Defra but within six nautical miles from the coastline, regional Sea 
Fisheries Committees (SFCs) regulate fishing methods, fishing gear, restrict fishing seasons, set minimum 
sizes for fish and shellfish and protect the seabed or control fishing for environmental purposes through 
byelaws. 
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skippers, completely statistically randomised respondent selection was not feasible. However, 
I ensured that the sample of fishers interviewed represented diversity of individuals within the 
fleet using relevant background variables that could be associated with different strategies 
such as gear types, size of vessel, age of vessel, ownership structure and experience (see 
Appendix 2 for respondent codes and details).  
 
This SW fishing community is an interesting and somewhat unique port in terms of the 
ownership structure of fishing vessels.  There is one large company that owns a fleet of beam 
trawlers.  It is the UK’s largest privately-owned family fishing business, and in 2008 owned 20 
beam trawlers.  The company is fundamental to the infrastructure of the community.  It not 
only owns vessels, it also runs the fish market and the daily fish auction, it supplies fuel, and is 
a fish merchant.  Their fleet are large vessels that are old (Table 1); only 14 of these vessels 
were actively in service during the time of the study (from this point onwards these vessels are 
referred to in the paper as ‘company’ vessels).  The other vessels are independent and are 
either owned individually by the skipper, generally as part of a small family business, or are 
owned individually but skippered by an employee (from this point onwards these vessels are 
referred to in the paper as ‘independent’ vessels).  These vessels are significantly newer and 
smaller in length (vessel age: t32 = -3.20, p = 0.003; vessel length: t32 = -4.50, p< 0.001).  All 
respondents were skippers of large vessels (>10 m), consisting of beam trawlers (n = 17), otter 
trawlers (n = 3), gillnetters (n = 8), scallop dredgers (n = 4), and crab/lobster potters (n = 2). 
 
Table 1. Mean and standard deviation (SD) of age and length of company vessels and 
independent vessels in the study 
Vessel type N Mean age SD age Mean length SD length 
Company 10 41 7.7 28.8 2.8 
Independent 24 26 14 19.1 6.5 
Total 34 30 14.2 22.0 7.2 
 
The interviewing approach was based on anthropologist H. Russell Bernard’s guidelines for the 
conduct of semi-structured interviews (Bernard, 1994).  Knowing that the respondent can 
influence the direction of the interview, the interviewer needs to ensure that the overall 
objectives of the interview guide are covered to a sufficient depth without leading the 
respondent. In order to get fishers to talk about their fisheries openly and in detail, time was 
invested to build mutual trust and to improve reliability of the responses. Therefore, I spent six 
months in Cornwall in 2008 and 2009, interviewed each respondent two or more times, and 
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conducted several informal interviews and conversations on the quayside. Triangulation was 
employed to increase confidence in the accuracy of the data collected through fisher 
interviews. Triangulation is a method of establishing the accuracy of information by comparing 
three or more types of independent points of view on data sources (Bruce et al., 2000). In 
addition to repeat interviews, observations were conducted on the quayside every day and 
during trip at sea, and detailed field notes were taken.   All interviews were recorded and 
transcribed verbatim and field notes were used where possible to verify responses.   
 
In the repeat interviews, skippers were asked questions to get to know the respondent; his8 
history in fishing, details about his current fishery and management of his business; his present 
and past annual fishing patterns; and his decision-making from a short term perspective (at the 
trip level).  Questions were asked about planning in the short term and for the future; the 
types and nature of interactions with skippers and within the wider industry; physical risk 
taking; trade-offs between financial and physical risk in both the short term and long term.  
Follow-up questions aimed to gain an understanding of how these factors influence his fishing 
strategy. Questions were open and allowed for a natural conversation to take place and were 
phrased in such a way that answers were not prompted by the interviewer.  
 
3.3.2. Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were also given personally to skippers, after the semi-structured interviews, to 
gain specific quantitative information that would have disrupted the flow and engagement of 
skippers in the semi-structured interviews.  These questionnaires were used for other aspects 
of this PhD research; therefore not all questions in them pertain to this particular chapter.  All 
skippers interviewed also responded to the questionnaire.  Information in questionnaires 
included specific details of background of skipper; gear and technology used; crew details; 
fishing patterns; short term tactics; investments and costs and earnings (see Appendix 3 for 
questionnaire). 
 
3.3.3. Participant observation  
When the opportunity arose, fishing trips were participated in.  These consisted of 1-8 days in 
duration, carried out throughout the field season and subject to weather conditions.  Onboard 
observations were important for a number of reasons.  First, participant observation gave a 
strong intuitive understanding of how fishing vessels operate and the decision processes 
skippers make.  Second, it allowed time to build trust within the fishing community and 
                                                          
8
 There were no female skippers! 
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undertake more in-depth interviews described in the previous section without time 
constraints.  The micro decisions that skippers made were observed and understood while 
skippers were making decisions at sea.  Third, observations provided confirmation (or not) of 
interview data already collected.  Detailed field notes were taken to record observations and 
conversations and were used in triangulation of interview data.  
 
3.3.4. Key informant interviews 
Unstructured surveys with key informants were also conducted on a number of occasions with 
members of the wider fishing industry including: the regional producer organisation (a fishers’ 
cooperative that manages quota, promotes produce, and represents the views and opinions of 
fishers); Seafood Cornwall (which collaborates with fishers, fish merchants, and harbour 
authorities to promote Cornish-caught fish, improve quality standards, and encourage 
sustainable practice);  fish merchants; retired skippers; vessel owners;  vessel crew; market 
workers;  and fisheries scientists/observers throughout the study period.  These unstructured 
surveys were used to obtain skipper contacts, to gain a broader perspective of the workings of 
the port, general issues facing the fishery and to verify skipper responses to interviews. 
 
3.4. Analyses 
Transcripts and field notes were systematically coded using qualitative analysis software, 
(NVivo 7) according to each theme of interest, to ensure that data were not used selectively.  
Data were coded according to themes based on the conceptual framework presented in Figure 
1.  The themes for coding are listed and described in Table 2.  Where possible, Likert-type 
scales (Likert, 1932) were created for each of the strategic qualities (i.e., dynamism, 
innovation, adaptability); for the enablers; and for the individual characteristics.  This allows 
some inferential statistical analysis of the data.  Dynamism, Innovation and Adaptability 
themes were used to identify fishers’ behaviour in relation to what Miles and Snow call the 
‘entrepreneurial problem’ and the ‘technology problem’ and allowed classification of each 
fisher strategy type   (i.e., Prospector, Analyser, Defender or Reactor).  Enabling behaviours 
(i.e., what Miles and Snow call ‘administrative processes’) were separated into themes of 
interactions, planning, risk taking (split into physical and financial risk taking) and stability.9  
Individual characteristics were also examined to see if they correlated to the strategic 
archetype of each fisher.  They were classified into themes of time horizon, household 
financial state and fishing ethic.  These are discussed in more detail in the following section. 
 
                                                          
9
 Miles and Snow (1978) define a number of administrative processes for each strategic archetype.  
Given the small size of operation for most of the fishers many of these were not relevant for this study. 
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Skippers were categorised as ‘company’ or ‘independent’ skippers.  The strategic position of 
company skippers was highly likely to be influenced and constrained by the company itself.  It 
may also be true that choice of employment (i.e., independent operator versus company 
employee) is influenced by individual characteristics.   This selection bias warranted analysing 
‘company’ and ‘independent’ skippers separately.  
 
Table 2. Themes of analysis 
Theme Description of theme 
Strategic quality 
 
  Dynamism The short term (within a year) dynamics of a skipper such as the 
fisheries he targets, his fishing gear use, and fishing location.  
   
  Innovation 
 
The long term innovation of a skipper such as the degree of 
experimentation with fishing gear, searching for fishing locations, 
and use of technology. 
   
  Adaptability 
 
The skipper’s ability to respond to changing conditions. 
Enablers 
 
  Interactions The degree of communication and cooperation between skipper 
and others. 
   
  Planning 
 
The degree of planning of fishing activities. 
   
  Physical risk taking 
 
The degree of risk taking at sea. 
   
  Financial risk taking 
 
The degree of risk taking with fishing investments. 
   
  Stability 
 
The stability of the business such as the stability of employees 
(crew), maintenance of vessel, and focus on quality of product. 
Individual characteristics 
 
  Time horizon Where the skipper is in his fishing career.  
   
  Household financial   
  dependence 
 
The dependency on fishing income to household income.  
   
  Fishing ethic 
 
The skipper’s attitude towards fishing as a lifestyle choice. 
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3.4.1. Strategic quality 
After coding, strategic qualities were determined using two related methods: 
(i)  Content analysis of the three strategic quality themes was undertaken and skippers were 
categorised as Prospector, Analyser, Defender or Reactor types for each theme individually 
based on the framework outlined in Figure 1.  This iterative analysis revealed that skippers 
don’t always fit perfectly into one strategy type, and may behave with a tendency towards 
a secondary strategy.   
(ii)  Using the thematic content analysis, a ranking system was used to give each skipper a 
strategy score.  Each strategic theme was divided into appropriate indicators (four 
indicators for dynamism, three indicators for innovation and adaptability) and then each 
skipper was scored on that indicator on a 1-5 scale (Table 3.).  An average weighted score 
was determined for each strategic theme for each skipper.  These were then summed to 
give a total strategy score for each skipper.  To examine the relationships between 
strategic quality indicators, a principle components analysis (PCA) was also undertaken. 
 
3.4.2. Enablers 
Content analysis was undertaken for each enabler theme and skippers were categorised 
accordingly.  The resulting categories are presented in Table 4.  Scores were given according to 
category, i.e., Category 1: Score = 1, Category 2: Score = 2, Category 3: Score = 3, and Category 
4: Score = 4.  These scores are Likert-type with low scores reflecting a low level of interaction, 
planning, risk taking and stability and progressively higher score reflecting higher levels of 
interaction, planning, risk taking and stability.  The scoring for interaction was not as 
straightforward as the other enabler themes.   Category 2 to 4 are sequential in terms of the 
amount of people the skippers communicate with.  Category 2 skippers have minimal 
communication, Category 3 skippers communicate with others in the local fleet and industry, 
and Category 4 skippers communicate with others locally and also further afield (UK and 
Europe).  Category 1 skippers were identified as those who try to get as much information 
from other skippers as possible but this is mainly through indirect sources such as listening in 
on radio conversations and picking up pieces of information on the quayside. These skippers 
do not have strong relationships with others who they share information with like Category 3 
and 4 skippers, therefore were given a value of ‘1’. 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Table 3. Indicators and their scoring system for each of the three strategy themes 
Strategy indicators Description of score allocation (scale 1 to 5) 
Dynamism  
Switches fisheries** 
(changes target species) 
1 = does not switch between fisheries throughout year 
5 = switches many times between fisheries throughout year 
 
Switches gear type** 
(changes gear type to exploit  
different opportunities) 
 
1 = does not switch gear types throughout year 
5 = switches many times between gear types throughout year 
 
Switches location* 
(changes locations to exploit  
different opportunities) 
 
Switches port** 
(changes the landing port) 
 
1 = does not switch fishing locations throughout year 
5 = switches widely between fishing locations throughout year 
 
 
1 = uses only one port 
5 = switches widely between landing ports 
Innovation  
Experiments with gear types* 
(experiments with gear types to 
exploit different fisheries or make  
gear more sustainable/efficient) 
1 = never experiments with fishing gear used 
5 = experimented many times with fishing gear used 
 
Searches for new locations* 
(searches for unexploited or 
undiscovered locations) 
 
1 = never searches for new locations to fish 
5 = always is searching for new locations to fish 
 
Uses new technologies** 
(e.g. ground discrimination software) 
 
1 = uses minimal fishing technology 
5 = is at the forefront of new fishing technology 
Adaptability  
Responds to changing conditions* 
(e.g. market changes and demands) 
1 = does not respond to changing conditions 
5 = alters practices in response to changing conditions 
 
Future trends* 
(e.g. consumer changes, 
environmentally sustainability) 
 
1 = does not examine fisheries trends 
5 = looks for future trends and opportunities in fisheries 
 
Adapted to fuel crisis* 
(In 2008 fishing fuel costs rapidly 
increased, see Chapter 5) 
 
1 = was not able to adapt practices in response to fuel crisis 
5 = was most able to adapt practices in response to fuel crisis  
* Scores were derived from qualitative content analysis.   
**Scores were derived from questionnaires (Switches fisheries: Q27; Switches gear type: Q17-21; 
Switches port: Q29-32; Uses new technologies: Q22-23) and qualitative content analysis.  
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Table 4. Categories of enabler themes 
Enabler themes Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4 
Interactions* Gets as much 
information as 
possible from 
other skippers 
but he doesn't 
necessarily give 
information to 
others 
Has minimal 
communication 
and cooperation 
with other 
skippers 
Has select 
skippers and 
people in the 
industry within 
the fleet only who 
he communicates 
and cooperates 
with 
Has select people 
to cooperate and 
communicate 
with.  These are 
people in fleet, as 
well as people 
further afield than 
Category 3.  
 
Planning* Spends minimal 
time planning 
short term or 
long term 
Plans short term 
fishing (trip level) 
only 
Spends a lot of 
time planning 
short and long 
term fishing but 
focuses is on 
improving the 
same practice 
Spends a lot of 
time planning 
short and long 
term fishing but 
also focuses on 
new practices and 
innovations 
 
Physical risk taking* Does not take 
any physical 
risks  
Trades off physical 
risks with profit 
Takes physical 
risks with fishing 
gear and/or crew 
safety  
 
Takes physical 
risks by fishing in 
bad weather 
Financial risk taking** Has no financial 
investment in 
fishing practice 
Has some financial 
investment in 
fishing practice 
Has high financial 
investment in 
fishing practice 
 
 
Stability     
  Stable crew** Unstable crew Semi-stable crew 
 
Stable crew 
 
 
  Maintenance level** Low level of 
maintenance 
Mid level of 
maintenance 
 
High level of 
maintenance 
 
 
  Focus on quality* Low focus on 
quality of fish 
Some focus on 
quality of fish 
High focus on 
quality of fish 
 
*Scores were derived from qualitative content analysis.   
**Scores were derived from questionnaires (Financial risk taking: Q6-13, 40-46; Crew stability: Q25, 
Maintenance: Q47-48) and qualitative content analysis.  
 
3.4.3. Individual characteristics 
Time horizon, or where the skipper is positioned in his career lifespan was hypothesised as 
influencing his strategic type.  All respondents started their fishing career almost always 
straight from secondary school (mean age ± SD, 17 ± 2.6 years old).  The common retirement 
age for skippers was considered to be around 65 years old.  Therefore skipper age was used as 
an indicator of where a skipper was in his career lifespan. 
 
The personal financial pressure and responsibility of a skipper and the number of people 
dependent on his income was also hypothesised to influence his strategic type.  Household 
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number and relative contribution of income data were collected.  Household financial 
dependence on fishing was calculated as number of people in household multiplied by the 
percentage household income attributable to skipper income (data derived from 
questionnaire: Q49-53).   
 
Skipper ethic, or his attitude towards fishing as part of his lifestyle, was hypothesised to 
influence his strategic type.  Skipper ethic was measured using the question (questionnaire: 
Q16) “Would you give up fishing if you won the lottery tomorrow?” (Response set: yes, no, I 
don’t know).  This response was verified and discussed in interviews.  
 
4. Results  
4.1. Strategic archetypes  
Content analysis revealed that skippers do not fit neatly into one of the four strategy types; 
Reactors, Defenders, Analysers and Prospectors.  They have a tendency towards a particular 
strategy but the edges of that strategy can be considered to be blurry which shows that there 
is a continuum of strategy type. In most cases the boundaries were unclear with skippers with 
Analyser strategies.  For example, an Analyser may have more qualities similar to classic 
Defender strategies, or an Analyser may have more Prospector qualities.  Figure 3 shows the 
categorisation of skippers into strategy type with their tendencies, and separated into 
company and independent skippers. 
 
   
Figure 3. Skipper strategic archetypes based on content analysis. The number of all skippers is 
presented, company skippers and independent skippers are also presented separately. 
93 
 
Strategy scoring further revealed that there is a continuum of strategy scores, in line with the 
finding from the content analysis.  In presenting these results it is possible to see the 
continuum of strategy scores (Figure 4), but I have also simplified the content analysis and 
categorised skippers into one of the four strategic archetypes.  Reactors remained as they 
were (n = 3). Defenders included the strategies (n = 15): Defender, Defender with Analyser 
tendency, and Defenders with Reactor tendencies. Analysers included the strategies: 
Analysers, and Analysers with Defenders strategies (n = 10). There were no skippers who fell 
purely into the Prospector archetype, but Prospectors with Analyser tendencies and Analysers 
with Prospector tendencies had distinct strategies from those skippers who were defined as 
Analysers, therefore these two groups were defined as Prospectors (n = 6).  Most skippers 
were either Analysers or Defenders.  Skippers who worked for the company were either 
Reactor or Defender-types only, where as independent skippers were Defender, Analyser or 
Prospector-types.  To illustrate the strategy scores, Figure 4 shows the strategy score given to 
each individual and their strategy type as defined by the thematic analysis.   Fishers who 
scored highly on dynamism, innovation or adaptability had high strategy scores, in other 
words, a skipper with Prospector characteristics tends to be highly dynamic, innovative and 
adaptable, compared to Analysers who scored more highly than Defender-type skippers. The 
least dynamic, innovative and adaptable are the Reactor-type skippers.  These relationships 
are examined further in the following section. 
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Figure 4. The strategy score for the four strategy archetypes; Reactors, Defenders, Analysers 
and Prospectors.  Red crosses show company skippers and blue crosses show independent 
skippers. 
 
 
A principle components analysis was also undertaken to further examine the patterns of 
correlations of the indicators of strategic qualities (dynamism: switching fisheries, switching 
gear, switching location and switching port; innovation: gear experimentation, searching for 
new locations and using new technologies; and adaptability: responsiveness to changing 
conditions, looking for future trends and ability to adapt to fuel crisis) for which each skipper 
was scored a 1-5 scale (Table 5).  The main axis of variation (factor 1) represented 62% of the 
variation and showed that if skippers scored highly on one strategic quality indicator, they 
tended to score highly on all strategic quality indicators.  The second axis of variation (factor 2) 
was comprised of two dynamism indicators; switching fisheries and switching gear types, and 
one innovation indicator; experimentation with gear (12% of variation), suggesting that these 
three indicators are related.   
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Table 5. Principle component factors describing strategic quality indicators. All factor loadings 
for each indicator are included, with loadings >0.4 highlighted in bold. 
Strategic quality indicators 
Principle components 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
Dynamism 
Switches fisheries 
Switches gear 
Switches location 
Switches port 
Innovation 
Experiments with gear 
Searches for new locations 
Uses new technology 
Adaptability 
Responds to changing 
conditions 
Looks for future trends 
Adaptability to fuel crisis 
Variance explained 
 
0.59 
0.67 
0.84 
0.70 
 
0.79 
0.82 
0.85 
 
0.91 
0.83 
0.82 
62.12% 
 
0.63 
0.53 
-0.27 
-0.40 
 
0.45 
-0.23 
-0.02 
 
-0.22 
-0.12 
-0.08 
12.39% 
 
 
4.2. Enabling behaviours 
For independent skippers, there were significant and positive correlations between all 
strategic qualities and almost all enabling behaviours.  Dynamic, innovative and adaptable 
skippers had high level communication/cooperation and planning behaviour.  They tended to 
be financial risk takers with high investment and also had a stable crew and high level of 
maintenance.  However only innovative skippers took physical risks, such as pushing the 
weather and gear in order to catch fish and these skippers did not have a focus on quality of 
product (Table 6.).  
 
In comparison, for company skippers, there were fewer significant relationships between 
strategic quality and enabling behaviours.  The more dynamic, innovative and adaptable 
skippers had more communication/cooperation and planning behaviour.  There was no 
relationship between physical risk, or stability of crew and strategic quality.  Financial risk was 
not considered because the skippers had no investment in their vessel.  Only the more 
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innovative skippers in the company had higher levels of maintenance and a focus on quality of 
product (Table 6).  
 
For independent skippers levels of communication/cooperation, planning, financial risk and 
maintenance were positively correlated.  The level of physical risk-taking was positively 
correlated with level of planning and negatively correlated with quality.  The skippers who take 
physical risks, putting themselves and their vessels in more danger, are unrelated to any 
behavioural characteristic in terms of communication/cooperation, financial risk taking, 
stability of crew, or level of maintenance.  Skippers who focus on quality of product had a 
higher level of communication and cooperation, a stable crew and higher maintenance (Table 
7). 
 
In comparison, for company skippers, there were fewer relationships between enabling 
behaviours than independent skippers.  Skippers with higher levels of planning were more 
likely to have more communication/cooperation with other skippers, have a more stable crew 
and higher maintenance.  Higher level of maintenance was also related to higher stability of 
crew and a greater focus on quality of product (Table 7.). 
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Table 6. Correlation (Spearman rank order) matrix of strategic qualities and enabling behaviour of independent skippers and company skippers 
Strategic  
qualities 
Skipper  
type 
Enabling behaviours 
Interactions Planning Physical risk Financial risk Crew Maintenance Quality 
Dynamism Independent 
(n = 24) 
0.63** 0.70** 0.12 0.46* 0.46* 0.54** 0.44* 
Innovation 0.69** 0.86** 0.41* 0.62** 0.54** 0.63** 0.40 
Adaptability 0.69** 0.87* 0.31 0.76** 0.64** 0.59** 0.42* 
Strategy score  0.70** 0.88** 0.22 0.67** 0.58** 0.65** 0.45* 
Dynamism Company 
(n = 10) 
0.77** 0.83** 0.28 - 0.28 0.43 0.42 
Innovation 0.70* 0.91** 0.06 - 0.57 0.83** 0.72* 
Adaptability 0.71* 0.69* -0.18 - 0.52 0.58 0.32 
Strategy score  0.75* 0.83** 0.17 - 0.36 0.67* 0.54 
* p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.001
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Table 7. Correlation (Spearman rank order) matrix of enabling behaviours of independent skippers and company skippers 
Enabling  
behaviours 
Skipper  
type 
Enabling behaviours 
Interactions Planning Physical risk Financial risk Crew Maintenance Quality 
Interactions Independent 
(n = 24) 
 0.71** 0.08 0.61** 0.29 0.53** 0.40* 
Planning   0.42* 0.67** 0.49* 0.57** 0.16 
Physical risk    0.34 0.12 0.03 -0.47* 
Financial risk      0.52** 0.74** 0.26 
Crew       0.57** 0.40* 
Maintenance        0.44* 
Quality         
Interactions Company 
(n = 10) 
 0.85** -0.06 - 0.58 0.59 0.46 
Planning   0.13 - 0.62* 0.68* 0.53 
Physical risk    - -0.49 -0.25 -0.05 
Financial risk     - - - 
Crew      0.63* 0.41 
Maintenance       0.65* 
Quality        
* p < 0.05,  ** p < 0.001 
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4.3. Individual characteristics  
4.3.1 Time horizon 
Although there was no significant correlation between the strategy score and age of the 
skipper (used as a proxy for skippers stage of career) for either independent skippers or 
company skippers. Figure 5 shows that there is a general trend, where skippers in later stages 
of their career tend to have a lower strategy score than younger skippers at the beginning of 
their career, suggesting that the stage in career may influence a skippers strategy, and it is 
more likely a skipper will have a tendency towards a Defender strategy if he is in the later 
stages of his career:  
 
“The likes of me, I think I’ve done the hard work in a sense, the challenge of it all is 
over like, my kids are 22 and 24 years old, so like I feel like I have succeeded and 
don’t need to prove anything anymore”. (D24) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. The relationship between age of skipper and strategy score for independent skippers 
(blue dots) and company skippers (red dots) (Independent skippers: RP = -0.26, n = 24, not 
significant; Company skippers: RP = -0.36, n = 10, not significant).  
 
 
4.3.2. Household financial dependence 
The percentage of a skipper’s income contributing to a household and the number of people 
dependent on his income is a significant predictor of fisher strategy score for independent 
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skippers.  Those skippers with a higher level of financial pressure on them at home with more 
people that depend on his income tend to have a lower strategy score, suggesting a more risk 
averse, defensive strategy.  Interestingly, there doesn’t appear to be a relationship between 
strategy and household financial dependence with the company skippers (Figure 6.) 
 
 
Figure 6. The relationship between skippers household financial dependence (number in 
household x percentage income attributable to fishing income) and their strategy score for 
independent skippers (blue dots) and company skippers (red dots) (Independent skippers: RP = 
-0.41, n = 24, p = 0.05; Company skippers: RP = 0.28, n = 10, not significant).  
 
 
4.3.3. Skipper ethic 
The skipper’s attitude towards fishing as a lifestyle choice influences his strategic position for 
independent skippers (Fig. 7.).  Skippers who tended toward Analyser and Prospector strategy 
archetypes were more likely to say they would not give up fishing, even if they (hypothetically) 
won the lottery.   
 
“I’ll still fish, definitely” (A8) 
 
“I’ll carry on as long as I’m able to get down to the pontoon and keep the boat 
pumped out *of water+.  I can see myself carrying on past 70.”(P2)   
 
“In some way I will fish all my life, even if it’s in a little punt catching mackerel.” 
(P26)   
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In comparison, a typical answer for those skippers who would stop fishing if they won the 
lottery was:  
 
“Fishing at the minute is stuffed.  I’ve had enough of this fucking job, I can’t be 
dealing with it.” (D17)  
 
Most of the company skippers (seven out of ten skippers) would give up fishing if they could.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. The response of independent skippers (blue dots) and company skippers (red dots) to 
the question “Would you give up fishing if you won the lottery tomorrow?” and their strategy 
score (Independent skippers: One way ANOVA, F2,21 = 5.91, n = 24, p = 0.009; Company 
skippers: t-test, t8 = -0.12, n = 10, not significant).  
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4.4. Strategic Archetype, strategic qualities, enabling behaviours & individual characteristics 
In this section the data pertaining to strategic indicators, enabling behaviour and individual 
characteristics are drawn together using the framework outlined in Figure 1 to present a 
typology of each strategic archetype (Figure 8-11).   
 
4.4.1. Prospector tendencies 
 
 
Figure 8.  Strategy qualities, enabling behaviours and individual characteristics of Prospectors 
 
Prospectors were all born into a family that has been fishing for generations.  Some have 
pursued higher education before becoming a fisherman, however, fishing was such a large part 
of their lives that they either left higher education prematurely or returned to fishing after 
completing.  None of these fishers were beam trawlers because it was not interesting and 
challenging enough as a type of fishing.  They preferred fisheries where they had to ‘hunt’ 
more for their catch. 
 
Skippers with prospector tendencies were very dynamic in the short term (annual).  They tend 
to move between fisheries throughout the year targeting different species or species mix, 
changing the gear type they use, are “very nomadic” (P23), moving around the region or the 
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country to exploit different fisheries, and using different ports to land their fish in order to try 
to gain the best prices for their product.   
 
“You have to stay one step ahead of everybody else.  By doing that, we change our 
gear, we change our ports, that’s what you have to do. Personally that’s what I 
think, and that’s what we do and hopefully we are doing the job." (P2) 
 
The prospector strategy is also highly innovative, and skippers experiment with new gear types 
in order to exploit new fisheries, to fish more efficiently, and to respond to consumer trends 
for sustainably sourced fish.  These skippers tend to invest time in searching for new locations 
to fish where other skippers don’t, and are at the forefront of new fishing technologies such as 
the most recent ground discrimination software which digitally maps the sea bed.   
 
“Yeah, there’s places where we’ve shot where we have never shot before and 
we’ve had fish. We’ve spent two and a half days just steaming around having a 
look, mapping the bottom.  We’ve spent a fortune on experimenting, and on 
different sorts of gear, because we don’t have the normal every day sort of rig.” 
(P31)  
 
Prospectors take pride in being innovative and are often imitated by other fishers.   
 
I like having this boat, I like having people saying have you seen that mans 
conveyers, have you seen that mans gear? That makes me feel like I’m doing my 
job right." (P28) 
 
Prospectors are the most adaptable in uncertain and changing conditions because they are 
flexible in the fish they can target and the gear available to them to use.  These skippers also 
tend to know what the industry trends are and look forward and try to predict the future in 
order to improve their capacity for adaptation.   
 
"I just think some people have it and some people don’t.  Some people are 
determined to get to the top and other people are happy just dodging along. I’m 
always keeping my eye on what’s going on."  (P33) 
 
In mid 2008, during the field work for this study, fuel prices rose rapidly which threatened the 
viability of many fishing operations in the SW fishing community (Abernethy et al., 2010).  This 
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provided a unique opportunity to access the adaptability of fishers to rapidly changed 
circumstances or ‘shock’.  Skippers with prospector tendencies were more able to “weather 
the crisis” (P2) and adapt because of their flexibility in fishing approach.   
 
"This situation will correct itself. It’s just when. And I can definitely hold on and 
survive until it does.  ‘Cause there is good thing about having this boat, she is the 
most efficient, she is the best boat here. She is the most efficient boat here, but 
she is also expensive to run. So the thing that makes me the strongest is also the 
thing that could kill me. That’s the problem. I could get out of this today and buy a 
wee boat that burns fuck all and survive. But I don’t want to do that. I don’t want 
to survive, I want to be the best at what I do.” (P28) 
 
Prospectors communicate widely within the fishing industry and often speak to fishing 
contacts in other regions of the UK and abroad to stay up to date with new advances in 
technology.  They also tend to be more involved than other fishers in regional and fishery 
committees, participating in fisheries policy discussions.  Prospectors also have certain 
skippers that they cooperate with and speak to at sea, who have the same strategy tendencies.  
They spend a lot of time researching their fishery and planning their fishing activities with a 
focus on innovation and new practices.  These fishers have a clear objective to make money, 
they are business-minded, organised, and they like hard work, spending a lot of time at sea 
relative to other fisher types.  They have invested heavily in increasing efficiency, in catch 
handling equipment, improving working conditions and comfort of their crew, and in 
maintaining their vessel.  Prospectors have a very low turnover of experienced crew whom 
they trust which means that alongside high levels of maintenance they can trade off the 
physical risks of fishing, such as working in poor weather, to stay at sea and continue fishing.  
Quality of fish is important to some of these skippers, who take measures to improve quality in 
search of higher prices.  However, not all prospector-type skippers made quality of product a 
priority. 
 
Prospector skippers tended to be in the early part of their career.  They had a partner at home 
who contributed to the household income and had fewer dependents than other strategy 
types which meant that investment in innovation was possible.  They were determined to 
always be fishers and saw themselves continuing to fish long after retirement age. 
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4.4.2. Defender tendencies 
 
 
Figure 9.  Strategy qualities, enabling behaviours and individual characteristics of Defenders 
 
Skippers with defender tendencies also are usually born into a fishing family, and started 
fishing at an early age, although some were encouraged by their families to pursue a different 
career.  The majority of the Defender-types are beam trawlers although the other gear types 
are also represented.   
 
Skippers with defender tendencies are not dynamic; they have a fixed fishery they exploit 
throughout the year.   
 
"So the species we target, we invest in those species and we stick to those species, 
which I don’t know if it’s a good thing or a bad thing.”  (D21) 
 
These skippers may only fine-tune their gear ("if it’s not broken then don’t fix it."(D11)) and do 
not go to different locations to improve catch and efficiency.  Common Defender-type 
comments were: 
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"I always like to go there, you’ve been there just so many times, and you know you 
can make a week’s worth from there." (D3)   
 
"You can’t catch other people’s fish really, you just gotta go out and go where you 
normally go." (D11) 
 
Defenders either try to create a stable niche and defend their position in the market place, or 
are simply content with what they do.  Therefore they do not experiment with gear types or 
try new locations to fish.  Defenders tend to have the standard technology and do not invest in 
new fishing technologies like Prospectors:  
 
"I’m probably old fashioned, I don’t really use *technology+ I’ve got the ground I 
used to work 20 year ago and we still go back to that ground, same tows, same bit 
of ground that I worked ever since I can remember.”  (D13) 
 
 Given the narrow set of product Defenders catch and their limited flexibility, Defenders are 
not readily able to adapt to changing conditions and struggled to maintain their business 
viability during the fuel price rise in 2008. For these skippers their future “looked bad” and 
they felt they were “finished if the price of diesel keeps going the way it is“ (D21).  One beam 
trawl skipper sums up the Defender strategy, talking about how making money from beam 
trawling is about keeping the gear fishing in the water for as much time as possible, going over 
the same fishing grounds and this is possible by making sure the vessel and gear are 
maintained to do the job:  
 
"This job is, keep it wet, keep it in the water, keep it whole, keep it going up, down, 
up, down, time over distance."  (D27) 
 
In pursuit of their strategy, Defenders have limited need for communication and cooperation 
with other skippers.  They are either very competitive and do not want to reveal their tactics to 
others, or they only trust a few individuals to share information with.  Defenders tend not to 
look outside their own fishery in the Southwest to gain information.  The majority of these 
skippers only spend time planning short term fishing (on a trip by trip basis), with some 
skippers spending very little time planning because they always follow the same pattern and 
make the same choices.  Defender skippers that do spend time planning tend to focus on 
improving what they are already doing.  These skippers are cautious investors and financially 
risk averse.  Company skippers tend to be Defender-types and therefore have no long term 
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financial investment in fishing (see next section for discussion of company skippers).  Skippers 
with Defender tendencies also tend to be very risk averse towards putting themselves, their 
crew and their vessel in danger.  Skippers with higher trust in their crew’s experience and who 
have a more regular crew, and higher maintenance if their vessel, are able to trade off the 
physical risks with financial risks at sea and can push the weather more in search of fish. 
 
Skippers with Defender strategies can be divided in to two age groups.  The Defender skippers 
in the earlier stages of their career tend to have a high level of dependency on their income at 
home and have made a decision to actively defend their niche.  Defenders also comprise older 
skippers nearing the end of their careers.  These skippers have fewer dependents and are 
more satisfied with their present situation and desire only a reasonable income until they 
retire.  Consequently, these skippers would like to stop fishing if they had an alternative source 
of money. 
 
4.4.3. Analyser tendencies 
 
 
Figure 10.  Strategy qualities, enabling behaviours and individual characteristics of Analysers 
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Skippers who are defined as Analysers also have a long family tradition of fishing.  They do not 
include any company skippers.  There are Analysers present in each type of fishery, beam and 
otter trawlers, gill netters, scallop dredgers, and crab potters.   
 
Analysers tend to be a balance between Prospectors and Defenders.  On the one hand they are 
dynamic and flexible, switching gear types and locations in order to exploit a couple of 
different fisheries throughout the year.  They are innovative and experiment with gear and 
search for new locations.  However, Analysers do not alter gear and locations in the short or 
long terms to the same degree as Prospectors.  They tend to use new technology but not as 
quickly as Prospectors, tending to wait a couple of years when it becomes cheaper to buy.  
Analysers are similar to Defenders in that they maintain their core fishery that they target and 
continue to improve upon.  For example, one Analyser skipper said: 
 
“The sole fishery that has always interested me.  It makes good money and we’ve 
invested in it….we try to broaden our horizon and will go to *other locations in the 
UK] to look for fish too." (A7) 
 
Analysers tend to be cautious, maintaining defender-like qualities, but also observe 
Prospectors’ innovations.  They are flexible yet stable.  After Prospectors have tried and tested 
a new innovation and Analysers observe its success and limitations, they may decide to follow 
the same innovation with improvements to its efficiency.   
 
“For the cuttle[fish], changing over to a twin rig probably makes a difference but 
that’s a lot of expense for 2 or 3 months of the year. So, hmmm, I’m not convinced. 
I’m gonna wait and see what the [other vessel] will do.” (A18) 
 
Analysers also fall between Prospectors and Defenders in their ability to adapt. They are not as 
adaptable as Prospectors because they don’t have the same degree of flexibility and have 
invested in a strategy which limits their fishing opportunities like Defenders.  In response to 
the fuel price rise in 2008, they had a survival mentality and felt that they would:  
 
"survive, I’m sure we would. Even the way the fuel is now, I hope it doesn’t go up 
any more but it probably will. We are going ahead, only slowly but we are still 
going ahead."   However, they are "pretty much stuck with what we’ve got now 
anyway. You have to turn up to work and just keep going, you can’t afford to tie 
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up against the wall, I can’t. I can’t afford to tie up…I’ve started to worry where am 
I going to be in five years time." (A8) 
 
Skippers who are Analysers communicate and cooperate with a select group of skippers who 
they trust and have the same strategy tendency while at sea.  They also seek information from 
outside sources to make choices but tend to speak to people within the southwest region.  
Analysers seek information from Prospectors on their practice and success in order to make 
informed decisions about new technologies.  A significant amount of time is spent planning 
short and long term fishing and while Analysers seek new opportunities, they primarily spend 
time planning ways to improve their current fishing practices.  Like the Defender, the Analyser 
is a cautious financial risk taker but is prepared to invest in increasing efficiency, improving 
working conditions and comfort of their crew, and in maintaining their vessel, once they have 
spent time determining the most cost efficient solution.  Like Prospectors, high maintenance 
level of their vessel is paramount, and alongside a trustworthy, experienced and long standing 
crew, Analysers can trade off physical risks to make money by fishing in poor weather.  The 
Analysers try to keep costs as low as possible and also get as much money per kilo of fish and 
therefore they have a high focus on the quality of their fish in order to attain a high price. 
 
Analyser skippers tend to be older than Prospectors but younger than Defenders and have less 
financial pressure at home than Defenders.  They either have partners who contribute to the 
household income or fewer dependents than Defenders.  Analysers are determined to have a 
full and prosperous career as a fisher and felt they were unlikely to give up fishing even if they 
won the lottery.    
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4.4.4. Reactor tendencies 
 
 
Figure 11.  Strategy qualities, enabling behaviours and individual characteristics of Reactors 
 
There were only three Reactors in the sample of skippers surveyed.  Like the majority of 
skippers in the SW fishing community, they came from fishing families.  The Reactors were all 
beam trawlers and company skippers.  These skippers never had any intention of attending 
further education and became fishers because “all my mates went fishing” (R20) and because 
of limited alternative opportunities.  Reactors tend not to be viable, and according to 
economic theory, they would not survive.  In the strategic management literature this group 
receives little or no attention because they either do not exist or are in a state of collapse.  
However, as discussed in the next section, the Reactors persist because of the way the 
company is managed. 
 
Reactors definitively do not switch fisheries, gear or locations throughout the year and always 
land to the same port.  One Reactor skipper said: 
 
 "[other fishermen] might have patterns, but I don’t, I’m just happy come lucky, if 
it’s [the fish] there, it’s there, if it’s not it’s not.  Well, probably then you start 
fuckin shitting yourself". (R10) 
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Reactors are also not innovative; they do not experiment with gear or search for new locations 
and are not interested in new technology.  For example, the attitude of one Reactor toward 
new technology was: 
 
"I don’t particularly want *ground discrimination software+, and plus you’ve got to 
pay an extra £50 a month for the fuckin thing. So at the end of the day, it don’t 
bother me one bit."  (R6) 
 
Reactors were habitual, and stubbornly continued to fish the same way they have done 
throughout their career, despite changing conditions:   
 
"So you go where you know.  Its smaller fish, but at the end of the day, you’ll 
hopefully have enough of it.  And plus, we’re in TV range. I like my TV. I like my 
sport and my TV, and I’m lost without it." (R6) 
 
As a result of this unstable and inflexible strategy, Reactors are unlikely to be able to adapt to 
changing conditions.  The fuel price rise in 2008 resulted in these skippers feeling like their 
future career in fishing was over.     When one Reactor-type skipper was asked what he was 
going to do in response to the fuel ‘crisis’, he said:  
 
"The future is looking bleak, very bleak. And personally myself, the days of fishing 
are finished…I’ll go on the dole. I’ll have to, because I can’t do anything else. So I 
can’t see a future. None whatsoever." (R20) 
 
Skippers with Reactor tendencies tended to try to obtain as much information as possible from 
other skippers and then choose to either use this information to make decisions such as where 
to go fishing, or choose to ignore the information if it was outside their habitual fishing 
practice.  Reactors did not give as much information as they received, and skippers with other 
strategy types did not seek information from them.  Given that Reactors were largely habitual, 
they spent minimal time planning fishing trips and often only thought about what they were 
going to do after they had left port.  Reactor skippers were financially risk averse as they were 
company skippers which did not require investment in fishing.  They tended to be physical risk 
takers but not necessarily by what they thought was their choice.  Reactors took risks with 
gear, and had a reputation for destroying gear on hard ground.  Two of the three Reactor 
vessels were going to sea with one crew member short.  This was because they couldn’t make 
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a wage with an extra crew member and also because they found it difficult to retain regular 
crew.  Maintenance on Reactor’s vessels was minimal and other skippers often mentioned that 
they would not set foot on these boats even while they were tied up to the quayside.  There 
was very little emphasis on fish quality and lack of company investment in these vessels meant 
that the quality of fish tended to be poor.   
 
Reactor skippers tended to be closer to the end of their career or were contemplating 
changing jobs.  There was no identifiable relationship with household financial dependence, 
although all of these skippers contributed 100% of the household income.  Reactor skipper 
ethic towards fishing was not as enthusiastic , compared to Analysers and Prospectors.  It was 
considered to be just a job and Reactors would give up fishing completely if they had an 
alternative source of income, even considering going on the dole rather than fishing.   
 
4.5. Independent and company skippers 
There was a clear difference between the distribution of independent skipper strategy types 
and company skipper strategy types.  Independent skippers were Defenders, Analysers or 
Prospectors and also tended to have characteristics that made simple categorisation difficult, 
while company skippers were either easily classifiable Reactors or Defenders, with one 
company skipper having some Analyser qualities.  I did not conclusively collect data to be able 
to determine if company skippers developed Reactor/Defender strategy because of the 
strategy of the company or because of their own strategic position, i.e. would company 
skippers have the same strategic position if they owned their own business?   
 
When questioned in interviews about their decision to work for the company instead of 
owning their own vessel, company skippers tended to respond either with a statement which 
referred to financial risk aversion and not wanting the responsibility of a fishing business:   
 
“It’s easier skippering a boat for somebody because if anything happens, you just 
come in and the owner is there and you say fix that.  It has to be fixed before going 
to sea again, and then you go home.”  (D5) 
 
Or, company skippers did not have the financial means to own a vessel in the first place 
because his family did not pass a fishing business on to him:    
 
“20 year ago, perhaps I should have bought a boat, but I didn’t.  And money comes 
into it as well. ‘Cause I’m not a fishing family either. I’m the only fisherman in my 
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family, so it’s not like I had a boat to start off with.  A lot of [independent skippers] 
start off with a small boat from their family and then build up from there. So I 
never had that either like.” (D16) 
 
The evidence to suggest strategy types are influenced by the company is the presence of 
Reactor archetypes.  Economic theory suggests that Reactors should not exist because they 
will be unprofitable.  Company skippers do not pay for the cost maintenance or fishing gear.  
Their earnings are determined by how much they catch, minus the trip expenses only.  
Independent skippers often demonstrated surprise that some of the company vessels were 
fishing at all given their high running costs:   
 
“They live in a kind of inertia, they’ve never gone out and looked at what happens 
in the rest of the industry”.  (P2) 
 
As a result, Reactors still earned a (low) wage despite their vessel being unprofitable to the 
company.  Given the company has a fleet of vessels they can afford to keep the business 
running with some unprofitable vessels.  This also allows an unstable strategy for skippers.  For 
example, taking risks with gear.  As company skippers do not pay for their gear, they can more 
easily take the risk of “smashing the gear up” (D27) in order to catch fish on rough ground.   
 
Company skippers are also constrained by the company to pursue other strategies.  They have 
limited influence on their ability to be innovators because the company limits the availability of 
technology, the ability to switch gear types and experiment with different fisheries and gears, 
and the ports that they can land to.   
 
In comparison, independent skippers tended to have a different outlook and passion for 
fishing and many independent skippers responded to questions about why they chose to be a 
fisherman and have their own business with statements such as:   
 
“Fishing is a strange thing, once you get the bug for it, it’s like a disease, it’s great, 
you know” (A18) 
 
and  
 
“I grew up in places like this, listening to old men’s sea stories and I thought it 
were great, watching the old men and kicked about with them” (P28) 
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Independent skippers also demonstrated determination, a need to be in control and have 
business-like qualities: When asked why a skipper invested in his own vessel independent 
skippers tended to have responses similar to the following:  
 
“I decided if I was making money for somebody, why can’t I make it for myself?” 
(D24)   
 
“I have controlled every aspect of my life. I’ve controlled whether I am successful 
or not successful. How successful I am has depended on how much I put in”. (P28) 
 
“We’re businessmen, and we work hard”. (A7) 
 
5.  Discussion  
The United Kingdom has a vision to develop: 
 
“a long term strategy for the sustainable future of the UK marine fishing industry.   
The strategy should be based on the need for sustainable management of marine 
resources and ecosystems, and take account of the diverse and changing 
circumstances of fishing and related industries, and the social and economic 
development of communities which depend on fishing activity.’(Prime Minister's 
Strategy Unit, 2004) 
 
The objectives of this study are to inform policy designed to achieve this vision.  There are two 
primary objectives.   First, I wanted to contribute to our understanding of fishers’ strategic 
behaviour and used a framework developed in the strategic management literature to do so.  
The framework enabled integration of fishers’ strategic choices as well as their individual 
characteristics, and explain why fishermen fish where they do, choices made in how they fish, 
and what factors explain why some fishers continue to exist while others don’t.   Current 
understanding of fisher strategic behaviours  are under-developed, yet understanding how 
fishers use marine resources, alongside understanding the dynamics of the resource itself is 
fundamental for achieving the United Kingdom’s  vision of sustainable fisheries management.   
Although widely recognised that understanding fisher dynamics is required, fisheries lacks a 
toolkit for defining and understanding the heterogeneity of fisher behaviour.  Therefore, I 
looked outside the fisheries literature and draw on the strategic management research to 
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construct the framework and adapted the robust strategic typology developed by Miles and 
Snow (1978) to a fishing context.   
 
The second objective was to test the framework by classifying the strategic behaviour of 
skippers in Southwest England.  This analysis revealed that fishers’ strategic behaviour can be 
classified on a continuum that captures the degree to which each skipper is dynamic, 
innovative and adaptable to changing conditions.  These three strategic qualities map into the 
Miles and Snow (1978) typology.  This typology provides a practical simplification of the 
continuum and allows classification of each fisher into one of four strategy types: Prospectors 
(18%), Defenders (44%), Analysers (29%) and Reactors (9%). It was identified that a skipper’s 
strategic position is ‘enabled’ through use of administrative processes and decisions captured 
by the  degree of communication, cooperation, planning, financial and physical risk taking they 
undertake and their emphasis on stability.  It was also found that skipper individual 
characteristics such as time horizon in terms of career, the financial pressure and 
responsibilities at home and also their ethic towards fishing determine a skipper’s strategy.   
Whether a skipper worked for a company or operated independently also informed their 
strategy type.  There is evidence to suggest that company skippers’ strategic behaviour was 
informed by the overarching company strategy.  It was also found that individual 
characteristics of the skipper influenced their choice to work for a company or to operate 
independently.   
 
Although the findings of this study need to be interpreted with some caution due to sample 
size and methodology, the preliminary evidence presented here does have a number of 
potential implications for designing policies that can ‘maximise the return to the UK of the 
sustainable use of fisheries resources and protection of the marine environment’ while setting 
clear social objectives of ‘providing valuable income and employment to remote communities 
which would otherwise make higher calls upon public funds…[by] helping smaller and 
vulnerable communities continue to have access to fishing opportunities’ (Prime Minister's 
Strategy Unit, 2004).  Firstly, in order to achieve these goals, the UK has emphasised the need 
to regionalise fisheries management, applying management solutions that are appropriate to 
the context specific needs.  In order to operationalise regional management, identifying fishing 
communities’ composition may be useful because each fishing community is likely to be 
different.  This analysis of a remote and vulnerable fishing community in the southwest of 
England revealed that the composition of skipper strategy types is dominated by skippers who 
are not flexible or innovative and hence have little ability to adapt to changing conditions 
(Reactors and Defenders make up 53% of skipper sample).  These fishers are primarily skippers 
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using beam trawl gear.   The domination of this strategy type could suggest that the fishing 
community is potentially in decline and could be heading towards becoming a ‘sunset 
industry’.  However, at the same time, the southwest fishery is the most important region for 
fisheries in England, with the most potential for growth.  If the government wants to 
encourage growth in fisheries and prevent the vulnerable communities becoming a drain on 
society in this region, the social objectives for this fishing community requires more attention.  
Decisions about product and labour markets, technology, and investment, to encourage 
adaptable strategies are needed (as well as wider policy commitments of regional 
development, and provision of services in the community, such as health, education, 
infrastructure, and finance).  
 
The second implication of this study is that understanding the strategic choices of fishers can 
assist in predicting the efficacy of different management regimes and regulations.  If policy is 
at odds with the strategic choices of fishers and/or their individual characteristics there will be 
problems of compliance.  Fishers will either ignore, avoid, or even worse subvert the initiatives 
implemented (Wilen et al., 2002, Raakjaer Neilsen, 2003, Raakjaer Neilsen and Mathiesen, 
2003).  This response to regulatory policy by the fishers creates a never ending cycle of 
supplementing regulation to solve problems created by former legislation. (Vestergaard, 1997, 
Christensen and Raakjaer, 2006, Degnbol et al., 2006).  In 2009, the European Commission for 
Fisheries identified that the current methods underpinning fisheries governance required 
transformation, and launched a wide ranging debate (The Green Paper) on the way EU 
fisheries are managed (European Commission, 2009), looking to reform the Common Fisheries 
Policy in order to achieve its goal of ‘exploitation of living aquatic resources that provides 
sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions’ (European Commission, 2009).  The 
Green Paper calls for fundamental reform that addresses the issues of over-capacity and 
compliance, suggesting a shift towards regionalised rights-based management, individual 
transferable quotas, and closed areas to protect sensitive habitats.  By identifying the 
strategies and motivations underlying fisher behaviour, the impacts of any such changes in 
fisheries management regimes and how they may influence different fisher groups, could 
potentially be predicted and policy designed to accommodate different user groups and/or 
influence strategy types that are more in line with management objectives.   
 
The third implication of this study’s finding relates to policy directed at fleet capacity 
management.  Overcapacity remains the fundamental issue facing EU and UK fisheries.  The 
target is to maintain a fleet whose harvesting capacity is proportionate to the size and 
productivity of available fish stocks.  The EU has repeatedly implemented structural policies to 
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reduce the fleet, such as decommissioning schemes.  However, this has not been effective at 
reducing capacity as it can remove only the most inefficient vessels, and the effort seeps back 
into the system through technological creep.  Using the categorisation of strategy types, the 
likely influences of decommissioning on each strategy can be examined.  Vessels that seem 
likely to be most attracted to decommissioning schemes are those skippered by Reactors.  
Reactors are skippers of vessels who are largely unprofitable and in this case only exist 
because the company employer effectively subsidises their operation.  They have an unstable 
strategy, and have little interest in changing their practice unless they are forced to.  These 
skippers are already looking for a way out of fishing and it seems likely that in response to a 
major shock, they may be finally pushed out of the industry.  Therefore, if Reactors do 
successfully apply for decommissioning, vessels that are using up resources without being 
profitable are removed which could have a positive effect on the efficiency of remaining 
vessels.  But on the other hand, these vessels may already be about to leave the industry 
anyway and it may be financially wasteful of resources to remove Reactors if the desired 
outcome is to remove a proportionate amount of excess capacity.   
 
Defenders may also be attracted by decommissioning as their inflexible strategy means they 
are struggling to adapt to the uncertain and changing conditions in fisheries.  In the case of this 
SW fishing community, many of the Defender type skippers used beam trawl gear, a highly fuel 
intensive method of fishing.  With fuel prices inevitably rising again in the near future 
(International Energy Agency, 2008), these skippers have an uncertain future.  As a result, if 
they had an alternative source of income, many Defender types said they would leave the 
industry to work in other marine sectors (Abernethy et al., 2010).  However, the problem 
arises when Defenders do not have an alternative source of income and are trapped in an 
inflexible and marginally profitable sector of the industry.  A large proportion of Defenders 
tend to be older fishers and nearing retirement age (fishers who used to be more flexible and 
innovative in the past have now settled for a Defender strategy to end their career).  
Therefore, if these vessels are decommissioned, it may be removing capacity that may exit the 
fleet in the near future anyway.  The other sub-type of defenders not considered yet are the 
younger skippers who very deliberately choose a defender strategy, defending the niche they 
have created for themselves in the market place, focusing on a narrow set of species they 
catch, focussing on a high quality product, working hard and are largely successful at being the 
best at what they do.  They can be heavy exploiters of a small number of species and can be 
very profitable because of their efficiency at doing so.  These skippers are unlikely to be 
attracted by decommissioning as they have a high fishing ethic, and a determination to remain 
in fishing.  However, due to their inflexibility, Defenders may also be the fishers most unlikely 
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to comply with regulations because they have to limit the impact of regulation on their 
economic viability. Given their predictable and stable patterns of resource use, Defender 
skippers may positively respond to rights based instruments of management such as 
cooperatives and territorial use rights (TURFs).  TURFs are rights to fishing grounds allocated to 
a group of resource users which they then manage between them.  Given their defensive 
nature, newcomers wanting to enter the fishery would probably find it very difficult to gain 
membership of such a collective association, therefore fishing capacity would be limited.   
 
Some operators who have applied for EU decommissioning have used it to their advantage, 
simply factoring in the premium they received for scrapping their vessel into future fishing 
investment decisions, using the money to purchase more efficient vessels (European 
Commission, 2009).  Analyser or Prospector skippers may be the type of skippers who would 
tend to make those decisions.  It is difficult to know how to manage innovative, dynamic and 
adaptable strategy types.  On the one hand their flexibility allows them to readily adapt to 
changing regulatory conditions which can cause pressure on resources.  But on the other hand, 
Prospectors and Analysers plan for the future, want to have longevity in their career and 
continue to fish.  They are more aware of sustainability issues and agree that fishing capacity 
needs to be more in line with resource availability.  These fishers are also more likely to adapt 
their practice in response to changing consumer preferences towards sustainably sourced fish.  
However, heavy regulatory restrictions limit their ability to be profitable and therefore, in a 
recent crisis driven by fuel-price hikes, limited their openness to sustainable practices (See 
Chapter 5).  This suggests that these vessels should be allowed to perform, be efficient and 
profitable to encourage good practice.  Therefore limiting the number of these vessels may be 
beneficial for efficiency (Hilborn, 1985).  Or, if sectoral efficiency and net economic 
contribution of fisheries is the goal of fisheries policy (e.g. Wealth-based fishery management, 
which puts resource rent at the heart of the management process (Cunningham and Neiland, 
2005), then flexible strategy types should be encouraged and policy and management systems 
designed to facilitate flexible behaviour.  For example, individual transferrable quota rights 
have been shown to result in the rationalisation and improved economic profitability of fleets 
in Denmark and Spain (MRAG et al., 2009) (although there would need to be safeguards in 
place to prevent concentration of ownership of rights).  In addition, market driven incentives 
used to encourage sustainable practices, and incentives such as grants and competitions to 
encourage development of gear changes that are in line with consumer demands for 
sustainability could also be useful tools for this type of strategy.   
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6. Conclusion 
This study is preliminary and designed to improve our understanding of the strategic 
behaviours of fishers with a view to informing fishery management policy directed at changing 
behaviour.  It is the first study, of which I am aware that has attempted to apply the Miles and 
Snow (1978) strategic typology in the fishery context.  The typology was adapted for this study 
and I do not claim to have tested empirically the typology per se but rather used it as a 
framework for ‘sense making’ of behaviour phenomena (Dervin, 1992).  As with most research 
studies there are limitations and many questions remain unanswered particularly those 
directed at informing policy choices.  Firstly, using a methodology which uses classification or 
archetypes can be contentious in itself (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993).  This study first 
identified that there was a continuum of strategic type because of overlapping strategic 
qualities and indicators.  However, in order to classify strategic archetypes, decisions were 
required in terms of cut-off points, which may result in limitations for predicting responses 
according to each strategic type.  Secondly, questions that remain unanswered are: Is strategy 
typing and routine inclusion of strategy types of fishers in management practical?  Given that 
fisheries management tends to focus on the vessel and not the individual skipper, is it possible 
to manage individual strategy types? How can the fact that skippers may change their strategy 
types throughout their careers be accounted for?  This study does, however, indicate that 
fishers do adopt a configuration of behaviours that reflect strategic qualities; technology 
employed and processes used.  Future research could build on this study and identify proxies 
that capture the key features of each strategic archetype.  Trade-offs between cost of design 
and implementing a data capture system and the benefits in terms of effective policy would be 
required.  Another question is whether it is ethical or fair to make decisions based on 
individual qualities of people?  How would fishers react if they knew policy was informed by 
this type of information?   
 
This study does not attempt to address specifically how to incorporate these findings into the 
design of fishery management policy.  This study is exploratory and further research is 
required to establish the validity of the theoretical framework used to interpret the findings as 
well as to refine the method used to understand the relationships between the constructs 
studied here.  Despite the potential limitations, this study is the first to employ a framework 
well developed and empirically tested in the strategic management literature.  This framework 
provides a more sophisticated approach to understanding fishers’ strategic behaviour.    
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8. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1a. Strategic typing based on Miles and Snow (1978).  
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Appendix 1a continued. Strategic typing based on Miles and Snow (1978). 
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Appendix 1a continued. Strategic typing based on Miles and Snow (1978). 
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Appendix 1b. Strategic typing taken from (Conant et al., 1990) based on Miles and Snow 
(1978).  
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Appendix 2.  Interview respondent codes. Prefix P indicates Prospector strategy-type,  
D = Defender- type, A = Analyser-type, R = Reactor-type. Primary gear type used, whether the 
respondent was a company or independent skipper, the age of skipper and interview date are 
also given. 
 
Respondent code Gear type Company/Independent Age Interview date 
D1 crab/lobster potter Independent 59 16.04.2008 
P2 otter trawler Independent 34 18.04.2008 
D3 gillnetter Independent 42 22.04.2008 
D4 beam trawler Company 38 26.04.2008 
D5 beam trawler Company 51 06.05.2008 
R6 beam trawler Company 43 07.05.2008 
A7 beam trawler Independent 48 07.05.2008 
A8 beam trawler Independent 39 08.05.2008 
A9 gillnetter Independent 37 09.05.2008 
R10 beam trawler Company 63 09.05.2008 
D11 beam trawler Independent 53 10.05.2008 
D12 beam trawler Company 45 12.05.2008 
D13 beam trawler Company 55 14.05.2008 
A14 beam trawler Independent 50 21.05.2008 
A15 beam trawler Independent 54 22.05.2008 
D16 beam trawler Company 52 24.05.2008 
D17 beam trawler Independent 41 24.05.2008 
A18 otter trawler Independent 36 30.05.2008 
A19 crab/lobster potter Independent 40 02.06.2008 
R20 beam trawler Company 58 07.06.2008 
D21 gillnetter Independent 42 11.06.2008 
A22 gillnetter Independent 36 11.06.2008 
P23 otter trawler Independent 47 12.06.2008 
D24 gillnetter Independent 49 12.06.2008 
A25 scallop dredger Independent 48 13.06.2008 
P26 gillnetter Independent 36 18.06.2008 
D27 beam trawler Company 47 30.06.2008 
P28 scallop dredger Independent 51 01.07.2008 
D29 scallop dredger Independent 57 02.07.2008 
A30 scallop dredger Independent 53 02.07.2008 
P31 gillnetter Independent 28 04.07.2008 
D32 beam trawler Company 38 07.07.2008 
P33 gillnetter Independent 45 07.07.2008 
D34 beam trawler Independent 32 08.07.2008 
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Appendix 3.  Questionnaire 
 
SOUTH-WEST QUESTIONNAIRE: UNDERSTANDING SKIPPER DECISION-MAKING  
                
Thank you for participating in this questionnaire.  It provides me with invaluable data for my PhD 
research.  I realise I have already taken your time with the interview that we did prior to giving you this 
questionnaire.  This questionnaire is simply some additional questions about you that I did not ask in the 
interview because they tend to be tick-box type questions more suited to questionnaires.  These 
questions relate to your background as a fisher and your general fishing patterns.  I am also asking some 
questions about the sorts of financial pressure you are under.  This is to see if there is a relationship with 
financial pressure and risk taking (that we talked about in the interview).  I realise financial questions are 
a sensitive area for some people, and I have tried to keep the questions as un-intrusive as I can.   
 
Let me reassure you again that your name or any facts that could identify you will not appear in any 
report of this study.  All of your answers will be kept confidential and cannot be traced back to you.  
Once the questionnaire has been returned to me, this page with your name on it will be removed from 
the questionnaire.  The questionnaire itself will be kept in a filing cabinet that is locked.  All computer 
files I generate will not have your name on them.  
 
I really appreciate the time you have given me.   
So, all skippers who return their questionnaire to me will go into a draw to win a hamper worth £100  
 
Please complete this questionnaire as soon as you can.  If you have any questions about the 
questionnaire, don’t hesitate to give me a call.  My number is XXX.  Once you have finished, you can 
send me a text or give me a call and I can come and collect it.  If I haven’t heard from you within a week, 
I will give you a call to arrange a time to come and collect it. 
 
Kirsten Abernethy 
 
 
Please fill in the following: (this page will be removed once the questionnaire is returned to Kirsten) 
 
Name of skipper: 
 
Contact details: 
 
Date of birth: 
 
Vessel name: 
 
Vessel PLN: 
 
Producer organisation membership:    [     ]  CFPO 
      [     ]  SWFPO 
      [     ]  OTHER, please specify 
                                                                                        ……………………………………… 
      [     ]  NONE 
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SECTION A.    
This section aims to understand a little of your background and history as a skipper.  It also aims to 
understand your general and current fishing patterns, including the types of gear you use, and some 
information about your crew.   
(i) Brief background. 
1.  What year did you start fishing?  
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
2.  What year did you start fishing in the South-west of England?  
(If the answer is the same as question 1, put NA) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
3.  What year did you first become a skipper? 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
4. Do members of your family fish for a living? (tick as many as appropriate) 
1  [     ]  YES, my sibling(s)  
2  [     ]  YES, my parent(s) 
3  [     ]  YES, my grandparent(s) 
4  [     ]  YES, my great grandparent(s) 
5  [     ]  YES, my child(ren) 
 6  [     ]  NO 
5. Please specify which qualifications you have (tick more than one if appropriate): 
 [     ]  Secondary school (left at/before age 16) 
[     ]  CSCs 
[     ]  GCSCs  
 [     ]  O LEVELS  
 [     ]  A LEVELS 
[     ]  University degree, specify:                                             . 
 [     ]  Skipper Class 2 (or equivalent) 
 [     ]  Skipper Class 1 (or equivalent)    
 [     ]  Other, specify:                                            .    
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6.  Do you currently own the boat that you skipper?  
1  [     ]  YES 
2  [     ]  I part own the boat I skipper (please specify your % ownership) ______ 
3  [     ]  NO (go to question 11) 
7.  In which year did you buy the boat you currently skipper? 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
8. In which year did you buy your first boat?  
             (If your current boat is your first boat, go to question 10) 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
9. How many boats have you owned over your career?  
For each boat, please list the type of boat, percentage ownership, and the years owned        
  
Boat type % ownership Years owned 
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
10. Do you expect to need a new boat at some point in your fishing career? 
 1  [     ]  YES,  in _____________  years (please fill in the gap) (go to question 14) 
 2  [     ]  NO (go to question 14) 
11.  Who owns the boat you currently skipper? 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
12.  Do you intend to buy your own boat in the future? 
    1  [     ]  YES  
    2  [     ]  NO (go to question 14) 
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13.   In how many years do you plan to buy your own boat? 
 _______________________________________________________________ 
14. How many more years do you plan to fish for? 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
15.  If you had to give up fishing, what would you do to earn a living? 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
16. Would you give up fishing if you won the lottery tomorrow? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO 
 3  *     +  I DON’T KNOW 
 
(ii) Gear types used. 
17.  What is the main type of fishing gear you currently use on the boat you skipper?   
(tick the one most appropriate box) 
1  [     ]  Beam trawl – Stonemat gear 
 2  [     ]  Beam trawl – Open gear 
 3  [     ]  Otter trawl  
4  [     ]  Twin otter trawl 
 5  [     ]  Triple otter trawl 
 6  [     ]  Scallop dredge 
 7  [     ]  Gill nets 
 8  [     ]  Seine nets 
 9  [     ]  Pots 
 10 [     ]  Other, specify:                                            .  
18. Did you use any gear types other than your main gear type in 2007? 
 1  [     ]  YES    
 2  [     ]  NO  (go to question 20) 
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19.   There are 3 things you need to do for this question. 
1. List each gear type you used in 2007 
2. List which months of the year you used the gear type  
3. Estimate the proportion of your total fishing income that that you got from the gear type in 
2007. (I have put an example in the first line) 
 
  
20. Did you use other gear types than your main gear type in 2006? 
 1  [     ]  YES   
 2  [     ]  NO  (go to question 22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Gear type 2. Month(s) gear was used 3. Proportion of total income 
Beam trawl January - June 60% 
   
   
   
   
   
  TOTAL = 100% 
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21.   There are 3 things you need to do for this question. 
1. List each gear type you used in 2006 
2. List which months of the year you used the gear type  
3. Estimate the proportion of your total fishing income that that you got from the gear type in 
2006:    
 
22.  What types of technology do you use while fishing? (tick as many as are appropriate) 
 1   [     ]  GPS 
 2   [     ]  Fish finder 
 3   [     ]  Plotting software 
4   [     ]  Sonar 
 5   [     ]  Ground discrimination 
 6   [     ]  Seabed mapping software 
 7   [     ]  ARPA radar 
 8   [     ]  AIS/Vessel Identification software 
9   [     ]  Satcom e-mail   
10 [     ]  Other, specify:                                            . 
11 [     ]  Other, specify:                                            . 
23. Do you have deck machinery to sort fish? 
 1   [     ]  YES 
 2   [     ]  NO 
1. Gear type 2. Month(s) used 3. Proportion of total income 
   
   
   
   
   
  TOTAL = 100% 
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(iii) Crew. 
24. On average, how many crew (excluding yourself) do you currently have on a fishing trip? 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
25. How often do you get new crew members? (tick the one most appropriate box) 
 1  [     ]  I have a completely different crew every fishing trip 
 2  [     ]  I have at least one new crew member every fishing trip 
 3  [     ]  I have at least one new crew member on most fishing trips 
 4  [     ]  I have at least one new crew member on half the fishing trips 
 5  [     ]  I occasionally have a new crew member 
 6  [     ]  I rarely have a new crew member 
 7  [     ]  I have had the same crew for more than one year  
 8  [     ]  I have had the same crew for more than five years 
 
26. Please describe the wage system:   
After expenses (please specify what these are) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
The total boat owner share is _________________ % 
The total crew share is _________________ % 
Please outline how the crew share is split: 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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(iv) General fishing patterns. 
27. This question is about what species you target throughout the year.   
For each month, please list the main species you target. 
Please make sure you have all the months of the year covered.  If a new target species is 
targeted half way through the month, please make a note of it.  If you take time off during the 
year please indicate when that is. 
 
Month Target species 
January  
February  
March  
April  
May  
June  
July  
August  
September  
October  
November  
December  
 
28. What is the current home harbour of your boat?  (tick the one most appropriate box) 
 1  [     ]  Newlyn  4  [     ]  Padstow  7  [     ]  Dartmouth 
 2  [     ]  Brixham  5  [     ]  Shoreham 8  [     ]  Teignmouth 
 3  [     ]  Plymouth  6  [     ]  Salcombe  9  [     ]  Exmouth 
 10 [     ]  Bideford  11 [     ]  Other  (please specify)__________________ 
 
29. In 2007, did you land fish at any other harbours? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO (go to question 32) 
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30. Please tick all the harbours you used in 2007 
1  [     ]  Newlyn  4  [     ]  Padstow  7  [     ]  Dartmouth 
 2  [     ]  Brixham  5  [     ]  Shoreham 8  [     ]  Teignmouth 
 3  [     ]  Plymouth  6  [     ]  Salcombe  9  [     ]  Exmouth 
 10 [     ]  Bideford   
 11 [     ]  Other  (please specify) ___________________________ 
 12 [     ]  Other  (please specify) ___________________________ 
 13 [     ]  Other  (please specify) ___________________________ 
14 [     ]  Other  (please specify) ___________________________ 
31. Was 2007 typical of the last five years? (Choose the one most suitable answer)  
 1  [     ]  Yes, I normally use this many harbours to land my fish. 
 2  [     ]  No, I normally use more harbours to land my fish. 
 3  [     ]  No, I normally use less harbours to land my fish. 
 4  [     ]  No, I normally use only one harbour to land my fish. 
32. Choosing a harbour to land and sell at. Please choose the one most suitable answer.  
 1  [     ]  I always land at my homeport and sell my fish at my homeport market 
2  [     ]  I always land at my homeport but will transport my catch to the market with the best 
              price  
 3  [     ]  I will land at ports other than my homeport but will always transport my catch to my 
              homeport 
 4  [     ]  I land at different ports and always sell at the port I land at 
 5  [     ]  I land at different ports and transport my catch to the market with the best price   
 
33. How many days were you at sea in 2007? (an estimate is fine) 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
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34. Was the number of days at sea in 2007 typical of the last five years?  
(Choose the one most suitable answer) 
 
 1  [     ]  Yes, I normally fish about the same number of days in a year. 
 2  [     ]  No, I normally fish more days in a year. 
 3  [     ]  No, I normally fish less days year.  
35. In 2007, on average, and if weather was good and constant, how long was each fishing trip? 
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
36. Was the length of trip in 2007 typical of the last five years? (Choose the one most suitable 
answer) 
 
 1  [     ]  Yes, the length of trip has been the same as 2007 for the past five years 
 2  [     ]  No, trips have usually been longer in the past. 
 3  [     ]  No, trips have usually been shorter in the past 
37. On average, how many hours/days do you have off between fishing trips?  (please indicate if 
you are including the landing day)  
 _____________________________________________________________________ 
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38. This question is about the factors that are important to you when deciding where to fish before 
you leave the harbour.  Please rank the following factors from 1 to 14, giving the most 
important factor for you a value of 1, and the least important factor a value of 14.    
 
Factor Ranking 
Season  
State of the tide  
What was caught on the previous trip  
What species you want to target  
The availability of quota  
Cost of fuel  
Availability of crew  
Seabed (hard/soft ground, wrecks, cables)  
The weather when steaming out  
The forecast for while at sea  
Market prices of fish  
What other boats in fleet have landed and where  
Reference to personal logbooks/diaries  
Information and news from contacts (other skippers)  
 
39. Please list other factors that are not on the above list that affect your decision about where to 
fish 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
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SECTION B.  Investments & financial risk 
The purpose of this section of questions is to see if there is a relationship between the decisions you 
make and the amount of financial pressure you are under.   
I realise that some of these questions are quite personal and I totally understand if you do not want to 
answer these questions.  Feel free to leave this section blank if you feel strongly that you do not want to 
answer these questions.  But, let me reassure you again that this is for my research only.  I am 
interested in general patterns only, not individuals.  This type of information will be extremely useful for 
my research. 
 
(i) Vessel investments   
(To be answered by skippers who own their boat only.  If you do not own your boat, go to 
question 49) 
 
40. Do you own your vessel outright?  
 1  [     ]  YES, I have paid off my vessel (go to question 42) 
 2  [     ]  NO, I still owe some money on my vessel  
41. After paying for your running costs (fishing trip costs including crew wages, insurance, 
maintenance, gear, administration costs) after each trip, please estimate the percentage of 
your earnings that goes to paying your vessel loan. 
 
______________  % 
42. Have you had to invest in rebuilding your vessel in the last 5 years? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO 
43. Have you invested in any new mechanical equipment in the last 5 years? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO 
 
44.  Have you invested in any new electronic equipment in the last 5 years? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO, I lease electronic equipment 
 3  [     ]  NO 
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45. Have you invested in any new catch handling equipment in the last 5 years? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO 
46. Have you invested in any new equipment to improve safety/working conditions/comfort on 
your vessel in the last 5 years? 
 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO 
47. Please list the types of regular maintenance you do on your boat in a year and how often you 
do it. 
Type of maintenance I do this maintenance every….. 
                                         Months 
                                         Months 
                                         Months 
                                         Months 
                                         Months 
                                         Months 
                                         Months 
 
48. Have you had to do any major maintenance to your boat in the last 5 years?  
 1  [     ]  YES, please specify  
 ________________________________________________________ 
    
 ________________________________________________________   
  
2  [     ]  NO 
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(ii)  Non-vessel investments and costs (To be answered by ALL skippers) 
49. How many people are there in your household? Please tick and where appropriate give the 
number. 
 [     ]  SPOUSE 
 [     ]  CHILDREN (number) ___________ 
 [     ]  OTHER RELATIVES (number) ___________ 
 [     ]  FRIEND (number) ___________ 
 [     ]  LODGER (number) ___________ 
 
50. Do you have sources of income, other than from fishing, coming into your household? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO (go to question 53) 
51. Please list your other sources of income. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
52. Please estimate the percentage of income that your fishing represents of the total household 
income. 
 
 [                        %] 
53. What are your current major areas of expense, excluding fishing related costs and general 
living expenses (food, electric, gas, water, council tax)?   
(tick as many factors suitable answers) 
  
1  [     ]  Mortgage 4  [     ]  Car expenses  7  [     ]  School fees 
 2  [     ]  Rent  5  [     ]  Home renovations    
 3  [     ]  Car loan  6  [     ]  Additional property    
 8  [     ]  Other  (please specify) ___________________________ 
9  [     ]  Other  (please specify) ___________________________ 
10 [     ] Other  (please specify) ___________________________   
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54. Have you undertaken any industry courses that help you to managing finances? 
 1  [     ]  YES 
 2  [     ]  NO 
 
(iii) Costs and earnings from fishing 
55. Please estimate your total fishing costs for the latest financial year (2007/2008).  If you do not 
own your own vessel, then please put down your claimed expenses 
 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
56. Please estimate your total earnings from fishing for the latest financial year (2007/2008). 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
57. Please estimate the number of fishing trips you did in the latest financial year (2007/2008). 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH! 
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Chapter 4 
Modelling fishing location choice  
for the beam trawl fleet  
in southwest England 
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1. Abstract 
How do fishermen choose where to fish?  A logistic random utility model (RUM) of fisher 
location choice by beam trawlers in the southwest of England was used to help answer this 
question. The RUM was parameterised using data from the EU vessel monitoring system, the 
UK logbook Fishing Activity database and the UK Fishing Vessel Register from 2005 to 2008. 
Individual vessel location choices and model variables were aggregated to ICES statistical 
rectangles (approximately 30 nautical miles square) by month.  The model outputs show that 
vessels in southwest England made location choices (in 2005 - 2007) based on recent economic 
returns (value of catch per hour fished) in the month prior and in the previous year in the same 
month.  Vessel skippers also made decisions based on the economic returns of the entire fleet; 
and tended to choose locations that yielded higher economic returns to the fleet compared to 
other available locations.  This suggests a transfer of knowledge on what others in the fleet are 
catching and where.  Beam trawlers also appeared to be risk-averse, preferring to fish 
locations closer to their homeport, and at locations with less variance in the value of catch per 
unit effort at a location, even if the economic returns could be high.  Vessels also preferred to 
fish in deeper water, particularly the larger vessels of the fleet.  To evaluate the model’s 
predictive ability, I compared 2008 location choices with predicted choices using the 2005 – 
2007 model coefficients.  The model correctly predicted vessels not fishing in a rectangle in 
97% of cases and correctly predicted where vessels fished in 56% of cases. The predictive 
ability of the model varied by ICES statistical rectangle and month and the spatial density of 
predicted choices corresponded closely to the observed choice densities.  This study shows 
that a RUM approach can be of practical use for policy makers who want to determine the 
factors that influence location choice of fishers and with further model development may be 
useful for predicting fisher response to management action.  
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2. Introduction 
Since the 1950s there has been consistent recognition that successful fisheries management 
relies on a detailed understanding of fisher behaviour (Gordon, 1953, Hilborn and Walters, 
1992, Charles, 1995, Wilen et al., 2002, Hilborn, 2007).  It is widely acknowledged that a 
primary reason for management failure is lack of knowledge of how fishers will respond and 
adapt to management (Hilborn 1985; Hart 2003).  Without a clear understanding of how 
fishers make decisions, the management regime can result in behaviour that is not intended by 
managers, even producing negative environmental, economic and social effects (Hilborn et al., 
2004, Pascoe and Mardle, 2005).  This lack of insight into such a fundamental component of 
fisheries management is surprising since management attempts to change incentives and costs 
in order to change fisher behaviour (Pascoe, 2006).   Fisheries policy continues to be informed 
primarily by biological information, and it has been assumed that if catch, effort and stock 
levels can be determined, then the fishery will be managed more successfully  (Punt and 
Hilborn, 1997, Pauly et al., 2002, Baker and Clapham, 2004). Progress toward incorporating 
fisher behaviour and the decision-making processes that underpin behaviour into policy 
decisions has been limited. 
 
A key area of fisher decision making that requires integration into fisheries policies is the 
choice of fishing location - where to fish.  Fishers will have different returns depending on their 
location choice because of patchiness and spatial heterogeneity in the marine ecosystem.    
Consequently there is increasing interest in restricting or modifying spatial location choice 
through the use of spatially explicit policies for the management of the marine environment 
(Christie, 1992, United Nations, 2002, IUCN, 2003, Hannesson, 2004, CBD, 2006, Roberts et al., 
2006, Wood et al., 2008).  A current example of this is in the UK, where the government has 
committed to put in place an ecologically-coherent network of marine protected areas (MPAs) 
by 2012 for the conservation and recovery of marine biodiversity and ecosystems (Marine and 
Coastal Access Bill, November 2009).  Although the proposed protected areas gives weight to 
biodiversity conservation, there are also clear commitments to “finding space for the 
competing range of activities in our seas, for example fishing… and manage them in a holistic 
way” (Defra, 2009).  A key factor policy makers require in order to know if spatial policies will 
meet objectives, is to understand how users of the marine environment will respond, such as 
where fishing effort will be displaced to if areas are closed (Smith, 2000). 
 
Research into understanding and predicting where fishers go to fish has been dominated by 
modelling and statistical approaches.  However, sets of knowledge can be drawn from social 
approaches in fisheries research and alternative disciplines and be used to add contextual 
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depth to understand the reasons underpinning location choice behaviour, including the 
interactions and trade-offs between individual profit maximisation goals, risk, knowledge and 
the incentives and institutions present (See Chapter 2 and 3 for detailed discussion and 
application).  For this chapter I focus on the use and value of modelling location choice, and 
examine how modelling can explore the relative contribution of profit, individual knowledge, 
information exchange between fishers, financial and physical risk taking, as well as vessel 
characteristics on location choice decisions .  There have been two main types of models used 
in the location choice literature.  The first type of model is based on ecological foraging theory, 
the Ideal Free Distribution (IFD) (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970), and the second type of model is a 
random utility model (RUM) which is based on the economic concept of utility (McFadden, 
1974).   
 
In his seminal paper, Gordon (1954) proposed that in a fishery, vessels will seek the most 
profitable fishing grounds and fishing effort will eventually distribute so that profit rates are 
equal among grounds.  In the ecological literature this is known as the Ideal Free Distribution 
theory (Fretwell and Lucas, 1970) and has been used to model fisher location choice 
(Abrahams and Healey, 1990, Gillis et al., 1993, Swain and Wade, 2003).  This hypothesis has 
been successful in predicting location choice but the case studies have been relatively simple, 
with only one or two species caught in a limited number of areas fished by a fairly 
homogenous fleet of vessels.   The model relies on assumptions that may be inaccurate and 
lead to erroneous conclusions when applied to more complex fisheries.  First, fishers are 
assumed to have homogeneous characteristics and motivations.  Second, fishers are assumed 
to have perfect information about the resource they exploit: the problem of finding fish is 
assumed away (Wilson, 1990).  Therefore this model is less relevant to many fisheries, such as 
in Europe where a mix of species are caught, the mix of fish is highly seasonal, fishers can 
choose between numerous grounds and use different size of boats and different gears to catch 
the same fish.  Furthermore, perfect information about the resource is never available.  The 
complex choice set a fisher faces combined with uncertain resource availability and 
management restrictions reduces an individual’s ability to know what the relative profitability 
will be for all alternative locations (Anderson and Christensen, 2006).   
 
The random utility model (RUM) is increasingly used to understand location choice in 
temperate fisheries (e.g. Bockstael and Opaluch, 1983, Eales and Wilen, 1986, Holland and 
Sutinen, 1999, Mistiaen and Strand, 2000, Smith, 2002, Hutton et al., 2004, Anderson and 
Christensen, 2006).  The RUM is based on the concept of utility which, in economics, is defined 
as the measure of happiness or satisfaction gained from a good, service or activity.  Rational 
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decision makers are assumed to make decisions based on maximising their utility (subject to 
constraint).  Therefore, in the RUM, utility is assumed to drive individual choice.  Utility (Uij) is 
defined as a linear combination of deterministic explanatory variables (zij) (that together make 
up the non-random part of the model) with a coefficient β, and a stochastic error term (εij) (the 
random component): 
Uij = βzij +  εij 
 
where, for a given person-time event, i (such as a fishing trip by an individual), a choice j (such 
as location) is made.  The explanatory variables (zij) can consist of the attributes of the choice 
(xij) and the characteristics of the individual (wij).   A logit distribution of the error term (εij) is 
most widely used in practical applications of RUMs in fisheries, to reflect a 0 or 1 choice.  The 
simplest of these is the conditional logit model (McFadden, 1974) which assumes that the 
choice of location is unordered.  So, the probability that individual i will go to location j, or not, 
is given by: 
Pr (Yi = j | zi1, zi2,…ziJ) = e
βzij / ∑J e
βzij 
 
The original RUM paper modelled the choice of which fishery to pursue (Bockstael and 
Opaluch, 1983), and the literature since has focussed on location choice decision-making, 
explaining observed location choices and predicting them (Holland and Sutinen, 1999, Hutton 
et al., 2004). The explanatory variables considered relate primarily to profit maximisation, and 
given that fishing is an economic activity, this is no surprise.  Expected profitability (catch, 
value of catch, or catch/value of catch per unit of fishing effort) is used as a variable in all 
models and has been found to be a significant predictor of location choice (e.g. Holland and 
Sutinen, 1999, Curtis and Hicks, 2000, Smith, 2002, Hutton et al., 2004).  However, fishers need 
to know where the fish are in order to be successful, therefore previous individual vessel 
profitability has also been used as a proxy for skipper knowledge and experience (e.g. Wilen et 
al., 2002, Smith, 2005).  Information exchange has been identified as being important in the 
search for fish, and variables that include fleet wide profitability have been considered to be a 
proxy for information exchange among the fleet (e.g. Curtis and McConnell, 2004, Anderson 
and Christensen, 2006).  RUMs have also included variables related to risk-taking behaviour, 
and generally show that profit is traded off with risk aversion.  This has been measured using  
the variability of returns at a location, with vessels choosing locations that have lower 
variability of returns than high variability of returns (e.g. Pradhan and Leung, 2004).  Risk has 
also been measured using distance from port, with vessels tending to select fishing sites closer 
to port rather than further away (e.g. Smith, 2002, Smith, 2005, Anderson and Christensen, 
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2006).   Vessels have also been shown to rely on traditional fishing grounds, showing inertia to 
change, in order to reduce uncertainty or habit (Holland and Sutinen, 2000).  Some models 
have also incorporated vessel specific characteristics, such as age and size of the vessel, 
showing that different classes of vessel exploit different locations (Mistiaen and Strand, 2000, 
Pradhan and Leung, 2004, Smith and Zhang, 2007, Prellezo et al., 2009).  In summary, profit, 
knowledge, risk and vessel characteristics have been shown to influence location choice in 
RUM models.  Therefore, I include variables related to all of these factors in the model 
presented in this study.  
 
In this chapter, I apply a RUM to understand and predict the location choice behaviour of the 
beam trawl fleet in Southwest England.  I provide insights into the assumptions, strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach, as well as the data requirements.  For this study I start by using 
the simplest of models, the conditional logit model, to determine predictors of vessel location 
choice from 2005-2007. I derived the variables for the model based on the literature (See 
above and Chapter 2 for full literature review) and the data available.  The variables were 
vetted and informed by in-depth knowledge of the SW beam trawl fishery and fisher decision-
making strategies (See Chapter 3).  I considered variables relating to individual vessel 
characteristics, and tested the effects of size, age and home port10 of the vessel.  I looked at 
the influence of individual experience using vessels previous value of catch per unit fishing 
effort (VPUE).  I also considered variables related to the location itself using the depth of the 
location (the only habitat-type data available).  I explore the degree of knowledge transfer of 
what the beam trawl fleet are currently catching and where, using fleet-wide VPUE in a 
location.  I examine the risk preference of vessels using the variance of VPUE of the beam trawl 
fleet in that location and if vessels choose locations close or far from their home port.  A range 
of models are explored and presented which examine the effects of different variables of 
interest and their interactions.  I specifically explore the interactions between vessel size, 
rectangle depth, rectangle VPUE and variation of VPUE. I then use the resulting model to 
predict location choice for 2008 and compare the results with actual location choice data for 
2008. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Description of the study location and fleets  
With the decline of North Sea fisheries, the southwest of England now holds most of the 
remaining English fleet.  The southwest  (SW) fishery is termed a ‘mixed fishery’: diverse in 
                                                          
10
 In other RUM models, all vessels have used one home port or it is controlled for.  If this has not been 
explicitly controlled for in the models, this may be an oversight. 
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terms of gear type and species caught, and ranging from small inshore day boats to large 
trawlers fishing on week-long trips in deep water over 100 nautical miles offshore.  The fishery 
operates primarily in ICES Area VII (Fig. 1) and this area contributed 28% of UK registered vessel 
landings (163,300 tonnes), constituting 27% of the value of landings (£169.9 million) into the 
UK and abroad by UK vessels in 2008.  There are three major landing ports and markets in SW 
England; Newlyn, Plymouth and Brixham and in 2008, total landings into these three ports 
constituted 44% of the total landings in England, which represented over half of the total value 
of English landings  (52%).  Demersal (bottom dwelling)species make up a significant proportion 
of fisher incomes in the SW (all landing statistics: Marine and Fisheries Agency, 2009). In 2008 
one third of total landings into Newlyn, Plymouth and Brixham were demersal species, such as 
monkfish (Lophius piscatorius), megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis) and Dover sole (Solea 
solea), which comprise of some high value species and represented 61% of the total value of 
landings over the three ports.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of the UK and ICES Area VII. ICES Area VII is further subdivided into Areas VIIa-k.  
Main Southwest ports/markets, Newlyn, Plymouth, Brixham and Shoreham are also identified 
on the map. 
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This study examines the location choice behaviour of the SW beam trawl fleet of vessels over 
15 metres in length from 2005 to 2008.  The beam trawl fleet targets a range of species and can 
catch 15-20 different species in one trip (Fig. 2).  However beam trawlers tend to target a core 
mix of species.  Some species caught are also very seasonal, for example, beam trawlers catch 
high quantities of cuttlefish for a few months in autumn/winter.  In terms of the characteristics 
of SW beam trawl vessels, there does not appear to be a large amount of variation within fleet 
in length of vessel (mean ± SD = 27.93 ± 4.04 metres, n= 46), although vessels do vary 
substantially in terms of tonnage (mean ± SD = 153.29 ± 53.27 tonnes) and engine size (mean ± 
SD = 555.23 ± 243.06 kW).  Vessels also tend to be old (mean ± SD = 36 ± 12 years).  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean annual KG and SD of species caught by the SW beam trawl fleet (2005-2008). 
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3.2. Data sources  
Data were extracted from three national fishery databases from 2005 to 2008; the EU vessel 
monitoring system (VMS), the UK logbook Fishing Activity database (FAD) and UK Fishing 
Vessel Register (FVR).  Since 2005, all UK registered fishing vessels over 15 metres have been 
fitted with VMS, a satellite tracking device that records the vessel position every two hours.  
This was linked using the fishing trip unique identifier to landings data held in the FAD.  FAD 
provides data on the total catch (KG), value of catch (£) for each species caught, and the gear 
type used for each trip.  Using the vessels unique registration number, the data were also 
linked to the FVR which provides vessel characteristics data such as the vessel size, age, and 
home port (the harbour where vessel is kept).  Data were extracted into a Microsoft Access 
database linked with mapping software, ArcGIS 9.2, where distances from fishing position to 
home port was calculated and bathymetry data (depth) incorporated. 
 
3.3. Data selection 
This large dataset was reduced to consider only the 22 rectangles that encompassed 
approximately 95% of fishing effort, catch and value; and the 46 vessels with complete records 
for vessel characteristics.  Firstly, SW beam trawlers exploit different subdivisions within ICES 
area VII.  Visual estimations were made of 2005 maps of fishing effort and ICES areas were 
selected that looked to include all fishing effort: ICES Areas VII d, e, f, g and h. Then the spatial 
resolution of the model was set at the size of the ICES statistical rectangle, which is 0.5° 
latitude x 1° longitude (approximately 30 nautical miles square).  Rectangles were selected 
where 95% of the average annual effort took place (2005-2008).  Rectangles where 95.16% 
annual effort took place also had 94.76% of the annual average catch weight, and 94.21% 
annual average catch value.  In some cases the rectangle included a proportion of land; I 
accounted for this in the model by including the calculated percentage of sea as a covariate.  I 
eliminated vessels (19 vessels) without complete records of vessel characteristics (vessel size 
and age, homeport, etc) and those whose characteristics changed over time, e.g. due to 
alteration or change of owner.  These vessels were removed to reduce any bias in the sample. 
 
The VMS data contained all vessel observations every two hours over the course of a fishing 
trip.  This included fishing observations where the vessel was fishing or steaming to a fishing 
ground.  To select fishing only observations, a speed filter was used (Mills et al., 2006).  For 
beam trawlers, if the vessel was travelling between 2-8 knots it was considered to be fishing.  
Other observations were assumed to be steaming observations and were removed from the 
data sets.  FAD data were then linked to the VMS data using a unique fishing trip identifier, and 
catch weight and value of catch were divided equally among observations for each fishing trip.  
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This is clearly a limitation of the data available but unfortunately there are no data of fine 
enough resolution which can attribute catch to a specific ICES rectangle.    
 
Catch value data were imputed for 6% of the total fishing observations.  Catch weight and 
value are highly correlated for all species (all species, RP > 0.9) and therefore, rather than 
delete the missing cases, the value of catch was imputed for each species (Nakagawa and 
Freckleton, 2008).  In 1.3% of total observations there were no data for value of catch or 
weight of catch.  This portion of the dataset was examined to see if there was any systematic 
bias or pattern which could explain the missing data, but as none was found these 
observations were therefore removed.  In total, there were 212,624 fishing observations 
(satellite positions) between 2005 and 2008.  The data were then aggregated to month and 
rectangle. Therefore, the analysis was restricted to 22 rectangles, for 46 vessels in 48 months, 
yielding a total of 48,576 observations. 
 
3.4. Conceptual model 
The model predicts the probability of a vessel choosing a given location (ICES rectangle) in a 
month.  In the time period the TAC and quotas for most of the demersal fish species in the SW 
was relatively stable and annual changes in quota were assumed to have a minor influence on 
choice of target species.  
 
The conceptual model takes the following form and explanatory variables are described in 
detail in the next section: 
 
Probability of a vessel choosing to fish in a rectangle in a month  
 =  β1(Fixed vessel characteristics, e.g. size, homeport)  
+  β2(Fixed rectangle characteristics, e.g. depth, variance off fleet VPUE in rectangle)  
+  β3(Vessel previous value of catch per unit effort (VPUE) in rectangle)  
+  β4(Vessel distance from homeport) 
+ β5(Fleet VPUE in rectangle) 
+ ε 
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Using the model coefficients from 2005-2007 data, I then predict the probability of a vessel 
choosing a rectangle in a month for 2008.  I compare the predicted 2008 choices with actual 
choices in 2008. 
 
3.5. Model Variables 
3.5.1. Vessel level explanatory variables 
(a) Fixed vessel characteristics: 
I restricted the variables to Vessel Capacity Units (VCU) and vessel age only.  Vessel age 
was taken as age in 2008.  A PCA analysis for possible variables showed that the main axis 
of variation was comprised of size-related vessel characteristics (factor 1), and vessel age 
(factor 2; Table 1.).  The data available for this analysis were vessel length (metres), vessel 
tonnage (tonnes), engine size (kW) and vessel capacity units (VCU) which is a value that 
takes into account vessel length (mt), breadth (mt) and engine size (kW) of the vessel (VCU 
= length x breadth x 0.45kW), age of the vessel (in years in 2008) and the vessel homeport. 
There were four home ports, Shoreham (n =2), Plymouth (n = 4), Newlyn (n = 25) and 
Brixham (n =15).  The vessel size variables are all highly related, therefore I chose VCU 
which integrates them.  Age of vessel varied by home port (One-way ANOVA, VCU: F3,42 = 
3.354, p = 0.028; Vessel age: F3,42 = 15.34, p < 0.001; Fig 3.). Shoreham vessels are smaller 
compared to the other ports, and Newlyn and Brixham vessel are old when compared to 
Plymouth and Shoreham vessels, to account for this I included home port as a dummy 
variable in the model. 
 
Table 1. Principle component factors describing fixed vessel characteristics. All factor 
loadings for each characteristic are included, with loadings >0.4 highlighted in bold. 
Fixed vessel characteristics 
Principle components 
Factor 1 Factor 2 
VCU 
Engine size 
Tonnage 
Length 
Age 
Home port 
Variance explained 
0.983 
0.956 
0.954 
0.921 
-0.174 
0.263 
62.52% 
0.005 
0.004 
-0.202 
0.187 
0.943 
0.412 
18.29% 
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Figure 3. Home port and A) VCU of vessels and B) Age of vessels (years). Shoreham: n=2, 
Plymouth: n=4, Newlyn: n=25, Brixham: n=15. 
 
 
(b) Time variant characteristics of vessels: 
Vessel previous catch value per unit effort (£ per hour fishing; VPUE) in month in rectangle 
was highly correlated with catch weight per unit effort (KG per hour fishing).  VPUE was 
the variable used.   
 
I examined lags of one to twelve months for VPUE (Fig 4.) and also examined the lags for 
value of catch and fishing effort separately.  For catch value and fishing effort, all lags are 
significantly related to the current value of catch and effort.  As expected, the previous 
month (lag 1) has the highest correlation coefficient, this then decays in subsequent lagged 
months and then grows again to be highly correlated at 12 months prior.  For VPUE the 
pattern is the same but the correlation coefficient does not build again towards the 12 
month lag. This indicates that the catch value, VPUE and fishing effort are related to recent 
catch value, VPUE and fishing effort; and catch value and fishing effort are also related to 
annual catch value and effort. Lagged VPUE (months 1-12) are included as variables in the 
model. 
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Figure 4. The correlations coefficients between vessel current value of catch (£), fishing effort 
(hours) and VPUE and lags of one to 12 months.  All correlations were significant, p < 0.01.  
 
 
For each vessel the distance (kilometres) from the centre point of each rectangle to the vessels 
homeport was calculated and included as a variable.  
 
3.5.2. Rectangle level explanatory variables 
(a) Fixed rectangle characteristics: 
The mean and standard deviation (SD) of rectangle depths (metres) were included as 
variables in the model.  The mean depth of rectangle varied from 25 to 167 metres (Fig. 
5.).  Depth was considered to be an important ecological factor to include as it can 
determine the catch composition and value, and also may constrain certain vessels that do 
not have the appropriate fishing gear to trawl in deeper water. 
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Figure 5. Mean and standard deviation (SD) of rectangle depths used in model. 
Percentages above columns indicates the percentage of sea in a rectangle (if less than 
100%) 
 
 
Given that the variance of catch in a rectangle has been shown to influence whether a 
vessel will choose a location or not, the coefficient of variation of VPUE of the fleet 
over the time period was calculated as a variable: 
 
CV VPUE = Standard deviation VPUE in rectangle/ Mean VPUE in rectangle (fleet)  
 
(b) Time variant rectangle characteristics: 
Rectangle (or total fleet) VPUE in a month was considered.  As I was interested in the 
selection of one rectangle over another, I calculated the relative VPUE for a rectangle 
compared to all the other rectangles in that month (VPUE in rectangle/VPUE in all 
rectangles).  Rectangle catch weight per unit effort (CPUE) was also considered but 
was highly correlated with VPUE.  Therefore, similar to the vessel VPUE variable, 
rectangle VPUE was used.   
 
The relationship between vessel and rectangle VPUE was examined.  Vessel VPUE was 
significantly and positively related to rectangle VPUE (VPUE: RP = 0.408, n = 7683, p < 
0.001). 
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3.5.3. Control variables 
Month (January to December), year (2006 and 2007), and the percent of sea in a rectangle (Fig. 
5.) were all included in the model as control variables. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Random utility model results 
The results of the random utility model of location choice using 2005 – 2007 data for the 
Southwest beam trawl fleet are presented in Table 2.  Seven final variations of the same 
baseline model are presented, which examine the effects of different variables of interest and 
their interactions.  Model 1 is the baseline model with all variables included and no interaction 
terms.  Models 2-7 explore the effect of removing variables or adding interaction terms.  All 
seven models are highly significant at the 1% level.  In this section, the variables that 
consistently show the same results across models are discussed as well as the points of 
interest of the different model iterations. 
 
As expected, for all models, vessel’s previous VPUE (Vessel VPUE Lag1-12) in a rectangle was a 
significant predictor of location choice, indicating that if vessels had high VPUE in a location in 
previous months, there was a high probability it would return to that location.  All lagged 
months were highly significant predictors (p < 0.01) except for the sixth month lag which was 
not significant.  The strongest coefficients were one and two month lags, and the 12 month lag 
(compared to other lags).  This suggests that recent VPUE and VPUE in the same month but the 
year before were important individual vessel characteristics predicting location choice.    
 
The size (Vessel VCU) and age (Vessel Age) of vessel did not influence the probability of a 
vessel choosing a location in a month in the basic model (Model 1).  However, given the 
expectation that the probability of a vessel choosing a rectangle may be related to both the 
size of the vessel and the depth of a location, this was investigated further.  The model with 
depth variables (Rectangle mean depth, Rectangle SD depth) removed did not influence the 
predictive power of vessel size (Model 3). However, when the interaction term, Vessel VCU x 
Rectangle mean depth was included (Model 2), it was highly significant, indicating that there 
was a greater probability of a larger vessel choosing a deeper location. These results show that 
the effect of VCU is strongly mediated through mean depth of rectangle.  Therefore, without 
controlling for this interactive effect between VCU and mean depth, the effect of VCU is 
confounded and the coefficient is not significant.  When the interaction between VCU and 
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depth is controlled for, VCU has a negative influence on location choice, which means that 
overall, larger vessels have a lower probability of fishing in a rectangle than smaller vessels.   
 
The distance from homeport to the rectangle the vessel is fishing in (Distance to home port) is 
a significant predictor of location choice in all model iterations (Models 1-7).  Vessels show a 
decreasing probability of fishing in a rectangle the further away from home port.  Four home 
port dummy variables were included, Shoreham home port, Plymouth home port, Newlyn 
home port and Brixham home port.  Brixham was used as the reference homeport. In most of 
the model iterations, there was no significant effect of individual home ports.   
 
Individual vessels tend to select the most productive areas, in terms of the fleetwide VPUE.  
The relative VPUE of the whole fleet in a rectangle (Rectangle Relative VPUE) was an important 
indicator of location choice of a vessel (Models 1-7).  Rectangle Relative VPUE is the total VPUE 
for all vessels in a rectangle in a month, relative to all the other rectangles in that month.  
Therefore, a high VPUE in a location relative to other locations in a month will result in a higher 
probability that a vessel will choose that rectangle in that month.   
 
The mean depth of a rectangle (Rectangle mean depth) significantly affects the probability of a 
vessel choosing a location to fish there (Model 1, 4-7).  A vessel is more likely to choose a 
fishing location if the water is deeper.  This may be because one of the main species caught by 
beam trawlers in the SW are megrim, and these tend to be caught only by the larger vessels in 
deep water.  The variation in depth (Rectangle SD depth) is a significant and negative variable 
in three of the six models, but is only significant at the 5% level in model 4.  This may indicate 
that vessels prefer to choose locations where there is less variation in depth.   
 
The variation in VPUE in a rectangle over the whole time period (CV VPUE) is an important 
factor affecting a vessels probability of fishing in a rectangle.  Model results suggest that 
vessels are risk averse, preferring to choose rectangles that have less variation in VPUE.  This is 
an interesting finding, therefore several iterations of the model were run to examine this 
variable further.  Firstly, to find out if the rectangle variation in VPUE was related to depth, the 
model was run without the depth variables (Model 3) and found the significance of CV VPUE 
remained the same as the basic Model 1.  The model was also run without the CV VPUE 
variable (Model 4) and found the significance and coefficient for depth variables remained the 
same.  Secondly, the model was run using an interaction term; Rectangle mean depth X CV 
VPUE (Model  5).  The interaction term was highly significant and negative, suggesting if the  
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location is deep and there are variable returns, vessels are less likely to fish there.   When 
there is the interaction term in the model, the CV VPUE variable becomes positive and 
significant, but the overall effect is that variation of VPUE is negative.  I also wanted to 
examine if there was an interaction between the CV VPUE and the Relative VPUE in a rectangle 
(Model 6).  This coefficient was highly significant and negative, which suggests that if there is 
high variability in VPUE in a rectangle, even if VPUE is high, there is a decreased probability 
that vessels will choose to fish that location, with the risk associated with the variability 
dominating the effect of high returns.  
 
For all models (1-7) all months of the year were significant variables. December was used as 
the reference month and there was a higher probability that a vessel will fish in a rectangle in 
all months compared to December.  Vessels may fish less in December because of the 
Christmas holiday period when fish markets are closed, and it is also likely they fish less due to 
poor weather at that time of year.   Year was also a significant variable.  2007 was used as the 
reference year, and 2006 had a negative coefficient in all models, meaning vessels were 
significantly less likely to fish in a rectangle in 2006 compared to 2007.  Therefore location 
choice appears to vary from year to year while controlling for other variables.  
 
Model 7 includes all variables and all interaction terms, and the coefficients are used for the 
predictive model. 
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Table 2. Southwest beam trawl RUM iterations (Models 1 -7), including variables, coefficient (β) estimates, standard errors (s.e.), model estimates. 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. 
Vessel VPUE Lag1 0.83*** 0.03 0.83*** 0.03 0.84*** 0.03 0.83*** 0.03 0.83*** 0.03 0.83*** 0.03 0.82*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag2 0.29*** 0.03 0.28*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.03 0.29*** 0.03 0.28*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag3 0.19*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag4 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag5 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag6 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag7 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.13*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 0.12*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag8 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.17*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 0.17*** 0.03 0.16*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag9 0.10*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag10 0.10*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 0.11*** 0.03 0.10*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag11 0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 0.15*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.03 
Vessel VPUE Lag12 0.25*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.03 0.25*** 0.03 0.25*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.03 0.24*** 0.03 
Vessel VCU -0.11 0.20 -11.54*** 1.82 -0.06 0.20 -0.10 0.20 -0.11 0.20 -0.11 0.20 -11.95*** 1.83 
Vessel Age 0.03 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 6.27*** 0.96 
Vessel VCU X mean depth   6.05*** 0.95         0.22*** 0.18 
Distance to home port -1.19*** 0.10 -1.26*** 0.10 -0.88*** 0.08 -1.19*** 0.10 -1.25*** 0.10 -1.22*** 0.10 -1.34*** 0.10 
Shoreham home port -0.30 0.22 -0.37* 0.22 -0.36 0.22 -0.29 0.22 -0.32 0.22 -0.29 0.22 -0.40* 0.22 
Plymouth home port -0.04 0.12 0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.12 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12 -0.04 0.12 0.02 0.12 
Newlyn home port -0.07 0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.08 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.06 
Rectangle Relative VPUE 1.24*** 0.13 1.25*** 0.13 1.19*** 0.13 1.22*** 0.13 1.24*** 0.14 2.71*** 0.36 2.72*** 0.36 
Rectangle % Sea  -0.75* 0.42 -0.34 0.44 0.74** 0.28 -0.47 0.41 -0.50 0.44 -0.93** 0.43 -0.20 0.46 
Rectangle mean depth 1.17*** 0.25 -14.76*** 2.53   1.11*** 0.25 2.32*** 0.34 1.26*** 0.25 -14.01*** 2.54 
Rectangle SD depth -0.17* 0.10 -0.18* 0.10   -0.23** 0.10 -0.11 0.10 -0.15 0.10 -0.08 0.10 
CV VPUE -0.15** 0.07 -0.14** 0.07 -0.15** 0.07   3.37*** 0.75 2.96*** 0.68 6.83*** 1.01 
Rectangle Rel. VPUE X CV VPUE           -1.57*** 0.34 -1.60*** 0.34 
Rectangle mean depth X CV VPUE         -1.96*** 0.42   -2.12*** 0.42 
   *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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Table 2 continued. Southwest beam trawl RUM iterations (Models 1 -7), including variables, coefficient (β) estimates, standard errors (s.e.), model estimates. 
Variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. β s.e. 
January 0.64*** 0.13 0.65*** 0.13 0.66*** 0.13 0.64*** 0.13 0.63*** 0.13 0.72*** 0.13 0.72*** 0.13 
February 0.42*** 0.13 0.43*** 0.13 0.43*** 0.13 0.42*** 0.13 0.43*** 0.13 0.45*** 0.13 0.46*** 0.13 
March 0.85*** 0.12 0.86*** 0.12 0.86*** 0.12 0.85*** 0.12 0.85*** 0.12 0.87*** 0.13 0.88*** 0.13 
April 1.06*** 0.12 1.06*** 0.12 1.06*** 0.12 1.06*** 0.12 1.06*** 0.12 1.05*** 0.12 1.07*** 0.12 
May 0.30** 0.13 0.30** 0.13 0.31** 0.13 0.30** 0.13 0.30** 0.13 0.31** 0.13 0.32** 0.13 
June 0.61*** 0.13 0.62*** 0.13 0.64*** 0.13 0.62*** 0.13 0.62*** 0.13 0.61*** 0.13 0.62*** 0.13 
July 0.59*** 0.13 0.59*** 0.13 0.61*** 0.13 0.59*** 0.13 0.59*** 0.13 0.59*** 0.13 0.60*** 0.13 
August 0.74*** 0.13 0.74*** 013 0.76*** 0.13 0.74*** 0.13 0.74*** 0.13 0.74*** 0.13 0.75*** 0.13 
September 0.73*** 0.13 0.74*** 0.13 0.75*** 0.13 0.73*** 0.13 0.73*** 0.13 0.74*** 0.13 0.74*** 0.13 
October 0.49*** 0.13 0.49*** 0.13 0.50*** 0.13 0.49*** 0.13 0.49*** 0.13 0.51*** 0.13 0.51*** 0.13 
November 0.72*** 0.13 0.73*** 0.13 0.73*** 0.13 0.72*** 0.13 0.72*** 0.13 0.73*** 0.13 0.73*** 0.13 
Year 2006 -0.15*** 0.05 -0.15*** 0.05 -0.15*** 0.05 -0.15*** 0.05 -0.15*** 0.05 -0.13** 0.05 -0.13** .048 
Constant -0.26 0.91 29.06 4.70 -2.79*** 0.79 -0.72 0.89 -2.60** 1.04 -2.88** 1.09 24.82*** 4.76 
N 24288  24288  24288  24288  24288  24288  24288  
-2 log likelihood 12469.79  12428.58  12500.95  12474.66  12446.73  12445.19  12377.12  
χ
2
 8505.25*** 8546.46*** 8474.09*** 8500.38*** 8528.31*** 8529.86*** 8597.93*** 
   *p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
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4.2. Predictive model results 
The RUM using 2005-2007 data was used to predict 2008 location choice behaviour for the SW 
beam trawl fleet.  Coefficients derived from Model 7 (see Table 2) were entered into the logistic 
regression equation with the actual 2008 values to obtain the predicted probability of a vessel 
choosing a rectangle in a month11.  Predicted probabilities with values ≥ 0.5 were given a value of 1 
(Vessel is fishing in rectangle in month), and values < 0.05, a value of 0 (Vessel is not fishing in 
rectangle in month).  These predicted values for 2008 could then be compared with the actual 
2008 data to determine the predictive ability of the model (Table 3.). 
 
Table 3. Actual 2008 fishing location data compared to Predicted 2008 fishing location data using 
RUM derived from 2005-2007 data. 0 denotes ‘Vessel not fishing in month in rectangle’, 1 denotes 
‘Vessel is fishing in rectangle in month’. Values are the frequency of observations. Total 
observations for 2008 was 12,144. 
  Predicted 2008 values 
% correct 
  0 1 Total 
Actual  
2008  
data 
0 10000 341 10341 96.7 
1 800 1003 1803 55.6 
Total 10800 1344 12144 90.6 
 
 
The model correctly predicted vessels not fishing in a rectangle in 97% of cases and correctly 
predicted vessels fishing in a rectangle in a month in 56% of cases.  The total effort in 2008 
compared to predicted effort in 2008 is shown in the maps of Figure 6.  This shows there is a 
higher density of effort closer to the English coastline than further away, and further highlights 
that the predictive model tends to underestimate the density of fishing effort. To explore this 
further, Figure 7 shows the percentage of fishing observations correctly predicted by the model.  It 
shows that effort is less likely to be accurately predicted in ICES rectangles further away from the 
English coastline.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11 Logistic regression equation: Pr(Y) = 1/1 + e–(b0 + b1X1 + b2X2 +…+ bnXn + εi) 
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Figure 6. Actual 2008 fishing effort (hours) data compared to Predicted 2008 fishing effort data. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Percentage of accurately predicted fishing observations in 2008 in each ICES statistical 
rectangle. 
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In order to examine if the predictive model by month, Figure 8a-c show the actual fishing effort in 
2008 compared to the predicted effort for 2008 for each month. 
 
 
 
Figure 8a. Actual 2008 fishing effort (hours) data compared to Predicted 2008 fishing effort data, 
January to April. 
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Figure 8b. Actual 2008 fishing effort (hours) data compared to Predicted 2008 fishing effort data, 
May to August. 
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Figure 8c. Actual 2008 fishing effort (hours) data compared to Predicted 2008 fishing effort data, 
September to December. 
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The ability of the model to predict fishing effort does not seem to have a discernable monthly 
pattern when examined visually on the maps.  However, for each month the maps show that the 
predictive model tends to predict less effort than actually occurred in 2008. Breaking down the 
correctly predicted percentage of fishing and no fishing observations by month, shows that there 
is some variation between months, with some months predicting fishing observations better than 
others (Table 4.).  In all months, the model correctly predicted vessels not fishing in a rectangle 
between 96 and 99% of the time.  It correctly predicts vessels fishing in a rectangle between 46% 
(January) and 68% (March) depending on month.     
 
Table 4. Percentage of correctly predicted fishing observations, no fishing observations,  
and total observations for each month in 2008. 
Month 
(2008) 
% Fishing 
observations 
correctly predicted 
% No fishing 
observations 
correctly predicted 
% Total 
observations 
correctly predicted 
January 48 98 90 
February 52 97 90 
March 68 97 92 
April 58 96 88 
May 46 96 88 
June 65 97 92 
July 51 96 89 
August 60 96 91 
September 60 96 91 
October 48 97 90 
November 61 97 92 
December 51 99 93 
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5. Discussion 
The results of the RUM show that beam trawl vessels in SW England in 2005 to 2007, make 
location choices based on recent economic returns and the economic returns in the previous year 
in the same month.  Vessels also make decisions based on the economic returns of the entire fleet; 
choosing locations based on higher economic returns of the fleet relative to other locations which 
is suggestive of transfer of knowledge of what others in the fleet are catching and where.  
However, SW beam trawlers also appear to trade off economic returns with risk- aversion tactics, 
preferring to fish locations closer to their homeport, and at locations with less variance in the 
value of catch per unit effort at a location.  Vessels prefer locations with less variance in VPUE 
even if the economic returns could be high.  Vessels also prefer locations where the water is 
deeper, particularly the larger vessels of the fleet. 
 
Hutton et al. (2004) is most relevant to this study because they modelled the location choice of 
European vessels (North Sea) that use the same gear (beam trawl), used the same spatial 
resolution (ICES rectangle) and also used the conditional logit model.  The main point of difference 
is that Hutton et al. (2004) used vessel trip level variables and aggregated the data to year, where I 
used vessel monthly data.  I extended the Hutton model in this study to include vessel specific 
characteristics such as vessel age, size, as well as distance from port. In addition, variation of VPUE 
in a rectangle was included which proved to be an important predictor of location choice.  While 
Hutton et al. (2004) found that greater number of trips, greater average trip length, and greater 
average effort (hours fishing) in a rectangle suggested a greater probability of returned activity, 
they also found that higher previous value of catch for the fleet impacted negatively on location 
choice which is in contrast with other studies (including this study) using similar methodology 
(Holland and Sutinen, 1999, Holland and Sutinen, 2000).  In line with this study and others, Hutton 
et al. (2004) found that the previous VPUE of vessels added likelihood of a choice being made 
(Campbell and Hand, 1999, Anderson and Christensen, 2006, Prellezo et al., 2009).  This 
comparison suggests that beam trawler location choices may be motivated by similar decision 
frameworks related to previous economic returns, but it also proved important to incorporate 
variables that examine risk taking behaviour (distance from home port and variance of returns) of 
vessels.    
 
The model overall successfully predicted where vessels did not fish 97% of the time, but only 
predicted where vessels did fish 56% of the time.  The ability of the model to predict where vessels 
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fish varied by month, and ICES rectangle.  The model fails on more occasions to predict location 
choice the further away the rectangle is from the English coastline.  2008 may have been an 
unusual year for location choice behaviour.  Interview-based fieldwork undertaken in 2008 
uncovered skipper behavioural differences in the SW as a result of rapid fuel price rises in 2008, 
such as vessels fishing closer to homeport than in 2007 (Abernethy et al., 2010).   
 
The power of the RUM used in this study to predict location choice in 2008 could be improved by 
the inclusion of species-specific catch variables, ecological variables, individual skipper 
characteristics, or a more complex approach to the modelling structure.  Depth proved to be an 
important variable for predicting location choice and the reasons for this could be found by 
incorporating catch data that relate to target species.  Interviews with skippers in the SW revealed 
that beam trawlers either targeted megrim and monkfish in the deep water (80- 120 nautical miles 
from port), or a mix of species closer to port (up to 60 nautical miles from port).  Therefore beam 
trawlers may use one of two strategies for location choice dependant on target species 
preference.  One option would be to not model the entire beam trawl fleet, but base the RUM on 
métiers - vessels doing similar activities under similar conditions.  Typologies for metiers have 
been used to analyse fisheries, and have been created from gear type, mesh size, fishing grounds, 
and a priori target species (Tingley et al., 2003, Marchal, 2008).  However, this approach does not 
account for fishers’ ability to switch gear type or target species. 
 
The model also lacks ecological data related to habitats and other biological information.  
Interviews with beam trawlers in the SW revealed they search for fish based on different types of 
sea bed substrate depending on the species they want to target (e.g., sand, stony ground, banks).  
Skippers determine the substrate by using technology such as echo sounders and ground 
discrimination software, which suggests that they make decisions based on fish habitat.  
Unfortunately these habitat data were not available for use in this model.  The lack of forward 
predictability of the 2008 model may also be due to inter-annual variation.  I found that there was 
a significant year effect with vessels less likely to fish in 2006 than 2007 in a rectangle.  This may 
also be due to a lack of ecology in the model, and knowledge of fish distributions changing from 
year to year.  It has been shown in the North Sea that the average depth distribution of most 
North Sea fisheries varies substantially annually due to inter-annual variability in local and regional 
climate (Dulvy et al., 2008). Future development of the model could include sea surface 
temperature as a variable to capture the distributional biology of fish stocks. 
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The model also does not take into account individual skipper qualities and characteristics (apart 
from some vessel characteristics).  In their model of location choice Smith and Zhang (2007) 
collected interview-based data and used skipper characteristics such as the age of skipper in their 
model. They found that older fishers were less likely to choose profitable locations than younger 
skippers and suggested this was because “old habits die hard”.  A possible option for future 
research is to model the location choices of fishers for whom I have interview data, incorporating 
individual skipper characteristics, risk preferences12, as well as their strategic archetype (See 
Chapter 3). For example, innovative and dynamic skippers (‘Prospectors’) may choose a wider 
range of locations, exploring new grounds and targeting different fisheries throughout the year, 
compared to skippers who focus more on improving their efficiency and improving what they have 
always done (‘Defenders’).  The difficulty with using these data with VMS and FAD derived data is 
making sure that the skipper has not changed on each vessel over the whole time period to be 
modelled. 
 
The model type itself may explain the lack of predictive power of the model and the method I used 
to evaluate the predictability of 2008 data may also be limited.  The model type itself could be 
improved: the conditional logit model used here is relatively simple, but I deliberately chose the 
conditional model for two reasons.  First, it provided a direct comparison of the North Sea beam 
trawl fleet modelled by Hutton et al. (2004).  If a different model type was used, it could not have 
been clearly determined if differences between this study and Hutton et al. (2004) were due to the 
different beam trawl fleets or to the model type.  Secondly, by starting with the simple model, I 
now have the opportunity to develop and improve the model further, and examine the effects of 
using different model types.  The main assumption (and limitation) of the conditional logit model 
is that it does not account for independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) - each choice is 
assumed to be completely independent and the probability of a choice is not affected by the other 
choices available.  However, for spatial analysis, this assumption is likely to be invalidated because 
of spatial autocorrelation (e.g., a vessel may be more likely to choose a location close to its current 
location, rather than locations further away) which can have implications for the application of the 
model to policy analysis.  The nested logit model is often used to overcome problems of spatial 
autocorrelation because although it is basically the same model (but with a hierarchical structure: 
a choice set within a choice set), it does not impose the independence of irrelevant alternatives to 
                                                          
12
 I also conducted experimental games with SW skippers to determine their risk preferences, publication 
forthcoming. 
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the same degree (Curtis and Hicks, 2000, Greene, 2003, Anderson and Christensen, 2006).  An 
alternative to the nested approach is the mixed logit model, which similarly does not impose the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives but can be difficult to estimate for more than three or four 
hierarchical levels (Mistiaen and Strand, 2000, Train, 2003, Smith, 2005), or a multinomial model 
which allows for more than two alternative choices.  However, all of these models use a static 
RUM framework.  It may be possible to determine a fully dynamic model which can include 
forward-looking behaviour (e.g., the location choice made on the first day of a fishing trip can 
influence subsequent location choices), which conceptually is the most realistic of all the RUMs.  
However, this is very computationally intensive and there is currently only one published paper 
that has applied a dynamic RUM to fishing location choice (Hicks and Schnier, 2006). 
 
In the predictive analysis, I simply reported the “hits and misses” – the ability of the model to 
predict the absence or presence of fishing.  It must be borne in mind this is a blunt tool.  For 
example, if the model predicted the vessel goes to the adjacent rectangle instead of the rectangle 
in question, this was scored as a “miss”.  Mapping the modelled outcomes was slightly more 
forgiving than the results presented in Table 3, and showed that the model was better at 
predicting 2008 closer to the English coastline.  More sophisticated predictive modelling may be 
possible but was beyond the scope of this study. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The practical purpose of developing random utility models of location choice is to accurately 
predict fisher responses to management actions.  When any catch or effort control, or technical 
measure intended to modify fishing pressure is introduced, vessels will respond to this 
management action. There are numerous examples of vessel responses to management, with 
perhaps the most dramatic associated with large area closures (Rijnsdorp et al., 2001). To ensure 
that management does have the intended effect on fishing pressure, methods are required to 
predict responses to management actions so that management recommendations can be modified 
to account for these responses.  For these purposes, random utility models based on the 
probability of choosing alternative fishing grounds based on expected net rate of return (utility) of 
each fishing ground were developed and can be of use (Allen and McGlade, 1986, Holland and 
Sutinen, 1999). Random utility models can be used to model fishing displacement due to 
management initiatives such as area closures (Hutton et al., 2004).  One issue with these models is 
that they rely on data collected at the scale of the rectangle size used and therefore predictions 
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can only be made at the scale of the rectangle (in this case ICES rectangle). While this may be 
suitable for predicting how fishing mortality changes as a result of effort reallocation, it does not 
help with predictions of local habitat impacts, which need to be predicted at much finer scales 
(Hiddink et al., 2006).  
 
In the past decade, increased availability of spatial information, advances in remote sensing, 
Geographical Information Systems (GIS), spatial statistics and enhanced computational power 
have provided new opportunities to understand the patchiness and heterogeneity of fishing 
activity in the marine environment.  The advent of vessel monitoring systems (VMS) which use 
satellites to continuously log and report vessel location provide an unprecedented overview and 
detail of fishing activity in near real time.  Given that there have been so many technological 
advancements for data collection, the key task for fishery analysts is now to advance new methods 
of analysis incorporating spatial characteristics which will have the capacity to accurately predict 
responses to management initiatives (Wilen, 2000).  Despite their limitations, with further 
development, random utility models could be incorporated in to fisheries management decisions 
for fisheries where these data are available and the increasing interest in spatially explicit policies 
of management may provide the impetus for policy makers to do so.  
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1. Abstract 
Volatile fuel prices are a threat to the viability of UK fishing communities. The economic and social 
impacts of rising fuel costs for fishers and communities in southwest England are examined. Fuel 
prices doubled between early 2007 and mid-2008, while fish prices remained relatively stable 
throughout as a result of the price-setting power of seafood buyers. It was the fishers who 
absorbed the increased costs, resulting in significant loss of income, reduced job security, and 
problems in recruiting crew. All gear types were affected, but fishers using towed gears were most 
adversely impacted. Fishing vessels with recent investment have greater fuel efficiency, so 
appeared to be more able to cope and to adapt to increased fuel costs. Fishing behaviour also 
altered as skippers attempted to increase fuel efficiency at the cost of reduced catches. Most 
skippers reported fishing closer to port, reducing their exploratory fishing, and ceasing 
experimentation with fishing gears with lesser environmental impact. Therefore, a threat to fishing 
community viability may have linked environmental effects. The impacts of this fuel price volatility 
foreshadow a likely future impact of rising fuel prices attributable to climate change adaptation 
and mitigation, and forecasts of rising oil prices. Without proactive planning and policy 
development, rising fuel prices have the potential to cause job losses and economic hardship 
additional to problems that may arise from poor management and stock decline, in all fishing-
related sectors of the industry.  
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2. Introduction 
Many European fish stocks are overexploited, and the fleets suffer from excess capacity, 
threatening the profitability of EU fisheries (Cook et al., 1997, Piet and Rice, 2004, Dulvy et al., 
2005, FAO, 2006). The economic performance of many sectors of the EU fishing fleet has been 
further constrained by restrictive management policies and lowered quotas implemented in 
response to the declining stocks. In 2004, the overall profitability of European fishing fleets was 
estimated to be hovering around zero (Beare and McKenzie, 2006). The decline in profitability has 
largely been masked by technological creep and subsidised fuel, which has allowed vessels to 
exploit new fishing grounds successfully, in areas farther from shore and in deeper water (Morato 
et al., 2006, World Bank and Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2008). In short, there is now a 
smaller total rent (broadly, net economic benefit) from EU fisheries to share.  
 
The profitability and economic sustainability of fisheries in the EU has been further weakened by 
the recent volatility in fuel price. The price of crude oil rose rapidly, peaking at more than US$140 
per barrel in July 2008. Since then it has more than halved. However, the recent oil price shock 
may well foreshadow future oil prices. World oil prices are predicted to exceed US$100 a barrel 
again within a few years and US$200 a barrel by 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2008). This 
does not account for any price increases that may be associated with measures to decarbonise 
societies through climate change adaptation and mitigation measures. The fisheries sector, and 
particularly large-scale commercial fisheries, is a major consumer of global oil, accounting for 
~1.2% of global oil consumption (Tydemars, 2005, Pauly, 2006). For many fisheries, including 
North Atlantic demersal fisheries, the energy content of the edible protein landed is <10% of the 
fuel energy burned to catch it (Tydemars, 2004). The fuel efficiency of fisheries therefore seems to 
be poor, but overall, fisheries have a higher percentage of edible protein energy return on fuel 
energy input than other animal protein sources such as beef, pork, and lamb (Tydemars, 2005). In 
other words, many fisheries are a more fuel-efficient method of food production than other 
agricultural systems. Most fuel is consumed while actually catching the end-product, at a fishing 
vessel level. There are few major energy inputs required prior to harvesting wild marine fish. In 
comparison, other food production methods, such as intensive animal-rearing, require energy 
expenditure throughout the production chain, including feeding, watering, and sheltering the 
animals (Pimentel, 2004, Tydemars, 2005).  
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As fuel consumption by the fisheries sector is concentrated at the fishing vessel level and 
comprises a significant proportion of fishing vessel costs, there has been policy interest in the 
potential effects of high fuel prices (Tietze et al., 2005, Graham, 2006). Increasing and variable fuel 
prices could be considered therefore to be an additional problem facing the fleets that are already 
struggling to be profitable. As a result, recent research has questioned what the likely scenarios 
will be for the future sustainability of fisheries. The emphasis so far has been on the ecological 
impacts and the resulting economic consequences. The rise in fuel costs and hence fishing costs 
may be good in terms of future resource sustainability and conservation, because the less-fuel-
efficient vessels are likely to go out of business (Arnason, 2007). Given that it is widely 
acknowledged that fishing capacity (number of fishers or amount of fishing effort) is currently too 
high to sustain fisheries, ecologically or economically,  a reduction in the number of vessels may 
benefit fisheries in the long term (Pauly et al., 2002, Sumaila et al., 2008). Arnason (2007) adds 
weight to this argument with a surplus-production bioeconomic model which predicts that the 
long-term effects of reduced fishing effort will result in less environmental damage and a 
decreased chance of stock collapse, increased sustainable yield (attributable to less effort and 
more fish), potentially resulting in an industry being in a better position to be profitable. Hence, 
increased fuel costs could be socially beneficial in the long term.  
 
A key limitation of the bioeconomic analyses described above is that the idea of equilibrium 
pervades the models, and assumes that any deviation (in a free market) results in a correction that 
eventually leads to optimal economic configuration, however far the system departs from it in the 
short-term. However, there are some potentially detrimental and non-linear consequences of 
increased costs that need to be considered alongside the potential benefits presented by 
bioeconomic models. Although effective management and appropriate capacity is necessary for 
healthy fishing communities to exist, the reverse is also true – socially cohesive, strong, well-
functioning communities are an essential contribution to the preservation of healthy fisheries 
(Jentoft, 2000). The short-term losses that may be triggered by increased fishing costs such as high 
fuel prices, putting fishers out of business, may jeopardise the underlying infrastructure of the 
fishery (e.g. markets, processors, and shore-workers), which can then result in the degradation of 
a fishing community and the community as a whole (Rossiter and Stead, 2003, Stead, 2005). This 
type of consequence may not be fully reversible even if stocks return to levels high enough to 
sustain a viable fishery. This reasoning has been applied to the ecological side of fisheries, with the 
increased recognition that overfishing can result in an ecosystem shifting to an irreversible 
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alternative stable state (Lees et al., 2006). However, such reasoning has not been applied to the 
human component of the fishery socio-ecological system.  
 
Understanding who will be the winners and losers if fisheries move towards a more economically 
viable fishery structure is important, particularly for remote communities that are more fisheries-
dependent. Fisheries provide a contribution to food security and employment, and “economic and 
social hardship requires *immediate attention+ while tackling systematic overcapacity” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2008). The importance of creating a stable future for 
both the industry itself and for the communities that depend upon it was recently emphasised for 
the UK (Prime Minister's Strategy Unit, 2004), but fisheries policy has tended to focus on removing 
excess capacity and effort from the fishing fleets. Wider policies are required to take the difficult 
next step – addressing the practical implementation of improving fishing-dependent communities’ 
ability to cope and adapt with change under uncertainty. First, the issue of social adaptation is not 
often addressed because it is complex, context-specific, and highly dynamic, and it is difficult to 
develop general methods of application (Berkes and Folke, 1998, Walker et al., 2002, Kallstrom 
and Ljung, 2005). It requires difficult decisions about product and labour markets, technology, and 
investment, as well as wider policy commitments of regional development, and provision of 
services in the community, such as health, education, infrastructure, and finance (Jentoft, 2000). 
Second, it specifically requires the creation of incentives for the fishing community to play an 
active role in preventing their own collapse, a difficult task given that fishers often have little 
incentive to participate in long-term resource management because of the uncertainty they face in 
terms of resource availability and imposed restrictions. This needs to be addressed aggressively, so 
as to not undermine the move towards more participatory governance of fisheries in the EU. 
 
Here, I document the impact of an acute fuel price shock in 2008 on the structure, behaviour, and 
relative vulnerability of different sectors of the UK’s southwest fishing fleet to identify who might 
be the winners and the losers in the face of uncertainty. Specifically, I conducted an analysis of the 
effects of fuel price and fish prices on profitability in this fleet, one of England’s largest remaining 
fleets, its structure, fisher behaviour, and the perceived impacts on the fishing community such as 
downstream effects for infrastructure. This research is based on interview data from skippers and 
vessel owners, vessel characteristics data from national statistics, and data on fuel and fish prices. 
First, I investigated the relationship between fuel prices and market fish prices to show that 
increased fuel costs are not being balanced by increased fish prices, reducing profitability. Second, 
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I examined the effect of the increase in fuel price on different gear types and vessel ownership 
structures to determine who is being affected. I then examined the effect of vessel characteristics 
on fuel consumption of different vessels to determine why different vessels are affected. I also 
carried out an analysis to investigate how fishers were being affected, i.e. how it was affecting 
their business and fisher behaviour. Third, I investigated the community impacts of rising fuel 
prices and the concerns that it has further increased the vulnerability of the fishing community.  
 
3. Methods 
The study was undertaken in a southwest (SW) English fishing community. The field site has been 
anonymised and is referred to throughout the chapter as a ‘SW fishing community’. With the 
decline of North Sea stocks, the fishery in the southwest of England now harbours most of the 
remaining English fleet. The three largest ports and markets in England are Newlyn, Brixham and 
Plymouth (Barratt and Irwin, 2008). In 2007, 18% of the >10 m fleet were registered in the SW 
fishing community, catching 9% of the total reported English landings, representing 12% of the 
total value of catch landed in England in 2007 (Barratt and Irwin, 2008). The southwest fishery is 
termed a mixed fishery: diverse in terms of gear type and species caught, and ranging from small 
boats that handline for mackerel (Scomber scombrus), to large beam trawlers fishing in deeper 
water more than 100 nautical miles offshore.  
 
3.1. Data and information sources  
Three types of data were collected for this study: fuel prices, fish prices, and skipper interviews. 
Fuel price data and fuel duty data for the past ten years were obtained through the records of a 
supplier of fuel to vessels in the SW fishing community. Fuel prices used were minus the duty. The 
fishing industry uses red diesel, which the European Commission taxes at a lower rate than 
roadside diesel. Fuel duty is set by the UK government and vessel owners can claim back the duty 
paid. (The rate changes each year: in June 2008 the rate was £0.0969 per litre.) Fish price data 
were obtained for the same period (spanning January 1998 –July 2008) from “Fishing News”, a UK 
weekly fishing industry newspaper that reports fish prices by port and by species (available at 
http://www.intrafish.no/fn/). Data for the four main species caught in the SW fishing community 
were recorded: monkfish (Lophius piscatorius), sole (Solea solea), hake (Merluccius merluccius), 
and megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis).  
 
185 
 
I also interviewed 34 skippers from the larger (>10 m) vessels. This represents 68% of the larger 
vessels registered in the SW fishing community in 2008. This percentage of vessels is approximate 
because although vessels are registered in the SW fishing community, their actual home port may 
be elsewhere and vice versa. It may also be an underestimation because there are several large 
vessels registered in the community that are not in service. Owing to the general difficulty in 
getting fishers to participate in surveys because of factors such as interview fatigue and time 
constraints, and the lack of a central register of skippers, completely statistically randomised 
respondent selection was neither feasible nor possible. However, I ensured that the sample of 
fishers interviewed represented relevant background variables such as gear types, size of vessel, 
age of vessel, ownership structure, experience, and participation in fisheries politics.  
 
The skippers interviewed were either owners of the vessel (skipper owners) or were paid on a 
share system by a company (company skippers). All interviewees were skippers of large vessels 
(>10 m), consisting of beam trawlers (n = 15), otter trawlers (n = 3), gillnetters (n = 7), scallop 
dredgers (n = 5), and crab/lobster potters (n = 4). Vessel characteristics data for each skipper 
interviewed were collected using the Fishing Vessel List statistics compiled by the UK Marine and 
Fisheries Agency (MFA; Marine and Fisheries Agency statistics fishing vessel lists, UK, available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.uk/statistics/vessellists.htm, and accessed 1 August 2008), including vessel 
size, age, and engine power. A semi-structured interview technique was used, and skippers were 
asked a series of closed questions to elicit further information about their vessel characteristics, 
including details about frequency of engine maintenance, time since last engine refit, fuel 
consumption, and fuel cost per hour as a percentage of the gross earnings from a fishing trip now, 
and 12 months previously. Fuel consumption is monitored closely by skippers, especially over the 
past few years when fuel prices have concerned them. Skippers tended to answer the question in 
terms of the number of litres of diesel burned each day. Taking into consideration the number of 
hours per day skippers fished, fuel consumption per hour was calculated as the consumption per 
day divided by the number of hours fished per day.  
 
Skippers routinely keep track of fuel costs per trip, because they take the cost of fuel from the 
gross earnings of a trip before they pay themselves and the crew. Skippers were asked to estimate 
the fuel costs and the earnings of a typical fishing trip in July 2007 and July 2008. The percentage 
changes in fuel costs and earnings between July 2007 and 2008 were calculated during the 
interview and verified by the skipper.  
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The skippers were then asked a series of open-ended questions on the influence of fuel price on 
their decision-making onshore and at sea, how their fishing behaviour had changed as a result of 
fuel price increases, and what they believed would be the future of fishing for their community 
(see Table 1 for an interview guide).  
 
Table 1. Interview guide 
Quantitative and qualitative (marked *) questions asked of skippers (n = 34). 
Ownership of vessel 
Gear type used 
Engine age 
Time since last major engine refit 
Fuel consumption per hour 
Fuel cost as a percentage of a trip gross in July 2008 
Fuel cost as a percentage of a trip gross 12 months earlier (in July 2007) 
The impact of increased fuel cost on their fishing in general, including constraints now faced * 
If there was any impact of the increased fuel cost on their fishing behaviour * 
The impact of the increased fuel costs on the community in which they live * 
 
 
The approach to interviewing was based on Bernard’s ideas for semi-structured interviews 
(Bernard, 1994). Knowing that the respondent can influence the direction of the interview, the 
interviewer needs to ensure that the overall objectives of the interview guide are covered to a 
sufficient depth without leading the respondent. In order to get fishers to talk about their fisheries 
openly and in detail, time was invested to build mutual trust and to improve reliability of the 
responses. Therefore, I interviewed each respondent two or more times, as well as conducting 
several informal interviews and conversations on the quayside. Triangulation was employed to 
increase confidence in the accuracy of the data collected through fisher interviews. Triangulation 
is a method of establishing the accuracy of information by comparing three or more types of 
independent points of view on data sources (Bruce et al., 2000). In addition to repeat interviews, 
observations on the quayside were conducted every day and used where possible to verify 
responses. Unstructured surveys with key informants were also conducted with members of the 
wider fishing industry including the regional producer organisation (a fishers’ cooperative that 
manages quota, promotes produce, and represents the views and opinions of fishers), and 
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Seafood Cornwall (which collaborates with fishers, fish merchants, and harbour authorities to 
promote Cornish-caught fish, improve quality standards, and encourage sustainable practice). 
Unstructured surveys were also conducted with fish merchants, ex-skippers, market workers, and 
fisheries scientists/observers throughout the study period. These unstructured surveys were used 
to gain understanding of the general issues related to the rise in fuel prices for fishers and the 
community within which they live, and to verify skipper responses to interviews.  
 
3.2. Analyses  
3.2.1. Trends in fuel and fish prices over time 
I chose simply to calculate the changes in absolute prices and percentage changes from the best 
linear model fitted to smaller sections of the data (as specified below, in the Results section). Daily 
and monthly patterns are apparent in the fish price data, so I estimated the annual trend while 
accounting for daily and monthly effects. 
 
3.2.2. Who is affected by increased fuel prices? 
Using interview data I determined which gear type (who) was most affected by increased fuel 
prices, and compared the difference in fuel consumption (log10 transformed) for each gear type 
using a one-way analysis of variance ANOVA, and fuel consumption between towed gears (beam 
trawling, otter trawling, and scallop dredging) and static gears (gillnets and crab pots), using an 
independent samples t-test. To assess the extent of the impact of fuel price increases on the costs 
of fishing for different types of fishers, the fuel cost as a percentage of a trip gross in July 2008 was 
compared with that in July 2007 for different gear types.  
 
3.2.3. Why are different vessels affected by increased fuel prices? 
I used a general linear modelling framework with model selection to examine which vessel 
characteristics (derived from data gathered during interviews and the MFA Fishing Vessel List) 
influenced the fuel consumption of different vessels. All vessels pay the same price for fuel, so 
there was no need for its inclusion as a variable. Vessel characteristics used included categorical 
variables, i.e. gear type (towed or static gear) and ownership structure (skipper owner or company 
skipper), and continuous variables, i.e. vessel size (using vessel capacity units VCU), vessel age 
(years), engine size (kW), engine age (years), and time since last refit (years). All continuous 
predictor variables were log10 transformed to ensure normality. To avoid multicollinearity I 
eliminated redundant predictor variables: vessel size and engine size were highly correlated (Rp = 
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0.980, n = 33, p < 0.001), as were vessel and engine age (Rp = 0.591, n = 33, p < 0.001). Only vessel 
size and engine age were retained for analysis. Possible interactions between predictor variables 
were decided a priori based on the interviews with fishers, and were also included in the model. 
All predictor variables were included to fit a maximum model, and the least significant variables 
were systematically excluded one by one based on small sample size Akaike Information Criterion 
(cAIC), ΔAIC, and AIC weights (Burnham and Anderson, 2002, Crawley, 2003). To test whether the 
level of investment into vessels was influenced by the ownership structure (owner skipper vs. 
company skipper), t-tests were undertaken on vessel age, engine age, and time since last major 
engine refit.  
 
3.3.4. How are fishing businesses and the community affected by increased fuel prices? 
Fishers were questioned on how fuel prices had affected fishing practices, behaviour, and their 
business. Questions were posed so that answers were not prompted by the interviewer. Skippers 
were free to list what they felt were their greatest concerns. Interviews were tape-recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. Transcripts were systematically coded using qualitative analysis software, 
(NVivo 7) according to each variable of interest, to ensure that data were not used selectively. The 
frequency of each answer type was calculated. During interviews, skippers were also asked about 
how increased fuel prices were affecting their community now and likely in future.  
 
4. Results  
4.1. Trends in fuel prices and fish prices over time 
Fuel prices for fishers in the SW fishing community increased by 359% from 1998 to 2008. In 
contrast, fish prices have remained relatively stable. Fuel price remained stable over the decade 
from 1987 to 1996, with prices averaging £0.12 per litre, then dipped and subsequently rose near 
the end of 2000. Since 2003, prices have increased by £0.05 per litre annually (F1,4 = 39.2, p = 
0.003). Average fuel prices increased by 45% from mid-2007 to mid-2008, from £0.31 per litre in 
2007 to £0.45 per litre by the end of May 2008. By mid-2008, they had reached £0.57 per litre, 
resulting in an average price of that year by then of £0.45 per litre. Accounting for day and month 
effects, where significant, average monkfish prices increased by £0.146 per year (18.6% increase 
from 1998 to 2008), sole by £0.39 (48.2% increase), hake by £0.066 (15.5% increase), and megrim 
by £0.35 (129.6% increase; Figure 1.). 
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Figure 1. The price of fuel (excluding tax duty) in UK pence (£0.01) per litre paid by vessels in the 
SW fishing community from January 1998 to July 2008, and the average monthly price of the four 
main species of fish in UK pounds sterling per kg landed at the market, for the period January–July 
2008 (Points are average monthly price for each fish species and lines of the same colour are loess 
smoothed curves to show the overall trend and help in interpretation) 
 
 
4.2. Who is affected by increased fuel prices? 
Fishers using different gear types are impacted differently by the increase in fuel cost, so fuel 
consumption was significantly different among gear types. Fishers that used towed gears were 
more affected by fuel price increases because they consumed significantly more fuel than vessels 
that used static gear (mean consumption  litre per h ± s.e.: towed gear, 81.00 ± 9.14, n = 11; static 
gear, 21.33 ± 2.96, n = 23; t32 = –4.43, p < 0.001; Figure 2.). The realised fuel costs doubled in the 
12 months studied, on average, for all gear types (Figure 3). Given that vessels that use towed 
gears burn more fuel than static gears, they were more seriously affected by the rise in fuel costs.  
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Figure 2. Average fuel consumption for five different gear types. Values are the means  2 s.e.  
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Figure 3. Comparison of fuel consumption as a percentage of fishing trip gross earnings between 
July 2007 and July 2008 for five different gear types. 
 
 
4.3. Why are different vessels affected by increased fuel prices? 
To examine the link between fuel use and characteristics of vessels, average fuel consumption per 
hour was regressed on VCUs and on dummy variables that indicated whether the skipper was the 
owner and whether the vessel used towed or static gear (Table 2). The following diagnostic tests 
were conducted: the RESET omitted variable test supported the null hypothesis that no variables 
were omitted (F3, 26 = 1.65; p = 0.2013). The mean variance inflation factor of 1.81 indicated that 
multicolinearity was not a problem. The Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test also accepted the 
null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (χ2(1) = 2.07; p = 0.1499); despite this, to make results 
comparable with the regression used later, I used robust standard errors. 
 
The finding was that higher fuel consumption is associated with towed gears and larger vessels. 
For example, towed gear vessels on average used some 24 l h–1 more than static gears. Similarly, 
the hourly consumption of fuel increased by 0.2 l for each additional unit of VCU. An interesting 
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but rather weak result (significant only at 10%) from this regression is the observation that, on 
average, vessels skippered by owners used less fuel than company skippers. There is a strong 
significant interaction between gear type (towed) and ownership. In Table 2 (column b), in 
addition to the variables included in column (a), an interactive term between skipper owner and 
towed gear type is included. This regression also passed the diagnostic tests mentioned above 
except that for heteroscedasticity. The RESET omitted variable test supported the null hypothesis 
(F3,25 = 0.20; p = 0.8929). The mean variance inflation factor of 3.87 indicates that multicolinearity 
is not a problem. The Breusch–Pagan/Cook–Weisberg test rejected the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity (χ2(1) = 7.18; p = 0.0074). Hence, the regression uses robust standard errors. In 
the regression, the independent owner effect was no more significant, but the interactive term 
was highly significant, the implication being that the fuel saving associated with skippers owning 
their own vessels mainly worked through ownership of towed geared vessels. In other words, 
ownership really makes a difference in fuel efficiency where fuel consumption is higher (towed 
gear vessels use more fuel than static ones).  
 
Table 2. Regression of fuel consumption on vessel characteristics. 
Coefficient Fuel consumption (l h–1) 
 
(a) (b) 
Skipper owner –12.23* 4.69 
 (6.46) (6.66) 
Skipper owner × towed gear  –38.76*** 
  (11.20) 
Towed gear 24.12*** 49.95*** 
 (6.29) (10.10) 
Vessel size (vessel capacity units VCU)  0.22*** 0.16*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
Constant –12.59 –11.76* 
 (8.27) (6.24) 
Observations 33 33 
r
2
 0.88 0.91 
 F3,29 = 86.68*** F4,28 = 75.91*** 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. *** p < 0.01, * p < 0.1 
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The extent of investment in the upkeep of fishing vessels depended on the ownership structure. 
Vessels skippered by their owners were newer, with newer engines and more recent and regular 
engine maintenance (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of average vessel age (t32 = –3.1, p = 0.004), engine age (t32 = –3.9, p < 
0.001), and time since last major engine refit (t32 = –2.8, p = 0.009) for skipper- and company-
owned fishing vessels.  
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4.4. How are fishing businesses and the community affected by increased fuel prices? 
The declining income from fishing attributable to rising fuel prices led to a vicious cycle for the 
skippers remaining in fishing. Almost all (88%) skippers mentioned that they had experienced a 
significant drop in income over the 12 months of study. Despite management restrictions 
remaining, the issue of greatest concern for skippers of relatively fuel-efficient vessels using static 
gear (netters and potters) was that increased fuel prices still had a significantly negative effect on 
income. Across all gear types, as a result of lowered wages, one-third (34%) of skippers 
interviewed stated that they were having problems recruiting deck crews because “by the time 
you take out the fuel expenses, there’s nothing left for the crew, so all the crew are leaving at the 
moment.” Without crew the boat cannot go to sea, and the skipper needs to seek alternative 
employment. Of the skippers experiencing crew problems, 67% were company skippers. Skipper 
owners tended to have fewer problems recruiting crew, with many having family members as 
crew or having had the same crew for a number of years, crew prepared to stay and to weather 
the bad financial times. These difficulties in crew recruitment were closely associated with the fuel 
price rise and the resulting rapid decline in profit share income. They are not thought to have been 
the consequence of a more general lack of willingness for people to enter the fishery because of 
improved opportunities in other sectors of the economy. Most crew are local from Cornwall, or 
from previously important English fishing ports such as Fleetwood, Grimsby, and Lowestoft, or 
from Scotland or Ireland, who had moved down to the southwest when their own local fishing 
industries collapsed. Some boats have taken to recruiting eastern Europeans with success, but this 
is becoming harder as the economies of those countries themselves improve. Most of the eastern 
European workers in the industry in the community work in processing. 
 
Many skippers felt they were experiencing job insecurity, (“the way fuel is going it is seriously 
worrying”), notably skippers who do not own their vessels (78%) and skippers of fuel-intensive 
beam trawlers (Figure 5a). Those skippers were considering job alternatives, and ironically many 
were considering “going to the North Sea to work for the oil and gas rigs”, another declining 
industry. Skippers who owned their own boats tended to be more positive, having “a good feeling 
about the fishing still”, and were hence more likely to be determined to remain fishing for as long 
as possible (Figure 5b). They tended to believe that fish stocks were increasing slowly (Figure 5c) 
and that there was a future for them within the fishing industry.  
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The rise in fuel prices also changed skippers’ incentive to fish. Among company skippers, more 
than half (56%) mentioned that they were now more concerned with survival, i.e. making enough 
money to support themselves and their families rather than profiting or “making big money”, 
which was the incentive of just 17% of company skippers. By comparison, changing incentives 
were not mentioned as frequently by skipper owners (56% of skipper owners mentioned 
incentives compared with 72% of company skippers). Almost one-fifth (19%) of skipper owners 
mentioned that their incentive to fish had changed to making a “liveable wage”, compared with 
38% of skipper owners who wanted to make big money (Figure 5d). 
 
 
Figure 5. The percentage of skipper owners (grey) and non-owner skippers (black) that (a) had 
concerns about the security of their job, (b) were determined to remain in fishing, (c) felt positive 
about the future of fishing with respect to the fish stocks and, (d) felt their incentive to fish had 
diminished given the rising cost of fuel. 
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The rapidly increasing fuel prices clearly changed how skippers fished and hence the amount they 
caught (Table 3). Skippers used a number of methods to reduce fuel consumption, including 
fishing with the flow of the tide and not against it, steaming and fishing more slowly, fishing in fine 
weather only, fishing closer to port, spending less time in exploratory fishing, and reducing gear 
experimentation. The consequence was that these behaviours decreased the amount of fish 
caught on a trip. Even if a vessel caught a comparatively large quantity of fish at one location, it 
may still not have been cost-effective to stay on that patch of productive ground if it meant towing 
against the flow of the tide. According to skippers, slower steaming and towing meant that it took 
longer to reach the fishing grounds, reducing the fishing time per trip and the total catch. Almost 
half the skippers interviewed said that their total days at sea had also been reduced because they 
“just wouldn’t go out in poor weather”. Poor weather reduces the amount and quality of fish 
caught because the gear tends not to fish effectively, and with high fuel prices it was no longer 
economically viable to operate in such conditions. However, a small number (15%) of skippers now 
saw fewer boats fishing in poor weather as being to their advantage, and actively used that in their 
fishing strategy by going to sea in such periods. Fewer vessels fishing in poor weather results in 
less fish on the market too, with the consequence that seafood buyers compete harder with each 
other, and bid higher to ensure that their orders and commitments are met, driving fish prices up.  
 
Fishing locations also changed: 21% of skippers said they had reduced their distance from port to 
reduce higher fuel costs. On the other hand, a small number of fishers felt that they had to travel 
farther in search of larger fish catches. More than half the skippers said they no longer explored 
new fishing grounds because they could not take the risk of not catching fish. Experimentation 
with gear changes were also reduced for the same reason. “There is no incentive any more to try 
out different gears”. It is not known whether the aggregate effect of these changes in behaviour is 
positive or negative for fish stock status. 
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Table 3. Skipper responses to the open question “How have skippers changed their fishing practice 
as a consequence of increased fuel prices?”  
Skipper response  Number of 
responses 
% of 
responses 
Skipper now uses the tide more when fishing owing to the increased cost of 
fuel  
 
23 67.6 
Skipper has reduced steaming and towing speed owing to increased cost of 
fuel  
 
13 38.2 
Skipper has reduced the number of days at sea because he no longer leaves 
port in poor weather owing to the increased cost of fuel  
 
16 47.1 
Skipper now pushes the weather more in order to increase his days at sea 
owing to increased cost of fuel and the lower profit margins 
 
5 14.7 
Skipper does not make shorter fishing trips owing to the increased cost of 
fuel (the cost of steaming to the grounds is too high for a short trip) 
 
8 23.5 
Skipper has reduced the distance travelled on fishing trips owing to the 
increased cost of fuel  
 
7 20.6 
Skipper has increased the distance travelled in order to find larger catches 
owing to the increased cost of fuel  
 
2 5.9 
Skipper can no longer afford to carry out any (or reduced) exploratory fishing 
reduced exploratory fishing owing to the increased cost of fuel  
 
18 52.9 
Skipper can no longer afford to experiment with gear, or has reduced 
experimentation owing to the increased cost of fuel  
 
11 32.3 
Skipper has attempted to increase the quality of fish caught in order to 
improve his income as a response to rising costs 
 
21 61.8 
Skipper now examines each haul carefully and calculates whether it is 
profitable or not as a result of the increasing cost of fuel  
 
27 79.4 
Skipper has invested in fuel-efficiency measures 
 
19 55.9 
 
 
The impact of rising fuel prices and relatively little change in the price fishers receive for their fish 
also raised serious concerns for the vulnerability of the communities in which they lived (Table 4). 
Most skippers (94%) expressed uncertainty about the future of the fishing industry within their 
community, and said that it “looked bleak”. All the skippers interviewed believed that many “boats 
would go to the wall” and that the fishing fleet would contract significantly as a direct result of 
increased fuel prices. More than 70% of skippers also expressed concern that a reduced fleet 
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would also result in “losing a lot of onshore jobs”, such as the people working at the harbour, and 
in the fish marketing, engineering, and processing sectors. Almost one-fifth of the skippers 
interviewed believed that the fish market itself could be at risk; with fewer boats landing fish, the 
continuity of fish supply would be lost, reducing the number of fish buyers, reducing competition, 
and eventually undermining the viability of the market. The loss of fishing industry infrastructure 
raised serious concerns with skippers. For example, a common thread in skippers responses was 
that the industry “was finished if the price of diesel keeps going the way it is”, and given that the 
“fishing industry keeps *the SW fishing community+ going”, “what will people do and what will 
happen to [the SW fishing community without the fishing industry?” “In this neck of the woods 
where we are, possibilities are limited. It’s a downward spiral”. 
 
 
Table 4. Skipper responses to the open question “What do skippers feel about the future of fishing 
for the fleet, and the community in which they live?” 
Skipper response Number of 
responses 
% of 
responses 
Skipper expressed uncertainty about the future of the fishing industry in their 
community 
 
32 94.1 
Skipper believes there will be a significant reduction in fishing fleet as a result 
of increasing fuel prices, pushing fishers out of business 
 
34 100 
Skipper mentioned a likely loss of jobs ashore (engineering, processing, 
harbour working, etc) 
 
24 70.6 
Skipper believes that shrinkage of the fishing fleet will result in a loss of 
continuity of supply for and viability of the fish market 
 
6 17.6 
Skipper believes that shrinkage of the fishing fleet will have a negative impact 
on the wider community in which he lives, which itself depends on the fishing 
industry for infrastructure and employment 
 
24 70.6 
 
 
5. Discussion 
Fuel prices for fishers doubled between 2007 and mid 2008 culminating in protests, strikes, and 
blockades of ports by fishers throughout Europe, including the UK (Hughes, 2008). The ‘fuel crisis’ 
was headline news in the UK fishing press, with reports of fishers “tying up boats” because they 
could not afford to go to sea, and of fishers preparing to leave the industry (European 
Commission, 2008b; (European Commission, 2008b, Lockley, 2008, MacDonald, 2008). This 
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research demonstrates that the consequence of this recent fuel price shock combined with 
stagnant fish prices was a significant reduction in income for fishers and a loss of job security. The 
most impacted sectors of the fleet were those that use towed gears, because fuel makes up a 
more significant percentage of their fishing costs than it does for static-gear vessels and for those 
vessels that had not invested in fuel-efficiency measures prior to the rise in the fuel price.  
 
Despite global oil prices dropping significantly since the time of this study, fuel prices are predicted 
to rise again to the same level as in mid-2008 and even higher (International Energy Agency, 
2008). In such a case, given the reaction observed in 2008, and on top of declining fish stocks, 
chronic overcapacity, and seemingly unsuccessful management, it seems inevitable that the 
fishing sector will consolidate further, with fuel-inefficient vessels leaving the industry and fuel-
efficient vessels surviving. This seems to be the case for EU fisheries as a whole, and there is direct 
evidence that this is the trend facing this SW fishing community. A reduction in effort follows the 
predictions of bioeconomic models. Other results captured in this study further strengthen the 
predictions made by those models, such as a reduction in the effort of fishing vessels, with fewer 
days spent at sea and fuel-consumption reduction measures reducing the quantity of fish caught. 
Bioeconomic model results indicate long-term potential growth in the overall profitability of the 
industry (Pauly et al., 2002, Arnason, 2007, Sumaila et al., 2008). However, this case study has 
additionally captured some potentially detrimental and irreversible consequences of increased 
costs that cannot be predicted by bioeconomic models, with unknown outcomes for vulnerable 
fishing-dependent communities such as this SW fishing community and with potential knock-on 
effects for the European fish supply chain. The rapid change in economic conditions in 2008 
intensified the pressure on fishing businesses and highlighted the susceptibility of the community 
to financial shocks. The primary concern was that the community would experience further job 
losses (crew, shore workers, and downstream processors), reducing the industry to a level where 
key parts of the infrastructure of the fishing industry, such as some onshore businesses, the fish 
market, fish merchants, and processors may disperse. The concern with such a situation in this SW 
fishing community is that such losses may generate irreversible effects for the viability of the 
fishing industry, causing erosion of the community, as previously observed in other parts of the UK 
(Rossiter and Stead, 2003, Stead, 2005). 
 
The key barrier to fishers in the face of unstable and rising fuel prices is that they have been 
unable to offset the increased costs, so reducing their ability to cope with and adapt to change. To 
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offset costs, there are two alternatives available to skippers: the first is to fish for longer and/or to 
catch more fish, and the second is to improve the price of fish at the first point of sale. This 
research revealed that most fishers were unable to fish more because the increased costs often 
outweighed the value of the quantity they could catch, so their strategy was to reduce their fishing 
to times where fishing was likely to be more efficient and profitable. Although a small percentage 
of skippers responded to increased fuel prices by increasing the number of days at sea, working in 
poor weather to gain a market advantage (a strategy also observed in Micronesia by Rhodes et al., 
2008), almost half the skippers interviewed said that they had reduced the number of days they 
fished. Skippers also used a variety of means to reduce fuel consumption, all of which reduced 
their total catch. However, the reduced catches combined with the higher costs resulted in lower 
wages available to recruit scarce crew, delaying skippers wanting to leave for the fishing grounds 
even further, and reducing fishing time and profitability. Fishers’ cost-mitigation measures were 
compounded by the fact that skippers already had catch limitations imposed as a result of the 
decline of some fish stocks and their associated quota, and bycatch limitations, and also by the 
potential overcapacity already within the fleet.  
 
The second alternative to offset increasing costs would be to improve the price of fish at first point 
of sale. However, ex-vessel market fish prices in this SW fishing community have remained 
stagnant for the past ten years, mirroring the trend in market fish prices across European fishing 
nations. Consequently, fishers, like farmers, have been unable to pass on increased costs down the 
market chain and also “have been unable to benefit from reduced supply and rising retail prices” 
throughout Europe (Joe Borg EC Fisheries Commissioner, European Commission, 2008c). It is 
difficult to obtain specific data on trends in retail prices in Europe because most retail data are 
collected and commercialized by private companies (FAO, 2008). However, there are indications 
that retail prices do not reflect the same pattern as fish prices at the first point of sale, but that 
they have been increasing. Evidence of this is the FAO fish price index for whitefish (based on 
import values), which suggests that import prices have been rising over the past ten years 
(Tveteras, 2008). In addition, CEPESCA’s (the Spanish Confederation of the Fishing Industry) recent 
analysis of auction price data compared the hake price at the end of 2007 (€11.25) with that at the 
end of 2008 (€4.00), a 64% decline in value of hake at the market despite rising fishing costs. At 
the same time, the price paid by the consumer fell only slightly, from €18.79 to €18.47 (Fishing 
News International, 2009).  
 
201 
 
This divergence of price trends at different points in the market chain prompted further 
investigation and revealed local and global barriers to fishers receiving higher prices for their fish. 
At a local level, the barrier to fishers receiving higher prices is the institutional set-up of the 
market. Fish buyers have price-setting power. Although all fish markets operate slightly differently, 
their similarity is that they tend to be auction markets, and the price received at the market 
generally depends on the quantity of fish being sold on a given day. When daily supply is low, and 
there is high demand, buyers compete harder with each other and prices tend to be higher. At the 
SW fishing community, most vessels land and sell their fish at the local market, where buyers bid 
in person each morning. Approximately 80% of all fish landed are then sold to buyers in 
continental Europe, mostly Spain and France, with the rest sold on the domestic market (personal 
communication, southwest fish merchant, 2008). Given the advantage of low supply driving the 
price up, fishers attempt to land and sell their own fish when few other boats are landing. 
Information on the number of boats predicted to land on a certain day is readily available at sea, 
and is used by skippers. Therefore, to some degree at least, fishers collude and make decisions 
about when to land in order to obtain the best price. However, there is no formal network or 
coordinated mechanism in place, and communication is mostly between small groups of skippers 
who have social ties. Wider coordination of landing times could strengthen fishers’ market power 
and improve the prices. However, the limitations to fishers being able to strategize and 
successfully play the market are that fresh fish is a perishable product and cannot be stored 
without additional costs, and uncontrollable factors such as weather override any strategy they 
might develop and determine the landing date and time.  
 
There are also global barriers to improving fish prices for fishers. Fish prices at the first point of 
sale throughout Europe have been maintained low because of the strong buying power of 
processors and marketing chains which have access to fish products at low import prices from the 
global market, including large volumes of illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fish (European 
Commission, 2008a). In the UK, the supermarket share of fish rose from 16% in 1988 to 66% in 
2001, at the expense of fishmongers whose market share dropped from 49% to 18% (Murray and 
Fofana, 2002). This trend in fish sales concentrating in supermarkets is evident across Europe 
(Guillotreau, 2004). Moreover, there is a concern that less fuel-intensive aquaculture products 
may permanently capture the market share over marine captured fish, effectively capping fish 
prices (World Bank and Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2008). The growth of aquaculture has 
allowed predictability of supply, which better suits large retail chains whose economies-of-scale 
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are built on efficient supply of large, reliable volumes. Therefore, it is the instutional set-up of the 
seafood market at both local and global levels that create barriers to fishers effectively passing on 
their costs and improving the price they receive, with negative consequences for the sustainability 
and resilience of coastal fishing communities.  
 
Given the limitations fishers face in offsetting costs, what can be done to improve the viability and 
stability of fishing industries in the face of volatile and rising fuel prices? A common response from 
the fishing industry is to call for increased subsides (BBC NEWS, 2008). Fuel is already subsided 
heavily throughout the world and in the UK. Globally, US$5.08 billion of the estimated US$7.75 
billion spent on fisheries subsidies in developed countries in 2000 were for fuel, mostly in the form 
of foregone taxes (World Bank and Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2008). Despite subsidies 
being widely considered to have harmful long-term effects on fish stocks (World Bank and Food 
and Agricultural Organisation, 2008), their total removal would undeniably cause economic and 
social suffering for fishers and fishing-dependent communities, especially with uncertainty in the 
oil price. However, increasing the subsidies would negate any potential positive environmental or 
economic impacts increased fishing costs might have by keeping unprofitable enterprises 
operating (Sumaila et al., 2008, World Bank and Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2008). 
Further, using subsidies as a solution to such industry-wide problems creates perverse incentives 
that mask economic reality, and potentially encourage greater investment and effort, which 
would, in the long-term, exacerbate financial hardship in the fishing sector.  
 
To survive, vulnerable fishing communities need to improve their ability to cope and adapt to 
changing conditions without relying on subsidies. The acute fuel shock reported here is a glimpse 
into a future of high oil prices. Given that fleet contraction seems inevitable, then any transition to 
a new fishing industry requires careful planning and management so that destabilization of the 
industry itself and the communities dependent on it is minimized. Policy makers, the fishing 
industry, and the fishing communities themselves all have a role in this. At the top level, 
governance needs to change from being centred on the biological to being informed by the 
biological, with greater emphasis on the economic and social processes and benefits fishing brings 
to communities, alongside resource conservation needs. Social objectives for fishing communities 
need definition, because there is no real platform without such definition from which to create an 
environmentally and economically sustainable fishery (Jentoft, 2000). If policy-makers do not shift 
the emphasis of governance and management, and continue without reform, the result will 
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undoubtedly be further decline in fish stocks, increased inefficiency in operations, and growing 
poverty in fishing-dependent communities. Failure to act would imply a sector that becomes a 
drain on governments and society rather than a contributor to society at large (World Bank and 
Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2008).  
 
This research has indicated that it may be important to understand that the players will alter as a 
consequence of the increased costs of fishing, as will fishing incentives and behaviour. Vessels 
remaining in the industry need to be efficient, well-managed, and adaptable in order to weather 
increasing and uncertain costs. However, I have also demonstrated strong market constraints on 
the ability of fishers to cope and to adapt, constraints not often considered by fisheries scientists 
and bioeconomists. Opportunities and interventions in the market chain to encourage prices to be 
more responsive to fishing costs, and to improve the price of fish at the first point of sale, would 
improve the adaptive capacity of fishing communities. This is necessary because the more 
constraints fishers face, the less opportunity there is for adaptability and innovation within the 
industry to move towards sustainable practice, as indicated by the reduction of pro-environment 
gear experimentation by skippers. The constraints promote a further barrier to social cohesion 
that is not an enabling framework for resource conservation or a move towards more participatory 
management. The 2008 fuel crisis brought complex economic and social objectives to the fore of 
policy debates on fishing in the UK, which perhaps may have been a further step towards aligning 
environmental, economic, and social objectives in fisheries management. 
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Are fishers ‘price takers’  
or ‘price makers’? 
The factors influencing cost  
pass-through for fishers in  
southwest England 
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1. Abstract  
This chapter investigates profitability in the fisheries of a southwest fishing community, in England, 
examining the relationship between fuel costs (which make up the majority of variable fishing 
costs) and the prices fishers received at the fish market from 1998 to 2008.  A time series analysis 
indicates that fish prices do not significantly respond to fuel price increases implying limited cost 
pass-through in this fishery.  In fact when there is a correlation, it is likely to be negative.  With 
increasing fuel prices, the fisheries of southwest England therefore experience higher costs, 
stagnant output prices and diminishing profitability, even before any decline in catch-rates has 
been factored in.  An interview based analysis uncovers strong market constraints to fishers’ 
ability to influence fish prices at first point of sale.  The interactions between the institutional set-
up of the seafood market, the lack of competition at the fish market, and globalisation of fish 
markets mean that fishermen lack the price-setting power to effectively pass on their escalating 
costs through improving prices at first sale.  Rising costs have resulted in reduced profitability for 
fishers which may have negative consequences for the sustainability and resilience of coastal 
fishing communities.  As long as fishing effort is not increased, it is suggested that policies and 
investment that give room for producers to remain profitable by increasing the price-setting 
power of fishers may contribute to the health of UK fisheries. 
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2. Introduction 
The state of global fisheries is told as a story of doom and gloom.  Marine fish catches are in 
decline (Pauly et al., 2002, Pauly et al., 2005, FAO, 2008b), the biomass of higher trophic-level 
species (i.e. the fish humans prefer to eat) in the sea is diminishing (Christensen et al., 2003), and 
several fish populations may be threatened with ecological and/or commercial collapse  (Cook et 
al., 1997, Dulvy et al., 2006, FAO, 2006).  These stories of fisheries decline are primarily due to 
either fisheries management failing to achieve its goals or lack of regulation, leading to 
overcapacity within fleets and overexploitation of marine resources.  Overcapacity has also been 
attributed to the ‘race for fish’ which can develop in open access or shared resource fisheries, 
where users have no rights over the resource and thus there is little incentive to conserve for their 
future (Gordon, 1954).  Technological creep and subsidised costs have also allowed vessels to 
successfully exploit new fishing grounds further from shore and in deeper waters (Morato et al., 
2006, World Bank and Food and Agricultural Organisation, 2008).  Dwindling fish stocks and 
collapsing fisheries have economic and social consequences for communities particularly for those 
with few employment opportunities other than fishing (FAO, 2008b).  
 
Despite the grim picture that is painted, the future of global fisheries is not necessarily doomed.  
There are increasing efforts to restore marine ecosystems and rebuild fisheries (Worm et al., 
2009).  State-designed management practices which have tended to employ a command and 
control approach through imposing restrictions on catch and effort, informed solely by science and 
reliant on enforcement, have clearly not been broadly successful.   In response there is a growing 
demand for development of new, more holistic management paradigms to rebuild ecosystems 
(Pitcher, 2001, Pauly et al., 2002).  The political commitments to an Ecosystem Approach to 
Fisheries management (EAF) - an adaptive integrated management system that aims to promote 
both biodiversity conservation and sustainable resource use by managing the ecosystem and the 
people that use it as a whole – are increasing (FAO, 2003).  There are successful fisheries from 
which management lessons can be learned and applied (Cunningham and Bostock, 2005).  It 
appears evident that good governance, enforcement, and compliance forms the basis for 
conservation and rebuilding efforts (Worm et al., 2009). Designing management with appropriate 
incentives, encompassing participation and transparency in design along with good science is also 
important (Defeo and Castilla, 2005, Hilborn, 2007, Costello et al., 2008, Mora et al., 2009).  
However the transition towards new methods of managing fisheries has been slow, despite the 
fact these new management measures appear to be a win-win situation for fisheries and marine 
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resource conservation.  There are many reasons for this but in fisheries systems even where there 
is capacity for change (i.e. developed world commercial fisheries with high enforcement) there 
seems to be two major deficiencies.  Firstly there is a marked difference between broad policy 
acceptance and the will to actually implement corrective measures (Mora et al., 2009).  Secondly, 
while the tools for successful management have been identified, the socioeconomic drivers that 
have enabled particular regions or fisheries to prevent or reduce over fishing while others remain 
overexploited have not been identified (Worm et al., 2009).  In other words, the incentive 
structures which are necessary for new management approaches to work are not understood.  
 
While effective management and appropriate capacity is necessary for healthy fishing 
communities to exist, the reverse is also true – socially cohesive, strong, well-functioning 
communities are an essential contribution to the preservation of healthy fisheries (Jentoft, 2000).   
Diminishing profitability may jeopardise the underlying infrastructure of the fishery, which can 
then result in the degradation of a fishing community and the community as a whole (Rossiter and 
Stead, 2003, Stead, 2005, Abernethy et al., 2010).  Unprofitability is often attributed to declines in 
fish stocks but is also due to rising costs of fishing.  A recent example of this was the impact of high 
fuel prices in 2008 on the highly regulated fisheries of the European Union.  Fuel prices for fishers 
doubled between 2007 and mid 2008 culminating in protests, strikes and blockades of ports by 
fishers throughout Europe including the UK (Hughes, 2008).  Research presented in the previous 
chapter showed that the consequence of this recent fuel price shock reduced fishers’ profitability 
and their ability to cope and adapt with the changing conditions, causing job losses, economic 
hardship, and deep uncertainty about the future (Abernethy et al., 2010).  One of the direct 
environmental consequences of the fuel price shock was that innovation and engagement within 
the industry toward sustainable practices was reduced due to fishers’ financial constraints.  The 
key barrier to fishers in the face of unstable and rising fuel prices was that they were unable to 
offset increased costs because ex-vessel market fish prices have remained stagnant for at least a 
decade.  This reflects the same trend in market fish prices across European fishing nations.  
Consequently, fishers, like farmers, ‘have been unable to benefit from reduced supply and rising 
retail prices’ throughout Europe and have been unable to pass on their increased costs (cost pass-
through) to the supply chain (Joe Borg EC Fisheries Commissioner, European Commission, 2008b).  
The divergence of trends for fuel and fish prices, and the evident inability of fishers to pass cost 
increases up through the value chain to buyers, retailers and consumers, prompted further 
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empirical investigation in the southwest, on the market structures and processes that constrained 
fishers’ ability to set prices to offset their rising costs. 
 
For fishers, cost pass-through is the ability to pass on increased costs of production to the buyers 
of the goods.  Thus, cost pass-through is directly related to the method of price formation at the 
first point of sale of fish.  The fish market and price formation has a long tradition in economic 
literature particularly in investigations of exchanges for similar goods (Mill, 1869, Thornton, 1869).  
If the fish market is competitive, then the price of fish is determined by the free interaction of 
supply and demand.  However, empirical studies tend to show that prices are determined by the 
market structure (such as the type of auction system) (Guillotreau, 2008), the characteristics of the 
traded good (Graddy, 2006), and the social interactions between different actors, which may 
include collusion (Acheson, 1985, Etienne and Vignes, 2008, Genesove, 2008).  This paper 
investigates which of these factors play a part in determining the price received by fishers at a 
southwest fish market. 
  
First I document the degree of cost pass-through for fishers and identify the factors constraining 
cost pass-through and determine market price.  Fuel prices comprise the largest proportion of the 
variable costs of fishing in this case, and it was this cost that changed the most over the time 
period under investigation.  I use econometric time series analyses to quantify the relationship 
between fuel prices and ex-vessel fish prices and thus determine the degree of cost pass-through 
for fishers.  I use co-integration techniques to model the long-run and short-run correlations 
between fuel price and fish price, and autoregressive integrated moving average models (ARIMA) 
to explore lagged effects.  I found there is very low cost pass through for fishers and therefore I 
undertook a complimentary interview-based analysis exploring the reasons for fish price 
suppression at the first point of sale.  I examine factors relating to the nature of the product sold, 
the method of sale, the factors influencing supply and demand, and the factors influencing the 
competitive nature of the market. 
 
 3. Methods  
3.1. The study location 
The study was undertaken in a fishing community, in the southwest of England. The field site has 
been anonymised and is referred to throughout the chapter as a ‘SW fishing community’.  The fish 
market in the SW fishing community is based on the quayside and operates Monday to Friday.  
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Fish is landed from vessels (any time from afternoon to late at night) and is sold on the market the 
next morning.  Prior to opening for sale, market workers use a grading machine to sort the main 
species of fish into weight-based size classes (1 to 5).  Other species of fish are graded by hand by 
market workers.  Damaged fish are removed from the grading system and are sold separately.  The 
fish sale starts at 6.30am, and continues until all the fish is sold, which on average takes two hours.  
All fish on the market is sold every day.  Two auctions operate simultaneously: One auction is for 
the large vessels with large quantities of fish (the large beam trawlers, otter trawlers and gill 
netters) and the other auction is for the small day boats with small quantities of mixed species.  
The fish are sold by vessel in the order they sailed into port and landed their fish.  The market is an 
open ascending price auction, or ‘shout auction’.  The auctioneer opens the bidding at a starting 
price (per kilo of fish) and then accepts increasingly higher bids from the floor where the 
merchants are standing around boxes of fish.  The highest uncontested bid wins the fish.   Fish is 
sold by the box or ‘stack’ (between 2-4 boxes high), species by species.  The winning bidder of the 
stack then has the option to buy the entire catch of that particular species caught by that 
particular vessel at the bidding price. Approximately 80% of all fish landed at the market are then 
sold to continental Europe, mostly Spain and France (mainly sold to wholesalers in Europe), with 
the rest sold directly on the domestic market.   
 
3.2. Cost pass-through: econometric analysis  
I examine the relationship between fuel price and fish price to quantify the cost pass-through for 
fishers using time series analyses.  Fuel price data and fuel duty data for ten years (January 1998 to 
July 2008) were obtained through the records of a fuel supplier to vessels in the SW fishing 
community.  Fuel prices used were minus the duty.  The fishing industry uses red diesel which the 
European Commission taxes at a lower rate than roadside diesel.  Fuel duty is set by the UK 
government and vessel owners can claim back the duty paid (The rate changes each year: in June 
2008 the rate was £0.0969 per litre.)  Fish price data were obtained for the same period from the 
‘Fishing News’, a UK weekly fishing industry newspaper that reports fish prices by port and by 
species (Fishing News [Online], Available at: http://www.intrafish.no/fn/).  Data for the four main 
species caught in the SW fishing community were recorded: monkfish (Lophius piscatorius), Dover 
sole (Solea solea), hake (Merluccius merluccius) and megrim (Lepidorhombus whiffiagonis).  Each 
one of these species are categorised into three sizes: large, medium and small.  To decide at what 
level of aggregation the analysis should be done – either on only fish-type level or fish-type-size 
level – pair-wise t-tests comparing mean prices of different sizes were conducted; the tests 
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indicated that mean price of fish is significantly different by size.  Hence, each species and size was 
taken as distinct giving a total of twelve products (four species x three sizes).  In all cases except 
for Dover sole, larger size fetches a higher price.  In the case of Dover sole, the medium size is the 
most expensive.  Dover sole is a popular restaurant dish and medium size is the perfect size for a 
plate, therefore it is in more demand than the other sizes.  With twelve products and 124 months 
between January 1998 and April 2008, the data contain 1488 observations of monthly fish and 
corresponding fuel prices.   
 
For the analyses, first descriptive graphs and statistics were run to examine the trends in fish and 
fuel prices over time including computing the average monthly growth rates.  Second, a time 
series econometric analysis was undertaken to test and quantify the correlation between fuel and 
fish prices in the short- and long-run.  The descriptive results indicated that most likely the fuel 
and fish price series are non-stationary which means that the mean and variance of price changes 
over time.  Therefore, a simple regression between fish price and fuel price will likely be spurious.  
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests were conducted as formal tests for non-stationarity (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979).  Three versions of the ADF tests were conducted; random walk without a drift 
(here current price (Pt) is last period price (Pt-1) plus pure random element (μt), i.e., Pt = Pt-1 + μt), 
random walk with a drift (the price series drifts either upwards or downward depending on a 
positive or negative constant drift parameter (δ) Pt = δ  + Pt-1 + μt) ) and random walk with time 
trend (Pt = βt  + Pt-1 + μt where t represents time ).  Generally, the ADF tests indicated that the two 
price series are non-stationary.  Therefore a regression between fuel and fish prices can only be 
meaningful if the two are co-integrated (i.e., if two time series are non-stationary, but the linear 
combination of them are stationary).  Johansen tests were run to test for co-integration.   
 
A co-integration analysis was then performed to examine both the long- and short-run 
correlations between fish and fuel prices, using co-integration equations to capture the long-run 
correlation between fuel and fish prices and vector error correction models to capture the short-
run dynamics.  A one month lag was used for this analysis.  To further examine the short-run 
dynamics between fuel and fish prices, autoregressive integrated moving average models (ARIMA) 
were used which help to control for autoregressive disturbances and also further examines lagged 
effects.   
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3.3. Cost pass-through: qualitative analysis  
To understand the factors that influence fish prices, qualitative data and analyses were 
undertaken.  Three types of qualitative data were collected in October 2009: Interviews were 
conducted with (1) key informants within the fishing industry in the SW fishing community, (2) fish 
merchants present at the fish market, and (3) daily observations of the fish market were 
undertaken over a two week period (See Appendix 1 for interview respondent codes and details).   
 
A key informant approach was used because it gathers the kind of qualitative and descriptive data 
that are difficult and time consuming to unearth through structured surveys and direct 
observation.  I spent six months in the fishing community in 2008 and had developed a rapport 
with the significant actors in the fishing community, hence key informants could be selected with 
confidence that data collected would be both reliable and precise.  Potential candidates were 
considered based on Tremblay’s  (1957) selection criteria for key informants: (1) The informant’s 
role in the community should expose him/her continuously to the information sought by the 
researcher, (2) the informant should have direct access to the information in a meaningful way, (3) 
the informant should willingly communicate knowledge with the researcher, (4) the informant 
should be able to communicate the knowledge in a clear and intelligible manner to the researcher, 
and (5) the informant should be impartial but if there are biases these should be clear to the 
researcher.  Given that only criterion (1) can be a certainty before interviewing begins, a 
preliminary list of eight informants was drawn up, determined by the nature of the information 
sought.  These included interviews with market workers, locally based government officials, fishing 
industry liaison officers and fisheries observers.  Lack of knowledge over the time period specified 
(10 years), bias, and lack of responsive communication between informant and researcher 
eliminated two informants.  The six informants that remained were well-qualified to respond and 
interviews were highly productive.  Qualitative interviews were conducted using open ended 
questions (Bernard, 1994).  In order to get the maximum detail of their knowledge, key informants 
were interviewed several times, with three of the six informants accompanying the researcher to 
observe the fish market on one or more occasions.    
 
A common guide of subjects to be discussed and specific questions were used for all respondents, 
allowing for both specific responses and the drawing out of broad themes and interpretations. To 
generate information about the forces that have influenced fish price at the market over the past 
ten years, the general subjects discussed with informants were (1) the nature of the product being 
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sold, (2) the method used to sell the product, (3) the factors influencing supply and demand, (4) 
the factors influencing competition, and (5) any events in the past ten years that may have 
influenced supply and demand, and/or competition.  All except one informant were very familiar 
with me and the field of research before the interview began.  The one informant who wasn’t 
familiar was given a full explanation of the research being conducted.  While informants were 
given considerable leeway with respect to the content of answers and were encouraged to follow 
from one thought to another with freedom, I constantly directed the informant to the focus of the 
interview, interjecting with comments and questions but without leading the interview. 
 
Interviews with merchants were conducted alongside key informant interviews.  I was interested 
to understand what merchants believed to be the factors constraining fish prices from their 
business perspective.  Interviews were undertaken with seven merchants.  The number of 
merchants changes at the market daily, and ranges from 20 to 30 merchants present each day.  Six 
merchants interviewed were mid-sized merchants, buying and selling between 5-20 tonnes of fish 
per week.  There are approximately 12-15 merchants of this size buying at the fish market. The 
other merchant was one of three large merchants, buying and selling more than 100 tonnes of fish 
per week.  Small merchants buying to sell fish at local markets, from shops, fish vans, and food 
outlets were excluded from this study as I wanted to understand what was affecting buying and 
selling of larger quantities of fish.  It is the medium and large merchant businesses that buy the 
bulk of the fish at the market.  Interviews were semi-structured and followed the same protocol 
described above for key informant interviews in terms of technique, except these interviews were 
conducted only once.   Interviewees were asked questions about (1) the size of their business and 
who they sold fish to, (2) the factors influencing supply and demand, (3) the factors influencing 
competition between merchants, and (4) merchant costs and their ability to pass their costs 
through to their customers.  For each subject I asked how these factors have changed over the 
past ten years and how these factors may influence fish price at the market.   
 
For key informant and merchant interviews, detailed notes were taken during each interview, and 
an in-depth report was written after each interview on the day of the interview.  Reports were 
systematically coded using qualitative analysis software, (NVivo 7) according to each variable of 
interest to ensure that data were not used selectively.  Using key informants as a qualitative 
technique requires the data to be judged for reliability.  I used agreement among informants as 
the criterion of reliability (Tremblay, 1957, Romney et al., 1986, Bernard, 1994).  Given that key 
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informants are most likely to provide accurate answers about things that are publically observable, 
I am confident in the responses presented in this analysis (Poggie, 1972).  The difference between 
key informant interviews and merchant interviews was that key informant interviews were 
analysed on the basis of consensus, where as for merchants I wanted to understand if there was a 
diversity of views.  Given that interviews with merchants were more subject to unreliable 
responses (because they are not unbiased participants in the market), triangulation of responses 
was very important to increase confidence in the accuracy of data collected.  Triangulation is a 
method of establishing the accuracy of information by comparing three or more types of 
independent points of view on data sources (Bruce et al., 2000).  Market observation and 
discussion with key informants about merchant practices formed the basis for triangulation. 
 
Daily observations at the fish market were conducted over a two week period.  Detailed notes 
were taken on (1) how the market is run from the point of fish landing to fish sale, including 
observations of the auction itself (2) how and why fish prices vary, (3) who the merchants are, 
what they do at the market and how they interact with each other.  These observations were 
undertaken to independently understand how the market works and also to increase confidence 
in the accuracy of data collected through key informant and merchant interviews.  Observations 
were recorded and detailed notes were written down each day. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Cost pass-through: econometric analysis  
4.1.1. Descriptive statistics 
Fuel prices rose much faster than fish prices during the study period 1998 to 2008 (See Appendix 2 
for average annual fish and fuel prices, and Appendix 3A and 3B for fish and fuel prices 1998-
2008).  For example, while fuel price increased by 185% in the study period, the highest increase 
for fish price was 117% (for large sole).  At its maximum, fuel price increased by 437% compared to 
that of January 1998 while the highest fish price increase was 268% (for large monkfish).  This 
pattern is clearly illustrated in Figure 1.   Each fish price was plotted against fuel price but both 
were computed as a proportion of the respective initial price with January 1998 given a value of 
one.  In all cases the plots for fuel and fish prices diverge.  Compared to January 1998 monthly fuel 
prices increased much faster than fish prices. 
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Figure 1. Fuel (blue line) and fish prices (red line) 1998 to 2008 for four main fish species 
at the market: monkfish, Dover sole, hake and megrim (January (m1) as reference = 1).  
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To further illustrate differences in price changes and get a quantitative measure, average monthly 
growth rates were computed by regressing logarithms of prices on time (year-month); the 
coefficients on the time variable measure the average monthly growth rates (Table 1).  While fuel 
price increased on the average by 1.1% per month, the highest growth for fish price was 0.72% for 
medium megrim and the lowest 0.10% for small hake. 
 
Table 1. Estimated monthly growth rates of fish and fuel prices (%) from 1998 to 2008. 
Fish type Growth rates SE 
Monkfish   
- Large 0.20*** 0.04 
- Medium 0.16*** 0.04 
- Small 0.16*** 0.04 
Sole   
- Large 0.29*** 0.05 
- Medium 0.33*** 0.04 
- Small 0.38*** 0.04 
Hake   
- Large 0.16*** 0.05 
- Medium 0.13** 0.05 
- Small 0.10* 0.06 
Megrim   
- Large 0.71*** 0.05 
- Medium 0.72*** 0.05 
- Small 0.67*** 0.06 
   
Fuel 1.11*** 0.00 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The above descriptive results all indicate that fuel price was increasing at a much higher rate than 
all fish prices.  This is indicative that fishers were not able to pass-through the increased cost of 
fuel to selling prices.  Further examining how the two prices are related, through time-series 
analysis, can help quantify how much of the increased cost is passed-through and whether or not 
there is a relationship between the two prices.   
 
4.1.2. Time series analysis: Tests for non-stationarity and co-integration 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests  were conducted as formal tests for non-stationarity (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979).  For fuel prices, the null hypothesis of unit root13 is accepted in all cases thus the 
                                                          
13
 The null hypothesis of unit root is that the time series is non-stationary, i.e. the mean and variance change 
through time.  If the null hypothesis is accepted for both fuel price and fish price, then a regression between 
them will lead to spurious results. 
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fuel time series is non-stationary (Table 2).  For fish prices the null hypothesis of unit root is 
accepted only for the case of random walk without drift.  This means that if fish prices are 
assumed to have a constant mean, the variation changes through time, and the fish price time 
series is non-stationary.  The same ADF tests were conducted on the first differences of price for 
fish and fuel prices (the change Δ in price between tX and tX+1) and the results indicate that the null 
hypotheses of unit root are strongly rejected in all cases (Table 2).  This indicates that the two are 
difference stationary14.  Overall, the ADF tests indicate that the two price series are non-stationary 
at first difference 15. 
  
The Johansen tests for co-integration involve calculating Eigen values, trace statistics and 
comparisons with critical values. The tests indicated that the two price series are co-integrated 
with rank one in eleven out of the twelve cases (which means the long term relationship can be 
represented by one equation); the only case with a maximum rank of zero was for small sole and 
fuel prices.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Difference stationary means that the time series for fish prices and fuel prices are stationary if one 
considered the first difference in prices (the monthly change in price), not the absolute values. 
15
 The fact that the series are difference stationary will be used to undertake further analysis to explore the 
effect of lags in Section 4.1.4.  
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root tests for (a) fish and fuel prices and (b) for first 
differences of fish and fuel prices (1998-2008). Three ADF tests conducted were random walk 
without drift, random walk with drift and random walk with trend. 
 Fish type (a) Fish and fuel prices (b) First differences of fish and fuel prices 
Without drift With drift With trend Without drift With drift With trend 
Monkfish       
-Large -0.06 -6.59*** -7.31*** -14.33*** -14.27*** -14.22*** 
-Medium -0.02 -5.99*** -6.57*** -14.98*** -14.93*** -14.86*** 
-Small -0.02 -5.86*** -6.85*** -15.70*** -15.65*** -15.58*** 
Sole       
-Large -0.08 -4.53*** -5.20*** -9.10*** -9.96*** -9.93*** 
-Medium 0.05 -3.81*** -4.97 -10.98*** -10.93*** -10.89*** 
-Small 0.09 -3.04*** -4.54*** -12.79*** -12.74*** -12.69*** 
Hake       
-Large -0.07 -7.02*** -7.48*** -15.89*** -15.82*** -15.76*** 
-Medium -0.17 -6.52*** -6.75*** -15.15*** -15.08*** -15.02*** 
-Small -0.24 -5.84*** -5.93*** -13.20*** -13.15*** -13.09*** 
Megrim       
-Large -0.05 -3.38*** -6.64*** -16.00*** -15.95*** -15.88*** 
-Medium -0.05 -3.50*** -6.82*** -14.96*** -14.90*** -14.85*** 
-Small -0.16 -4.41*** -7.58*** -17.25*** -17.19*** -17.13*** 
       
Fuel 1.97 0.12 -2.10 -9.26*** -9.51*** -9.51*** 
*** p<0.01 
 
4.1.3. Time series analysis: Co-integration analysis 
First I discuss the co-integration regression equation results which captured the long-run 
correlation between fuel and fish prices.  Small sole, small hake and medium hake are not 
significantly correlated with fuel prices in the long run at 1% and 5% levels (Table 3, Pp(log)); the 
significant increase in costs due to higher fuel prices did not seem to pass-through to these fish 
prices at all.  Over all species and size classes, the long-term pass-through was relatively low, as 
reflected by the coefficients on fuel prices in the co-integration equations (Table 3, Pp(log)).  Since 
the prices are in logs, the coefficients give elasticities.  For example, a 1% increase in fuel price was 
associated at most with a 0.60% rise in fish price (medium sized megrim).  For hake, monkfish and 
Dover sole the elasticities dropped below 0.16%, 0.20% and 0.27% respectively. The elasticities are 
higher than 0.50% only for megrim.  It is difficult to tease apart why there is variation between 
species, but megrims may have a higher elasticity because there is a high demand for megrims 
from Spain.  The SW fishing community is known as the main port in the southwest of England for 
selling megrims caught by their beam trawl fleet.  The beam trawl fleet has contracted in the ten 
year study period as beam trawling has become less profitable; one of the reasons being beam 
trawlers are high fuel consumers.  Therefore with high demand and reduced supply, megrims may 
221 
 
be more responsive to fuel price increases over time.   In summary, these co-integration equations 
indicate that there is a significant long-run correlation between fuel and fish prices (with the 
exception of small sole, small hake and medium hake) but the elasticity of fish price with respect 
to fuel price is relatively low. 
 
Next I discuss the vector error correction models which captured the short-run correlation 
between fuel and fish prices and provide some striking results (Table 3).  First, the short-term 
response of fish prices to changes in fuel prices is very weak (almost non-existent); this is captured 
by the coefficients on lagged changes of fuel prices (dPp(t-1)).  From the twelve coefficients only 
small sole is significant (p<0.05).  Interestingly, for small sole, the correlation is also negative; the 
fish price moves in the opposite direction to fuel price changes in the short run.  Given other 
factors, this indicates that the profit of producers dependent on these types of fish were likely 
squeezed from both sides – higher costs as well as falling product prices.   
 
The error correction coefficients (EC) are highly significant and in most cases show rapid 
adjustment to equilibrium conditions.  The EC captures what proportion of a deviation from the 
long term relationship, as captured by the co-integration equations, is ‘corrected’ in one month.  
In eight out of 12 cases, the coefficients are higher than 0.40, implying that more than 40% of the 
deviation from equilibrium relationship between fuel and fish prices is ‘corrected’ within one 
month. 
 
Overall, the co-integration results indicate that there is a long-term relationship between fuel and 
fish prices but the magnitude is small; a 1% increase in fuel price brought about a much lower 
percentage increase in fish prices in the study period, with megrim as the exception.  In the short 
run, generally there is no correlation between changes in fuel and fish prices; in the case where 
there is correlation, it is negative, meaning higher fuel prices are correlated to lower fish prices. 
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Table 3. Co-integration and error-correction models for fish and fuel prices (1998-2008) 
Fish type Co-integration equations Vector error correction models 
 N Chi-2 Pp (log) EC dPf (t-1) dPp (t-1) Cons Chi-2 
Monkfish         
-Large 122 17.69*** -0.19*** -0.74*** 0.12 -0.38* 0.00 67.19*** 
   (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.21) (0.01)  
-Medium 122 11.54*** -0.17*** -0.57*** -0.00 -0.25 0.00 50.90*** 
   (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.18) (0.01)  
-Small 122 13.16*** -0.18*** -0.53*** -0.05 -0.22 0.00 49.81*** 
   (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.01)  
Sole         
-Large 122 11.67*** -0.22*** -0.47*** 0.34*** -0.23 0.00 46.77*** 
   (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.19) (0.01)  
-Medium 122 14.49*** -0.26*** -0.35*** 0.18** -0.27* 0.00 29.26*** 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.16) (0.01)  
-Small 122 13.08*** -0.34 -0.22*** -0.04 -0.43*** 0.00 25.72*** 
   (0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.14) (0.01)  
Hake         
-Large 122 5.70** -0.15** -0.61*** -0.04 -0.38 0.00 58.26*** 
   (0.06) (0.10) (0.09) (0.24) (0.02)  
-Medium 122 3.17* -0.13* -0.54*** -0.04 -0.41 -0.00 48.71*** 
   (0.07) (0.10) (0.091) (0.25) (0.02)  
-Small 122 1.67 -0.11 -0.49*** 0.06 -0.36 -0.00 37.38*** 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.27) (0.02)  
Megrim         
-Large 122 22.47*** -0.56*** -0.29*** -0.20** -0.05 0.00 32.15*** 
   (0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.23) (0.02)  
-Medium 122 30.11*** -0.60*** -0.35*** -0.12 -0.07 0.00 31.94*** 
   (0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.26) (0.02)  
-Small 122 29.01*** -0.59*** -0.42*** -0.21** -0.06 0.00 50.16*** 
   (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.30) (0.020)  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Co-integration equations: N = number of 
observations; Chi-2 = Chi square statistic; Pp (log) = fuel price (in log) Vector error correction models: EC= 
error correction; dPf (t-1) = lagged change in fish prices; dPp (t-1) = lagged change in fuel prices; Cons = 
constant.  
 
4.1.4. Time series analysis: ARIMA 
As reported above, the fuel and fish price series are generally non -stationary but are difference 
stationary; the Augmented Dickey Fuller tests for first differences of both price series strongly 
rejected the null hypothesis of unit roots.  Hence, Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average 
(ARIMA) models are fitted using first differences of prices.  The autocorrelation functions for the 
first differences of fish prices (given in Appendix 4) show some significant autocorrelations 
especially with price levels twelve months previously; many autocorrelation coefficients fall 
outside the 95% confidence interval.  To control for autocorrelation, the ARIMA models are 
estimated with autoregressive function that considers twelve months lag (AR(12)); in addition a 
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moving average component of MA(1)16 is included.  The regression results from the twelve ARIMA 
models are reported in Table 4.  The autocorrelation functions for the error terms from the ARIMA 
model are given in Appendix 5; and almost all the autocorrelation coefficients are within the 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
In all the ARIMA models lagged price changes of fuel prices (in logs) up to six months are included 
to see if some of the effect of fuel price take time to be reflected in fish prices.   First, from the 
seventy two coefficients on lagged changes in fuel prices, only sixteen are significant even when 
considering 10% levels of significance.  Second, from the sixteen that are significant, eleven are 
negative; since there were significant increases in fuel prices during the study period this negative 
relationship mainly captures decreases in fish prices accompanying increases in fuel prices.  Both 
of the results from the ARIMA models reinforce the findings from the vector error correction 
models. 
 
Overall, the time series analysis indicates that fish prices were not significantly responding to fuel 
price increases implying limited cost pass-through in the fisheries of southwest England.  In fact 
the negative coefficients from the ARIMA model indicate if there is a correlation, it is likely to be 
negative.  With increasing fuel prices, this implies the fisheries of southwest England are likely 
suffering from both higher costs and relatively sluggish output prices.  In the next section, the 
possible underlying reasons for lack of cost pass-through are discussed using qualitative data 
analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 MA models relate what happens in the current period to the random errors that occurred in the past. 
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Table 4. ARIMA models for fish and fuel prices from 1998 to 2008 (in first differences) 
 dPf (t-1) dPp (t-1) dPp (t-2) dPp (t-3) dPp (t-4) dPp (t-5) dPp (t-6) AR(12) MA(1) Const Sigma Chi-2 N 
Monkfish (dPf) 
-Large 0.23*** 0.03 0.09 -0.00 -0.06 0.28 -0.14 0.69*** -1.00*** -0.00 0.12*** 4.79e+12*** 117 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18) (0.24) (0.20) (0.12) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)   
-Medium 0.20 0.04 0.20 -0.11 0.10 0.13 -0.13 0.55*** -0.83*** -0.00 0.11*** 126.34*** 117 
 (0.27) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) (0.00) (0.01)   
-Small 0.15 0.00 0.11 -0.01 0.01 0.20 -0.23* 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.12*** 119.24*** 117 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) (0.00) (0.01)   
Sole (dPf) 
-Large 0.39*** -0.24* 0.25 -0.41** 0.43** -0.07 -0.08 0.73*** -1.00*** 0.00* 0.11*** 9.72e+12*** 117 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17) (0.12) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)   
-Medium 0.40*** -0.24** 0.25 -0.57*** 0.71*** -0.25 0.01 0.58*** -0.91*** 0.00 0.10*** 567.00 117 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01)   
-Small 0.45*** -0.29** 0.07 0.07 0.25 -0.19 0.07 0.25** -0.87*** 0.00 0.10*** 186.55*** 117 
 (0.15) (0.12) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.00) (0.01)   
Hake (dPf) 
-Large 0.27*** -0.41* 0.82*** -0.58* 0.27 0.04 -0.23 0.43*** -1.00*** 0.00 0.16*** 9.55e+10*** 117 
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.28) (0.34) (0.39) (0.32) (0.21) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)   
-Medium 0.31*** -0.47** 0.86*** -0.53 0.16 -0.03 -0.09 0.47*** -1.00*** 0.00 0.16*** 1.41e+12*** 117 
 (0.10) (0.22) (0.30) (0.36) (0.36) (0.30) (0.22) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02)   
-Small 0.53*** -0.47** 1.12*** -0.81** 0.05 -0.06 0.14 0.46*** -1.00*** 0.00 0.17*** 9.31e+10*** 117 
 (0.07) (0.21) (0.29) (0.34) (0.38) (0.32) (0.21) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)   
Megrim (dPf) 
-Large 0.17 0.04 -0.02 -0.19 0.31 -0.12 -0.15 0.61*** -0.89*** 0.01 0.14*** 546.69*** 117 
 (0.17) (0.14) (0.22) (0.28) (0.26) (0.24) (0.17) (0.13) (0.07) (0.00) (0.01)   
-Medium 0.34*** 0.06 0.10 -0.23 0.12 0.15 -0.28 0.48*** -1.00*** 0.01*** 0.16*** 1.18e+14*** 117 
 (0.09) (0.18) (0.27) (0.37) (0.35) (0.32) (0.24) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)   
-Small 0.24** 0.19 -0.08 -0.15 0.09 0.21 -0.23 0.52*** -1.00*** 0.00*** 0.19*** 7.50e+12*** 117 
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.35) (0.42) (0.40) (0.40) (0.29) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)   
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. dPf (t-1) = 1 month lagged change in fish prices; dPp (t-1 to 6) = lagged change in fuel prices (1 to 6 
month lags); AR(12) = autoregressive term; MA (1)= moving average term; Cons = constant; N = number of observations 
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4.2. Cost pass-through: qualitative analysis  
A summary of key informant responses of the factors that influence fish prices and the direction of 
that influence (positive or negative) at the market is given in Table 5, categorised by the five main 
subjects that were discussed.  Similarly, a summary is presented in Table 6 of the factors 
merchants thought influenced fish prices, along with the number of merchants who gave that 
response.  The common subjects were factors that influenced the supply and demand of fish and 
the competitive structure of the market, so they are discussed together in this section and were 
used to create Figure 2.   
 
4.2.1 Nature of the product and method of sale  
The fish sold on the market is fresh and therefore a perishable product.  The fresher the fish, the 
higher the quality, and the more desirable it is for merchants to buy it.  There is no incentive, nor 
is there the capacity for fishers to store fish.  Fishers also try to maximise their time at sea, so to 
the best of their ability, they come in to port to land, put their fish on the next market then, at the 
earliest opportunity, go back to sea again. Hence fishers are rarely present at the market.  Thus, 
fish merchants have the advantage both in terms of the perishability of the product as well as that 
they can afford to wait.  This strengthens their price-setting power and prices are subject to what 
fish merchants are prepared to pay on the day of sale.   
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Table 5. Summary of Key Informant responses to factors influencing prices at the market, the changes over the study period and direction of influence 
on fish price 
 
Changes  
1998-2008 
Influence 
direction 
Influence on fish price 
Nature of product sold 
Fresh fish is a perishable product 
 
 
No change 
 
- 
 
Fishers do not store fish, thus are subject to the price fish merchants are prepared to 
pay on the day of sale. 
Method used to sell product 
Open ascending price auction 
 
 
No change 
 
? 
 
Merchants bid openly at auction & highest bid wins. Prices are subject to daily supply 
and demand, and amount of competition between merchants. 
Factors influencing supply and demand 
Weekly fluctuations in supply due to 
tides 
 
Daily fluctuations in supply due to 
weather 
 
 
Export market trading days 
 
 
Number of vessels at market 
 
 
Volume of fish sold at market 
 
 
Fish storage capacity of fish merchants 
 
 
 
Quotas 
  
 
No change 
 
 
No change 
 
 
 
No change 
 
 
Decreasing number 
of vessels 
 
Decreasing volume of 
fish 
 
Increasing storage 
capacity 
 
 
Variable by species 
 
- 
 
 
+/- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
+/- 
 
Gillnet vessels fish on neap tides only. Thus boats tend to land fish to market at the 
same time, increasing supply and reducing prices. 
 
Poor weather results in less vessels fishing and landing to market, reducing supply, 
and increasing prices.  Good weather has the opposite effect. 
 
~80% of fish landed is exported to continental Europe. Fridays experience low prices 
due to low European demand. 
 
Fewer vessels at the market reduces supply and should increase prices over time. 
 
Fewer vessels reduces quantity of fish sold at the market, reducing supply and should 
increase prices over time. 
 
When supply on the market is low, prices remain low because of stored fish (chilled 
and frozen). The quality of fish landed has also improved markedly over time which 
can extend length of storage time. 
  
Some quota species have increased in abundance which has increased supply and 
reduced prices. Some quota species have decreased in abundance which has 
decreased supply and increased prices. Some quota species have remained the same. 
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Table 5 continued. Summary of Key Informant responses to factors influencing prices at the market, the changes over the study period and direction of 
influence on fish price 
 
Changes  
1998-2008 
Influence 
direction 
Influence on fish price 
Factors influencing competition 
Access to global market 
 
 
 
Access to local markets 
 
 
 
Number of merchants 
 
 
Cooperation between merchants 
  
 
Increasing access to 
global market 
 
 
Increasing access to 
local markets 
 
 
Decreasing large 
merchants 
 
No change 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
 
With increased technology (internet) and globalisation, fish landed at market is in 
competition with globally sourced fish, suppressing the price of fish at the market. 
 
With increased technology (mobile phones and internet) merchants have access to 
more local fish markets and throughout the UK, suppressing the price of fish at the 
market. 
 
Fewer large merchants created an oligarchy, reducing competition which 
suppresses the price of fish at the market 
 
There may be cooperation where merchants predetermine the fish they buy, 
reducing competition during bidding which suppresses prices 
 
Events influencing fish prices 
Regulation of illegal landing and  
selling of fish 
 
 
 
 
Registration of buyers and sellers 
 
 
Regulation of fish processing  
 
 
2002: Increased 
enforcement to stop 
illegal fishing 
 
 
 
2005: Reg. buyers & 
sellers  
 
2003: Animal  
By-Products Regulation  
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
? 
 
 
- 
 
 
Illegal landing of fish undermined the price of fish on the market. From 2002 UK 
fisheries enforcement increased vigilance and prosecution of illegal landings, 
forcing all fish to be landed to the market. This forced merchants to compete for 
fish, driving price up, but also increased supply of fish on the market, driving price 
down.  
 
Registration of all buyers and sellers also enabled increased vigilance of illegal 
landings and species switching.   
 
Fish waste products required disposal increasing merchant costs & merchant 
motivation for lower prices. 
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Table 6. Summary of main merchant responses to factors influencing fish prices at the market and number of respondents  
 
 Merchant responses 
Number of 
respondents 
Factors 
influencing 
supply and 
demand 
 
A main determinate of fish prices is fluctuations in supply caused by weather (seasonal and daily) and tide 
Season governs prices through demand. Merchants believe there is more demand for fish in warmer seasons than colder seasons 
The amount of fish has decreased over the past ten years which has increased prices 
Merchants store fish which can alleviate supply problems to customers when fish supplies are low 
(a) Merchant has the same storage capacity as 10 years ago 
(b) Merchant has more storage capacity as 10 years ago 
(c) Merchant has less storage capacity as 10 years ago 
Demand for fish from merchants customers has changed for different species, as species have become popular or unpopular 
(a) Overall demand has remained the same 
(b) Overall demand has increased 
6 
6 
6 
6 
2 
3 
1 
6 
3 
3 
Factors 
influencing 
competition 
 
There is increasing access to fish on the global market which creates competition with locally caught fish 
There is increasing access to fish from other local UK markets and merchant buys more from these markets  
The mix of small, medium and large sized merchants has changed. There are fewer large merchants and more small merchants 
(a) Overall the number of merchants is the same 
(b) Overall the number of merchants has increased 
(c) Overall the number of merchants has decreased 
There is no communication at all between merchants because they are competing against each other for customers 
4 
5 
6 
1 
1 
4 
5 
Costs and 
cost pass 
through 
 
Costs for merchants have risen. Common rising costs: fuel, packaging, energy costs (running premises), labour, and waste removal 
Merchants are able to pass costs through as they work to specified margins (% profit), and all middlemen along market chain pass 
on costs according to margins (one merchant mentioned lowered margins but increased volumes of fish bought to compensate) 
Example of cost pass through: Fuel crisis of 2008 
(a) Staff cuts 
(b) Apart from staff cuts there was no noticeable difference to business practices or profits as merchants passed 
increased transport costs on 
5 
6 
 
 
3 
6 
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Figure 2. Factors influencing fish prices in the long term (1998-2008). Downward arrows indicate factors that suppress fish price, while upward arrows 
indicate factors that increase fish price.  Quota variably affects fish prices, with some species experiencing higher quotas over time, increasing the 
supply of fish on the market (which should decrease price), and other species experiencing lower quotas over time decreasing the supply of fish on the 
market (which should increase price). Better fish quality should improve prices, but actually facilitates greater storage for merchants.  
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The auction is subject to the laws of supply and demand, and is governed by price, utility and 
quantity.  It assumes that in a competitive market, price will function to equalise the quantity 
demanded and the quantity supplied, resulting in an economic equilibrium of price and quantity.  
Therefore, when supply is low, prices will be high, and vice versa.  Given the advantage of low 
supply driving price up, some fishers attempt to land and sell their fish when few other vessels are 
doing so.  Information on the number of boats predicted to land on a particular day is readily 
available at sea and is used by skippers.  To a very limited degree, fishers can cooperate and make 
decisions about when to land in order to get the best price.  There is no formal network or 
coordinated mechanism in place and communication is mostly between small groups of skippers 
who have social ties.  Furthermore, the limitations to fishers being able to strategise and 
successfully ‘play’ the market are that uncontrollable factors such as weather override strategy 
and determine landing time.   
 
4.2.2 Factors influencing supply and demand 
In the short term, supply and demand are uncertain and variation is attributable to many potential 
factors.  Both key informants and merchants said that the main short-term fluctuations in supply 
are caused by weather and tides, causing daily variation in price.  Poor weather keeps vessels from 
fishing and supply of fish to the market is limited during these periods.  Merchants have to 
compete harder for the available fish and prices at the market can be relatively high.  Good 
weather has the opposite effect.  The majority of vessels will go fishing resulting in a relatively 
abundant supply of fish on the market, which can reduce the price of fish.  The state of the tide 
also has a substantial impact on fish prices at the market for the gill net fleet (approximately one 
third of the fleet of >10 metre vessels).  Gill nets are static nets that sit like a vertical wall anchored 
from the bottom of the sea.  The nets are most effective when the tide is weak (neap tides) and 
are ineffective when the tide is strong (spring tides) because the net does not sit vertically in the 
water.  Therefore, the gill net fleet only fish on the neap tide.  When the neap tide ends, the entire 
gill net fleet come to land at almost the same time, creating a glut of fish on the market, and can 
result in relatively low fish prices.   
 
There are also short term fluctuations in demand, with high demand raising and low demand 
reducing the price of fish.  Eighty per cent of all fish sold at the market is transported for sale to 
continental Western Europe.  Key informant responses indicated that as a result there is low 
demand for fish on Fridays (and therefore relatively low prices) at the market because the timing 
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of transport means that fish will not be ready for sale over the weekend.  Merchant responses 
indicated there was also a trend for higher demand before public holidays.  They also noted a 
seasonal trend in demand, where fish is in higher demand in warmer weather than colder 
weather, particularly when the fish is destined for the UK market.  Merchants mitigate fluctuations 
in supply and demand by forward buying and storing fish either in refrigerated chillers or in 
freezers. 
 
Short term fluctuations have a significant effect on fish price.  However for this study it is 
important to understand the long terms drivers of fish price stagnation over the period 1998-2008.  
Both key informants and merchants said the supply of fish on the market had decreased 
substantially:  
 
“There has been a huge reduction in the amount of fish on the market.  When I first 
started at the market [ten years ago], we would still be selling fish at one pm.  Now 
it’s a rare thing to go ‘til 10am.  The market is turning over half what it was ten years 
ago.  It’s changed here an unbelievable amount.”  (KI 6) 
 
Key informants said the reduction in fish quantity was due to the contraction of the fleet of larger 
vessels but that having fewer vessels has also made daily fluctuations in price more noticeable.  In 
addition, key informants said that the amount of fish on the market was also subject to the quota 
system, and has fluctuated over time depending on the species.  Given that merchants said that 
demand for fish had either remained the same or increased over the time period and supply has 
been reduced, if the market is responding to the economic model of supply and demand, fish 
prices should have been increasing over the ten year period.  However, as shown descriptively in 
Figure 1, this is not the case and prices have remained stagnant.  Fishers have attempted to raise 
the prices they receive by improving quality of fish through improvements in fish handling and 
chilling on board the vessel but it is questionable whether this has had a true impact on the price 
they receive.  Inadvertently, this has benefitted merchants as improvements in quality have 
lengthened the shelf life of the fish, increasing the storage time before selling fish on. 
 
4.2.3 Factors influencing competition 
The standard economic model of supply and demand requires a perfectly competitive market.  
Therefore I also looked at factors influencing competition in the fish marketing system.  Key 
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informants and merchants stated that since 1998 there had been a reduction in the number of 
merchants and also a redistribution of the mix of small, medium and large merchant businesses 
present at the market with there being a trend towards fewer large merchants and more small 
merchants.  This seems to have created an oligopsony , with only three large merchants 
competing for the bulk of the fish sold each day.  Improvements in communications and 
technology have also reduced competition for fish at the market because other local markets can 
be accessed simultaneously by merchants.  A merchant business may have a buyer or an agent at 
several markets that s/he will be in constant contact with during the auction via mobile phone, 
along with being in constant contact with her/his customers advising them on quantities available 
and price trends.  There has also been a shift in the UK toward electronic fish markets and auctions 
are conducted on the internet.  One fish merchant said: “I can talk to my buyers at Newlyn and 
Brixham on my mobile and buy fish online from Plymouth all from bed if I want to” (M 4).  
Increased access to more markets has meant merchants can more easily search for the lowest 
available price for each species of fish.  Both key informants and merchants also strongly 
suggested that increasing globalisation has meant that fish caught in the southwest of England is 
in competition with equivalent species sourced globally.  For example, hake caught in the 
southwest is competing on the Spanish market with large catches of hake caught in Chile and in 
South Africa and Namibia, which is driving prices down.  Increased access to both local and global 
markets has effectively increased wider supply and decreased demand for fish at the market of the 
SW fishing community. 
 
Opportunities for merchant collaboration on price may be greater than ten years ago with fewer 
merchants on the market.  All merchants said they were highly competitive with each other and 
don’t tend to talk to each other at all.  One fish merchant referred to competition with other 
merchants as: “It’s war!” (M 2).   However, some key informants said they feel uncomfortable 
about the amount of friendliness between merchants.  One key informant said: 
 
“There is no evidence that there is any collusion [between merchants] but everyone is 
suspicious.  The friendliness between buyers makes me feel uncomfortable. The buyers 
from [companies X, Y and Z] all have dinner together and things. This is not a healthy 
situation. If there was a blind clock auction then the whole market would be more 
transparent.” (KI 4) 
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Over the time period spent in the SW fishing community, it was common to hear fishermen say 
they had received low prices unexpectedly and it happens too many times for it to be a random 
event. One skipper said: 
 
We used to land at [the local market] but we were getting quite unhappy with our 
prices. We were getting bad prices all the time when the prices weren’t so bad at 
other markets. It happened too many times so we landed elsewhere. We didn’t intend 
to carry on [landing elsewhere] or do it as a mark of protest.  The difference was 
between the salesmen.  [The merchants at the alternative market] could be bothered 
to do something to better the prices and ones at [the local market] were like whatever 
they pay they pay. And we’ve never landed another fish here. Obviously it costs us 
more ‘cause you pay landing dues twice and then you have the transport, but it works 
out better for us in the long run.” (beam trawler, SW fishing community)  
 
Hostility and suspicion between fishermen and merchants is not an uncommon situation in 
fisheries (Acheson, 1985).  However, many fishermen in the SW fishing community now refuse to 
sell at their local market because they strongly believe that merchants predetermine the vessel 
they will bid on and thus don’t bid against each other.  These fishermen now sell their fish at an 
alternative market which is an electronic market designed to favour fishermen – merchants bid 
anonymously and remotely so any communication between auction bidders is minimised.  
Fishermen who now sell at the electronic market have reported earning more money for their fish 
on average as a result of switching.  Although there is no evidence for any cooperative behaviour 
between merchants, it would not be surprising given that it is more beneficial for merchants to 
cooperate than compete.   
 
4.2.4 Changes in merchant costs and cost pass-through for merchants 
Merchant costs have been rising over time. Common rising costs mentioned were fossil fuel 
related costs such as fuel for transport and energy costs to run their premises and packaging.  
Labour costs have also increased as skilled workers are more difficult to find and wages had gone 
up in the past ten years.  Waste removal costs (of fish products) have also risen.  However, all 
merchants indicated that they had passed on increased costs to their customers because they ran 
their businesses according to margins. In other words, they would only sell fish in order to make a 
specified percentage profit.  One merchant mentioned that he now worked to lower margins than 
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previously, but increased access to markets meant that he could compensate for this by increasing 
the volumes of fish bought and sold. 
 
I specifically asked merchants about the impact of the fuel crisis in 2008 where diesel fuel prices 
paid by fishers reached a peak in mid 2008 after doubling from the start 2007 (Abernethy et al., 
2010). I asked this question to find a potential common example of cost pass-through for 
merchants.  Three of the six merchants said they cut the number of staff that worked for them.  
However, apart from reducing labour costs, merchants said there was no discernable impact on 
their business, or on fish prices at the market.  Two merchants had difficulty pin-pointing the 
period of time in question indicating it did not impact their business, whereas for fishermen, it was 
clearly identified as a major threat to the viability of their business (Abernethy et al., 2010), 
further reinforcing the difference in ability to pass-through costs compared with fishers.  
 
4.2.5 Events that may have impacted on market fish prices 
I asked key informants if there had been any major events such as regulation change that may 
have impacted market prices in the study period.  The main change mentioned by all key 
informants was the shift away from illegally landing fish, or ‘black fishing’.  Black fishing in the UK 
can be defined in two main ways.  First, it may be fish that is landed and sold directly to a 
merchant without going through the market or being reported officially.  Second, fish may be sold 
through the market but is recorded as a different species to what it actually is because the annual 
quota has already been reached and landing above the annual quota is illegal.  Here I consider the 
former type of black fishing.  Key informants including fisheries enforcement officers said that 
black landing of fish sold directly to merchants undermined the price of fish on the market.  Black 
fish was sold at very low prices, lower than market value.  Given that merchants had already 
bought black fish, demand for market fish was reduced and the price of market fish was 
suppressed.   
 
“No fisherman wants to black land.  It was done back then because fishermen were 
struggling to be profitable when the quota system came in. But the black price was 
lower than market price. The merchants took advantage of the situation. Then the 
market price also suffered because merchants had already bought the bulk of their 
fish through cheap black landings, so there was less competition at the market for the 
legal fish.”  (KI 2) 
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In 2002, the UK government’s fishing enforcement agency systematically improved vigilance, 
enforcement and prosecution of black landings UK wide.  There were investigations and 
prosecutions throughout the industry including in the SW fishing community.  The effect was that 
after 2002, the majority of fish from the >10 metre fleet is now landed through the market and as 
the correct species.  This was further reinforced in 2005 with the compulsory registration of 
buyers and sellers of fish which creates a paper trail of fish from the point landed to the consumer 
at the end of the market chain.  The reduction in black landings has had uncertain effects on the 
price of fish at the market in the long term.  On one hand, fish merchants are forced to compete 
for fish using only the auction system which should drive prices up.  On the other hand, the supply 
of fish on the market has also increased which would have the opposite effect and suppress prices. 
 
The other main regulatory event mentioned by key informants was the introduction of regulations 
for fish processing and waste disposal for merchants.  All merchants tend to process fish to some 
degree (such as filleting and packaging).  Prior to 2003 when the Animal by-products regulation 
was imposed, merchants used to sell their waste fish.  Since regulation merchants have to pay to 
dispose of their fish waste, increasing merchants running costs and incentive for merchants to 
keep prices low. 
 
5.  Discussion 
Fish prices at the market do not notably respond to fuel prices in either the short term or the long 
term, implying limited cost pass-through in the SW fishing community.  Increasing fuel prices and 
stagnant fish prices means that fishers suffer from both higher costs and sluggish output prices.  
The analyses of the market have shown that the fishers have no price setting power because of 
the nature of the product and the method by which it is sold.  Fresh fish is a perishable product 
which means it has to be sold quickly.  It relies on the auction market to be run according to the 
economic model of supply and demand with perfect competition in order to gain fair prices.  
However, it was found that the forces that should be driving prices up such as high demand, 
reduced supply and improvements in the quality of fish, are being outweighed by local and global 
forces that are reducing the competitiveness of the market.   
 
On the local level the amount of fish landed has declined and merchant costs have increased, 
resulting in fewer large merchants bidding on the market.  This has effectively created an 
oligopsony resulting in less competition for fish and more potential for cooperation between 
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merchants.  Although merchant costs have also been rising, unlike fishers they are able to offset 
and pass on costs in several ways.  Fisher efforts to improve quality of the fish on the market has 
inadvertently allowed merchants to store fish for longer, buffering short-term variability in supply.  
Increased access to alternative local and electronic markets as well as improved communications 
has given merchants greater opportunities to search for the cheapest daily fish prices possible; but 
the same opportunity doesn’t seem to be exploited equally by fishers.  On the global level, 
southwest fishers are now competing internationally to sell their fish.  Fish caught by the SW 
fishing community directly competes with fish products at low import prices from the global 
market, which includes large volumes of illegal, unregulated and unreported fish (European 
Commission, 2008a).  Effectively, for southwest fishers trying to sell their product at the best price, 
supply has increased and therefore demand has diminished.  
 
This study uncovered strong market constraints to fishers improving fish prices at point of first 
sale.  The interactions between the institutional set-up of the seafood market, the lack of 
competition at the SW fishing community market, and globalisation of fish markets has created a 
barrier to fishermen effectively passing on their costs and improving prices.  Rising costs, coupled 
with stagnating prices, result in falling profit margins for fishers, which may have negative 
consequences for the sustainability and resilience of coastal fishing communities (Abernethy et al., 
2010).  The importance of creating a ‘stable future for both the industry itself and for the 
communities that depend upon it’ was recently emphasised for the UK (Prime Minister's Strategy 
Unit, 2004).  In order to achieve healthy fisheries, fishing communities need to be encouraged to 
improve their ability to cope and adapt with changing conditions, alongside addressing resource 
conservation needs (Jentoft, 2000).  Social adaptation is difficult to address because it is complex, 
context specific and highly dynamic and fishers often have little incentive to participate in long 
term resource management because of the uncertainty they face in terms of resource availability, 
imposed restrictions and profitability.  Opportunities and interventions in the market chain to 
encourage prices to be more responsive to fishing costs, and to improve the price of fish at first 
point of sale may be an approach that has largely been overlooked by fisheries scientists and 
managers.  As long as there is no increase in fishing effort, increased profitability may reduce the 
constraints fishers face and create more opportunity for adaptability and innovation within the 
industry toward sustainable practices, resource conservation and participatory management.   
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From the literature and on-going initiatives in Cornwall (southwest fisheries encompass Cornwall, 
Devon and Dorset) I have identified three main options to improve fish prices. These initiatives are 
by no means guaranteed solutions and require local and context specific initiatives.  Here I discuss 
the advantages and disadvantages of each.  The first option for improving prices is to try to add 
value to fish through product differentiation.  This can be achieved through improving the quality 
of the fish at market, promoting traceability and ecolabelling.  In Cornwall there has been targeted 
work on improving the quality of fish products since 2004.  There have been improvements in on-
board fish handling techniques contributing to increased quality which has critically improved the 
reputation of Cornish fish and has improved the value of some fish species sold (Nautilus 
Consultants Ltd, 2008).  However, as also mentioned in the results, this has also had an 
unintended benefit for merchants who have been able to capitalise on improved quality because it 
has enhanced the shelf life of fish and its storage capacity.  Traceability and ethically sourced food 
products are also becoming increasingly important to the consumer (Jaffry et al., 2004).  Despite 
limited funding, over the past five years a non-profit organisation, Seafood Cornwall 
(http://www.seafoodcornwall.org.uk), has been actively promoting Cornish caught fish and have 
initiated a responsible-sourcing certification scheme.  This has led to recognition by retailers and 
environmental nongovernmental organisations (Nautilus Consultants Ltd, 2008).   
 
These types of product-differentiation can generate market-driven incentives which also support 
fisheries management objectives.  An example of this is gear experimentation by innovative 
skippers which both improves fish quality and reduces environmental damage.  Beam trawlers in 
the southwest of England experiment with square mesh codends and square mesh panels which 
has been shown to significantly reduce bycatch and discards, and increase catch value (Revill et al., 
2007).  However, the increase in fuel prices in 2008 reduced the experimentation of gear by the 
SW fishing community skippers (Abernethy et al., 2010).  While skippers still saw the value in 
continuing to modify gear, they felt they could no longer afford the fishing time (and money) lost 
through experimentation.  The inability to offset the rise in fishing costs compromised the 
reputation and commitment of the fisheries to market themselves as responsible, high quality and 
consistent fish producers.  In addition, it is unclear what the limitations are for increased prices 
through consumer demand for product differentiation.  There is evidence to suggest that there is a 
gap between consumer attitudes and support of responsibly sourced fish and actual consumer 
behaviour.  Furthermore there is uncertainty about the benefits to marine resource conservation 
(Jacquet and Pauly, 2007, Ward, 2008, Gulbrandsen, 2009).  Consumers trade off wider 
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environmental concerns with pragmatic factors such as price and convenience alongside a lack of 
awareness and knowledge of differentiated fish products (Weatherall et al., 2003, Verbeke et al., 
2007).  
 
The second option is to seek alternatives to the existing market structure.  Merchants reported 
consistently high demand for southwest-caught fish over the study period.  Although cheaper 
alternatives from the global market may be attractive to large retailers, the European seafood 
trade is still characterised by wide diversity of products and many southwest-caught fish species 
retain a cultural value to European consumers.  The key may be to develop initiatives to improve 
competition between fish buyers.  The electronic market is eighty miles from the SW fishing 
community.  It operated very similarly to the SW fishing community market until 1999 when it 
converted to a modern electronic market allowing buyers to bid online, increasing the number of 
buyers including international buyers.  Buyers have access to information on who caught the fish, 
when, and the gear type used.  Vessel reputations have been established as a result.  Since the 
inception of the electronic market, it has reported improved fish values as a result of improved 
competition, and higher volumes of fish as more vessels are attracted to land there.  Some SW 
fishing community skippers now transport their fish to the electronic market because of the higher 
prices they receive.  Despite this being common knowledge, many skippers have fidelity towards 
landing at their home market through habit, convenience and loyalty to the local fishing industry.  
Given that there is a marked locality effect, investments to alter the market structure and improve 
competition need to be directed at the local market itself rather than incentivising fishers to sell to 
alternative markets.  
 
The third option is to challenge the price setting power of fish merchants through cooperative 
strategies.  Given that fish prices at first point of sale have remained relatively stable over the past 
ten years and retail prices appear to have risen17 , there may be an opportunity to integrate the 
market.  Marketing cooperatives have been shown to be an effective tool in fisheries for reducing 
                                                          
17
 It is difficult to obtain specific data on trends in retail prices in Europe because most retail data are 
collected and commercialised by private companies (FAO, 2008a). However, there are indications that retail 
prices do not reflect the same pattern as fish prices at the first point of sale, but that they have been 
increasing. Evidence of this is the FAO fish price index for whitefish (based on import values), which suggests 
that import prices have been rising over the past ten years (Tveteras, 2008). In addition, CEPESCA’s (the 
Spanish Confederation of the Fishing Industry) recent analysis of auction price data compared the hake price 
at the end of 2007 (€11.25) with that at the end of 2008 (€4.00), a 64% decline in value of hake at the 
market despite rising fishing costs. At the same time, the price paid by the consumer fell only slightly, from 
€18.79 to €18.47 (Fishing News International, 2009) 
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costs and increasing income (Kitts and Edwards, 2003).  Associations in Cornwall such as the 
Southwest Handline Fishermen’s Association (http://linecaught.org.uk), Cornish Tuna 
(http://www.cornishtuna.com), and the Cornish Sardine Management Association 
(http://www.cornishsardines.org.uk) comprise fishing enterprises acting as cooperatives, 
providing opportunities to market their differentiated product and sell directly to anyone along 
the supply chain, with success.  Developing more cooperatives requires policy support, 
investment, management and determination on the part of the member fishers.  Producer 
organisations (POs) may be the key to developing marketing cooperatives.  However, with limited 
funding and grant opportunities, producer organisations in the UK currently focus on maximising 
quota entitlements and try to achieve steady supply and market prices for landings through quota 
regulation.  Given the limitations of resources, there is little capacity for POs to get involved with 
direct marketing outside giving support to broader umbrella projects (e.g. Seafood Cornwall) and 
to facilitating communications between PO members and sales agents (Carleton et al., 2006).   
 
It is often assumed that standard setting by retailers and certification schemes to encourage 
consumers will offer the route to sustainability.  However it has been shown that the intended 
benefits and goals for the ecosystem and consumers are not always achieved (Jacquet and Pauly, 
2007).  There needs to be an incentive for the fishers to shift toward sustainable practices.  This 
will only be possible if fishers are given the opportunity to be profitable which will enhance their 
ability to cope and adapt with changing conditions.  I have identified three possible alternative 
strategies for offsetting costs through ex-vessel price improvements.  Policy makers, the public, 
the fishing industry, and the fishing communities themselves all have a role to play: adding value 
through product differentiation through improvements in quality, traceability, certification 
schemes, all require public education and demand; improving competition at the fish market 
requires policy and community driven changes of the institutional set-up as well as investment; 
and forming fisher cooperative strategies requires organisation and collaboration between fishers 
themselves and potentially the producer organisations.   
 
6. Conclusions 
It is fundamental that overexploitation of fisheries needs to be addressed in order to prevent 
further declines.  However, it is also clear that in order to succeed in managing fishery resources, 
initiatives rely on understanding the socio-economic incentives of fishers to change behaviour.  
Fishing costs have been rising for a number of years, particularly fuel costs.  It is almost certain 
240 
 
that fuel price will continue to rise in the future.  However, this study has identified that it is not 
necessarily the fuel prices that are the constraint preventing fishers from coping and adapting to 
changing conditions.  There are stagnant fish prices at the market and fishers are unable to pass-
through increasing costs.  The institutional set up of the market means that “fishermen are price 
takers not price makers” (KI 4) and this is contributing to the decline of UK fishing communities 
such as the SW fishing community described in this study.  As long as fishing effort is not 
increased, policies and investment directed at improving fish prices for fishers may contribute to 
improved profitability and health of UK fisheries. 
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8. Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Interview respondents 
Respondent 
code 
Respondent 
category 
Respondent details Interview 
date 
KI 1 Industry liaison Head of Cornish Fish Producers Organisation 02.10.2009 
KI 2 Government official Fisheries officer, Marine Fisheries Authority 07.10.2009 
KI 3 Fisheries observer Fish market observer and fisheries vessel scientific 
observer 
12.10.2009 
KI 4 Industry liaison Head of Seafood Cornwall 08.10.2009 
KI 5 Industry liaison Fisheries liaison officer, Seafood Cornwall 06.10.2009 
KI 6 Market worker Market worker and auctioneer at fish market 13.10.2009 
    
M 1 Merchant Mid size fish merchant (buys 5-6 tonnes fish per week) 02.10.2009 
M 2 Merchant Mid size fish merchant (buys 8 tonnes fish per week) 05.10.2009 
M 3 Merchant Mid size fish merchant (buys 2-10 tonnes fish per week) 05.10.2009 
M 4 Merchant Mid size fish merchant (buys 10 tonnes fish per week) 07.10.2009 
M 5 Merchant Mid size fish merchant (buys 10-20 tonnes fish per 
week) 
12.10.2009 
M 6 Merchant Mid size fish merchant (buys 5 tonnes fish per week) 14.10.2009 
M 7 Merchant Large size fish merchant (buys 100 tonnes fish per 
week) 
16.10.2009 
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Appendix 2.  Average annual fish and fuel prices (1998-2008). Fish prices are in UK £/kg and fuel prices UK pence/litre. 
Fish type 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Monkfish            
-Large 7.44 8.23 9.20 9.27 8.83 8.85 8.19 8.52 10.07 10.54 10.05 
-Medium 7.40 7.96 8.45 7.73 7.74 7.81 7.03 8.18 9.96 8.93 9.39 
-Small 6.90 7.24 7.08 6.62 7.02 6.80 6.39 7.65 8.85 8.12 8.81 
Sole            
-Large 8.18 8.71 8.01 8.37 8.56 8.55 9.21 9.47 10.66 11.69 9.44 
-Medium 9.99 10.08 9.42 9.64 9.60 9.60 10.58 11.04 13.16 14.51 13.03 
-Small 7.95 6.87 6.42 6.67 6.51 7.44 8.07 8.68 9.98 10.80 9.49 
Hake            
-Large 4.85 5.72 4.92 4.74 4.76 4.82 5.50 5.46 5.92 5.77 6.77 
-Medium 4.08 4.51 3.75 3.68 3.84 3.82 4.24 4.27 4.70 4.65 4.76 
-Small 3.22 3.22 2.69 2.57 3.08 2.83 2.84 3.20 3.64 3.29 3.42 
Megrim            
-Large 3.97 4.32 3.96 3.90 4.53 5.17 5.94 6.97 7.90 7.35 7.48 
-Medium 2.77 3.02 2.81 2.76 3.25 3.87 4.23 4.98 5.50 5.11 6.05 
-Small 2.29 2.41 2.35 2.25 2.60 2.92 3.04 3.88 4.44 4.02 4.88 
            
Fuel 9.48 11.09 17.64 16.44 15.39 17.22 20.30 27.77 31.71 31.79 44.22 
 
Appendix 3a. Fish prices (January 1998- April 2008). Prices are in pence per kg 
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Appendix 3a. continued.  Fish prices (January 1998- April 2008). Prices are in pence per kg 
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Appendix 3a. continued.  Fish prices (January 1998- April 2008). Prices are in pence per kg 
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Appendix 3a. continued.  Fish prices (January 1998- April 2008). Prices are in pence per kg 
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Appendix 3b. Fuel prices (January 1998- April 2008). Prices in pence per litre 
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Appendix 4. Autocorrelation functions for first difference of fish prices 
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Appendix 4. continued.  Autocorrelation functions for first difference of fish price 
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Appendix 4. continued.  Autocorrelation functions for first difference of fish price 
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Appendix 4. continued.  Autocorrelation functions for first difference of fish price 
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Appendix 5.  Autocorrelation functions for residuals from the ARIMA models 
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Appendix 5. continued. Autocorrelation functions for residuals from the ARIMA models  
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Appendix 5. continued. Autocorrelation functions for residuals from the ARIMA models  
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Appendix 5. continued. Autocorrelation functions for residuals from the ARIMA models  
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Chapter 7 
Concluding remarks 
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1.  Key findings 
Understanding fisher behaviour is fundamental for designing fisheries policies which use 
appropriate incentives to promote goals of improving ecosystem functioning, efficiency and 
profitability of fishing enterprises, and the well being of fishing communities (Wilen, 1979, 
Salas and Gaertner, 2004, Branch et al., 2006, Hilborn, 2007).  In many fisheries, policy has 
failed to develop the ability to understand and anticipate fisher behaviour in advance of 
regulations, or learn how to shape behaviour in ways that promote management goals (Hanna, 
2001). The research presented in this thesis attempted to help readdress the imbalance 
between understanding fisheries resources and the resource users, and adds to our 
understanding of individual fisher and fleet-wide decision making.  I used theory from a range 
of disciplines within and outside fisheries research to formulate an interdisciplinary approach 
to uncovering the factors that influence heterogeneity of behaviour, the patterns of fisher 
decision making, and the implications of operating a fishing business under uncertain and 
changing conditions.    
 
The research results provided an insight into the strategic behaviour of fishers and showed 
that there are different strategic archetypes within a fishing fleet.  The analysis revealed that 
fishers’ strategic behaviour can be classified according to the degree to which each skipper is 
dynamic, innovative and adaptable to changing conditions. A skipper’s strategic position was 
‘enabled’ through the degree of communication, cooperation, planning, financial and physical 
risk-taking they undertake and their emphasis on stability.  A skipper’s individual 
characteristics such as career time horizon, the financial pressure and responsibilities at home, 
their ethic towards fishing and whether they work for a company or operate independently 
were also important determinants of a skipper’s strategy.  Defining skippers strategic 
behaviour revealed that about half of skippers were not flexible or innovative and hence had 
little ability to adapt to changing conditions.  The other half of skippers were able to readily 
adapt to changing regulatory conditions.  This could result in high pressure on resources but at 
the same time, these skippers were more likely to adapt their practices towards goals of 
environmentally sustainable fisheries.    
 
A fisher’s short term tactics, such as location choice are informed by his/her strategy (Béné, 
1996, Christensen and Raakjaer, 2006).  Location choice behaviour was investigated in this 
thesis, using a logistic random utility modelling (RUM) approach. Using variables informed by 
the data collected through interviews with skippers and the literature, the model revealed that 
skippers made location choice decisions based on recent and annual economic returns.  This 
motivation was modified by the influence of knowledge transfer within the fleet (of where the 
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rest of the fleet were gaining high returns) and financial and/or risk aversion,  with skippers 
preferring to fish locations closer to their home port, and choosing locations with less variance 
in economic returns even when alternative locations may yield higher returns.   
 
The opportunity to examine how fisher behaviour is modified by uncertain and changing 
conditions arose unexpectedly when there was a fuel price ‘shock’ during fieldwork in 2008.  
Fuel prices had doubled between 2007 and 2008, peaking in mid-2008.  It resulted in a 
significant reduction in income for fishers, a loss of job security and problems in recruiting 
crew.  Sectors of the fleet that used towed gears, and had not invested in fuel-efficiency 
measures, were most impacted and less able to adapt.  Fishing behaviour altered as skippers 
attempted to increase fuel efficiency at the cost of reduced catches, fishing closer to port, 
reducing exploratory fishing, and ceasing experimentation with fishing gears with lesser 
environmental impact. This highlighted that a threat to fishing community viability may have   
negative environmental effects.  The key barrier to fishers in the face of unstable and rising 
fuel prices was that they were unable to offset increased costs because ex-vessel market fish 
prices have remained stagnant for at least a decade.   
 
Strong market constraints to fishers’ ability to influence fish prices at first point of sale were 
uncovered.  The interactions between the institutional set-up of the seafood market, the lack 
of competition between merchants at the fish market, and globalisation of fish markets mean 
that fishermen lack the price-setting power to effectively pass on their escalating costs through 
improving prices at first sale. 
 
2. Limitations  
Overall this thesis adds weight to the argument that understanding aggregate fisher incentives 
can augment the design of fisheries governance systems for social-ecological sustainability and 
for fishing community resilience.  It demonstrates that using a mixed methods approach and 
theories drawn from disciplines outside fisheries science (such as behavioural economics, 
psychology, social anthropology, management science, organisational theory, political science 
and economic geography) to research fisher behaviour can result in richer mechanistic 
understanding of the complexity of fisher behaviour and how it is modified by psychological, 
cultural and social determinants.   The range of methods used in this thesis and the fact that 
research into fisher decision making is a relatively unexplored area, means there are 
limitations to this work in terms of direct policy relevance and the findings need to be 
considered as preliminary and exploratory (particularly for Chapters 3 and 4) while still useful 
for developing new methods for understanding fisher behaviour.  Chapter 3 drew upon the 
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strategic management research to develop a framework for categorising fishing strategies and 
is the first, of which I am aware, that has attempted to apply the Miles and Snow (1978) 
strategic typology in the fishery context.  As with most research studies, many questions 
remain unanswered particularly those directed at informing policy choices and how defining 
strategies can be ethically and practically incorporated into policy.  Chapter 4 developed 
further the RUM applied by Hutton et al. (2004) to model and predict location choice 
behaviour of the southwest English beam trawl fleet by including variables related to risk 
taking.  The simple model was chosen and variables were limited by the data available.  There 
is much scope to develop and improve the power of the RUM for southwest fisheries by the 
inclusion of species-specific catch variables, ecological variables, individual skipper 
characteristics, or using a more complex approach to the modelling structure.  Chapters 5 and 
6 investigated the constraints placed on southwest fishers due to rising costs and the inability 
of fishers to pass-through costs, and raised some important questions that were beyond the 
capacity of this thesis to answer, but provide scope for further research, such as: How can the 
adaptability of vulnerable fishing communities in southwest England be improved?  Can policy 
supportive of market-based solutions improve the social and ecological resilience of fisheries?   
 
The social analysis used in this thesis was based on case study research undertaken in 
southwest England.  The case study is ‘a research strategy which focuses on understanding the 
dynamics present in a single setting’ (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Case study research has both 
strengths and limitations. The strengths are that it provides in-depth understanding of 
complex behaviour and interactions and uncovers causal relationships, it is grounded in ‘lived 
reality’, can facilitate the exploration of the unexpected, and encourages rich theoretical 
development.  The limitations are that there is often too much data for easy analysis, and how 
the data is analysed and what to omit can be contentious. The complexity that is uncovered is 
difficult to represent simply and qualitative data does not lend itself to statistical analysis. The 
findings are highly context-specific and it is difficult to know the degree to which they can be 
generalised to other systems.  There are often doubts about reliability of data, and given time 
limitations it cannot always answer the large number of relevant questions that are raised 
during the data collection process.   
 
In order to mitigate these limitations, a rigorous approach to data collection and analysis was 
taken. I lived in the fishing community for a total of six months, and spent almost every day on 
the quayside, talking to fishermen on several occasions each.  I spent a long time getting to 
know the fishermen and people in the community in order to gain trust.  Fishermen in the 
southwest tend to be very wary of outsiders and researchers.  They also suffer from interview 
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fatigue from government and regulatory officials and required reassurance from me that I was 
not going to use the data I collected to their detriment.  Going to sea on fishing trips and 
participating in all aspects of fishing (except for potentially dangerous aspects such as helping 
with gear retrieval) proved invaluable for gaining trust and acceptance beyond my status of 
‘the researcher’ in the community.  Once fishermen realised that I wanted to talk to them 
about what they do and not about contentious issues in the fishing community such as 
regulations, illegal activity or environmental impacts of fishing, fishermen tended to open up 
and I am confident that the data collected was accurate.  No fishermen stopped the interview 
during the process, and only a few fishermen declined to be interviewed.  I am aware that my 
presence did not go unnoticed - I was often the only female on the quay.  I think I was a source 
of interest at the start of my fieldwork, but over time I believe that my sustained presence 
resulted in fishermen being more comfortable and open towards me.   
 
The interview guide and questionnaires used were rigorously designed and reviewed by peers 
and key informants in the field prior to implementation in order to capture all relevant 
variables in an appropriate manner.  Data were triangulated to increase confidence in the 
accuracy of data.  In addition to repeat interviews and questionnaires, observations on the 
quayside and interviews with key informants were undertaken.  Although based primarily at 
one port, I also went to several other ports in the southwest to interview fishers which allowed 
me to be confident in generalising my findings for the southwest region.  I returned to the 
community on two follow-up occasions which facilitated further exploration of questions 
raised after initial analysis of the data collected during the main field season.  Content analysis 
was employed to analyse qualitative data (Stone et al., 1966, Krippendorff, 1980). Content 
analysis is a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences that can 
be replicated.  Thus, transcripts of interviews, questionnaires and field notes were 
systematically coded using qualitative analysis software, (NVivo 7) according to each theme of 
interest, to ensure that data were not used selectively and to ensure they were analysed 
rigorously.  
 
3.  Policy relevance and application of findings  
Although fisheries research is dominated by understanding the resource itself, interest in 
understanding the dynamics of resource users is increasing.  There is a growing demand for 
development of new, more holistic management paradigms to rebuild ecosystems  (Pitcher, 
2001, Pauly et al., 2002).  The ecosystem approach to fisheries management (EAF)has been 
accepted as one of the key “vehicles” for developing and improving fisheries management (De 
Young et al., 2008). The purpose of the EAF is ‘to plan, develop and manage fisheries in a 
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manner that addresses the multiplicity of societal needs and desires, without jeopardising the 
options for future generations to benefit from a full range of goods and services provided by 
marine ecosystems’ (FAO, 2002). Political commitments to an EAF management system are 
increasing (FAO, 2003).  The Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) which underpins EU fisheries 
management explicitly refers to ‘progressive implementation of an eco-system-based approach 
to fisheries management’ (EU, 2007).  However, the EAF is still considered to be mostly in the 
conceptual stages of implementation (Garcia and Cochrane, 2005, Francis et al., 2007, 
Murawski, 2007).  Despite best intentions, effective implementation of the EAF has not been 
straightforward (Caddy and Seijo, 2005).  The commitment to the concept and values of the 
EAF is far ahead of the research and changes in governance systems and processes required to 
operationalise the approach, particularly for complex organisational structures with competing 
interests like the European Union (EU) (Cury et al., 2004, Jennings, 2005).  
 
A key element of the EAF is the understanding of the links between ecosystem functions and 
fisheries.  The EAF requires research which focuses on understanding how management 
initiatives affect fishing on target species, on other species in mixed fisheries (such as those in 
the EU), and on food webs and habitats.  The EAF seeks to develop pressure-state-response 
models that link ecosystem-state indicators with pressure-state indicators from fishing effort, 
and design management actions to alter fishing pressure to achieve the desired values of 
ecosystem indicators and hence the desired status of vulnerable species, vulnerable habitats 
and overall health of the fish, plankton, bird and other communities.  Fundamental for this 
research is predicting the effects of different management actions on fishing effort, before the 
ecosystem impacts can be assessed.  Model types such as the RUM developed in this thesis 
could play a key role.  There is growing interest in the use of spatially explicit policies for 
implementing the EAF, such as marine reserves and area-based property rights, as 
contemporary fisheries research emphasises patchiness and spatial heterogeneity of the 
marine ecosystem (Christie, 1992, United Nations, 2002, IUCN, 2003, Hannesson, 2004, CBD, 
2006, Roberts et al., 2006, Wood et al., 2008).  RUMs developed so far have been used to 
model the redistribution of fishing effort in response to marine protected areas (Hutton et al., 
2004).  However, improved RUMs could also be used to model the effects of other regulations 
such as reducing capacity, fishing gear restrictions (such as mesh size) and reduced quotas for 
target species.  It is important to make sure RUMs reflect the reality of fishing decision making 
as much as possible if they are to be effectively used for policy purposes.  Incorporating 
variables based on talking to fishers and validating models through interview-based 
approaches (techniques used for this thesis) is of critical importance (De Young et al., 2008). 
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While the EAF is widely considered to be the appropriate direction for fisheries management, 
especially to account for fishery-ecosystem interactions, it is argued by some fisheries 
economists that by itself, the EAF is not sufficient to address inappropriate incentives 
influencing fishers and the ineffective governance that frequently exists in commercial, 
developed fisheries (Hilborn et al., 2004, Grafton et al., 2006).  Part of the problem has been in 
the definition of the EAF.  Some definitions are focused on natural science ecosystem 
components, while others interpret the EAF more holistically, and emphasise a broader 
integrated and interdisciplinary social and economic approach.  In response to an international 
call for assistance to define the ecosystem approach for fisheries, the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)  published guidelines in 2003 and defined the EAF as: 
“an ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF) strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by 
taking account of the knowledge and uncertainties of biotic, abiotic and human components of 
ecosystems and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries within 
ecologically meaningful boundaries” (FAO, 2003).  This definition suggests that the EAF should 
consider the human-ecosystem interactions within the context of wider social objectives that 
operate regionally.  However, it neglects to state that the boundaries need to be socially, 
economically and politically meaningful as well as ecologically meaningful. 
 
Understanding the links between the marine ecosystem function and fisheries appears to be 
possible using modelling-type approaches which incorporate a sound understanding of fisher 
behaviour.  However, a big challenge of the EAF facing policy makers lies in its implementation.  
Implementing the EAF is a human pursuit.  On one hand, the social, economic and institutional 
dimensions of fisheries can be drivers, constraints, and/or supports for EAF implementation.  
On the other hand, there can also be social, economic and institutional impacts of EAF 
implementation (De Young et al., 2008). Thus, it is also essential to understand the incentives 
and disincentives that drive human behaviour within the context of societal and community 
objectives, in order for fisheries management to induce desired outcomes which are 
compatible with societal objectives.  Specifically, knowledge of institutional arrangements 
including governance structures that are required, what the economic drivers of fishing activity 
and the social and cultural values, norms and forces associated with fishing are, how incentives 
and penalties induce appropriate reactions, and the external influences such as global markets, 
natural and economic ‘shocks’ and political changes, and how these impact on fisheries 
management and are compatible with fishing communities objectives, are required for 
implementing a successful EAF.  The work undertaken in this thesis on the fuel price ‘shock’ 
and subsequent analysis of the fish market highlighted the need for these types of contextual 
knowledge to be incorporated into fisheries management decision making.  Although effective 
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management is necessary for healthy fishing communities to exist, the reverse is also true – 
socially cohesive, strong, well-functioning communities are an essential contribution to the 
preservation of healthy fisheries (Jentoft, 2000).  Reduced fleet profitability triggered by 
increased fishing costs or barriers to improving fish prices can put fishers out of business and 
jeopardise the underlying infrastructure of the fishery.  It can change the incentives of fishers, 
changing the way they fish, reduce compliance or induce shifts away from desirable 
sustainable practices, and result in the degradation of fishing communities so they become a 
drain on society rather than a contributor.   In this worst case scenario, using an EAF to mend 
the fisheries management inadequacies of the past may be too late. 
 
Therefore, EAF management requires a two-tier approach to achieve its aim of an integrated 
and holistic system of management and it needs to be practically applied to EU fisheries 
urgently.  First, target fish species and fishing activity within the context of the ecosystem 
requires appropriately designed management actions.  Second, the fishery needs to be 
examined within the larger context of households, fishing communities and the social and 
economic environment (De Young et al., 2008).  Both of these aspects require an 
understanding of incentives, for which understanding the drivers of fisher behaviour is 
fundamental.  The FAO notes that “incentives work indirectly through affecting those factors 
that lead to particular individual or collective choices…” (FAO, 2005). Although incentives are 
complex and multi-faceted, incorporating the human dimension of fisheries will reduce the 
uncertainty and improve the efficacy of EAF design and implementation for EU fisheries.  
 
4. Future directions for research 
The role of prices in fisheries development is not well understood.  Constraints on market 
prices, under-pricing and failure to incorporate externalities into the true market cost can lead 
to overuse of ecosystem services and potentially a waste of these services (De Young et al., 
2008). Fishery input prices (e.g. fuel), directly impact on fishers’ production activities.  This 
thesis revealed that the institutional set-up of the market and rising input prices created 
barriers for fisheries profitability.  Prices also impact resource management.  If, for example, 
certain species yield very high prices, management action aimed at reducing effort in this 
fishery will prove difficult, as the incentive to cheat becomes correspondingly high.  Or, if 
profitability is compromised, fishers’ openness to sustainable fisheries practices is reduced.  
Although this thesis uncovered that prices and profits are not the only motivating factor 
driving individual decisions, they underpin much of the behaviour observed and are important 
enough to seek further understanding of them and their inclusion when designing an EAF 
management plan. EAF management actions and policy design have direct impacts on markets 
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and trade.  Markets and trade also impact on the ability to manage fisheries to achieve 
objectives.  Therefore, this is an area of fisheries research identified in this thesis that requires 
much more attention. 
 
The ideas presented and discussed in this thesis are becoming increasingly relevant in a truly 
holistic fisheries management context where understanding the complexities of incentives are 
so important. Momentum is building for implementing new approaches to fisheries 
management and there is clear recognition that a better understanding and incorporation of 
the “people side" of marine resource use is crucial.  
 
 
“The purpose of a fishery is human use of a source of food.  Fishing is carried out by 
human beings for human purposes.  Any successful evaluation of the aims and 
methods of fishery regulations must necessarily involve consideration from the side of 
the so called social-sciences as well as the natural ones.” (Gordon, 1953, p. 442)  
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